1. Introduction

In the autumn of the year 2007, Renaat Declerck sent a message to Bernd Kortmann and Elizabeth Closs Traugott, the editors of Mouton de Gruyter’s book series *Topics in English Linguistics*, informing them of chronic health problems which prevented him from continuing his multi-volume work *The Grammar of the English verb phrase*. When he wrote the message, Declerck had resigned himself to the realisation that he might never be able to conduct any serious research. Declerck’s linguistic work had always been driven by a more than well-developed sense of duty and the decision to put an end to it must therefore have been equally deliberated as liberating.

By the time Declerck drew a line at his active involvement in linguistic research, he had drawn many a fine line between linguistic categories. Throughout his career, Declerck was careful to tease apart phenomena which others might have confused. In this respect, he profiled himself more as a ‘splitter’ than as a ‘lumper.’ In the words of the biologist Simpson (1945: 23), “splitters see very small, highly differentiated units—their critics say that if they can tell two animals apart, they place them in different genera … and if they cannot tell them apart, they place them in different species. … Lumpers, on the other hand, see only large units—their critics say that if a carnivore is neither a dog nor a bear, they call it a cat.” As one typical example of Declerck’s approach, consider the typology of *when*-clauses (WCs) that he proposed in an entire monograph devoted to the subject (Declerck (1997)). He distinguishes no fewer than
When a Linguist Draws a Line

8 general types, which we list below together with one of the examples he provides:

(i) WCs used as direct questions, e.g. When did it happen?
(ii) WCs used as indirect questions, e.g. I asked him when it had happened.
(iii) WCs used as relative clauses modifying a temporal noun phrase, e.g. Those were the days when everybody had flowers in their
hair.
(iv) WCs as nonrestrictive relative clauses without an overt anteced-
ent, e.g. And it was hard to imagine a prettier teacher. Nothing
gave him greater pleasure than to watch his improvements in her
face, when she would genuinely sigh and toss her lovely head in
sweet agony. (LOB corpus)
(v) WCs as free relative noun clauses, e.g. These memories of when
I was in India are gradually fading.
(vi) WCs used as adverbial time clauses, e.g. John will leave when I
arrive.
(vii) Narrative WCs, e.g. I was sitting quietly in the kitchen when
suddenly a stranger entered the room.
(viii) Atemporal WCs, e.g. This is what usually happens in cases when
the divorced woman has no income of her own.

For some of these classes, Declerck makes a further distinction between
several subclasses, some of which themselves again fall into various dis-
tinguishable usage types, etc., so that his typology is in fact made up of
more than 80 types and subtypes at different levels of specificity.
Of course, such an approach is not without risk. Vandelanotte (this
volume) warns linguists not “to devise countless divisions and subtypes to
the point of creating a separate category for every individual usage
event.” But this is not what Declerck could be accused of. He seems to
have been well aware of the danger of needlessly proliferating categories.
When he made a distinction between categories, this was based on formal,
semantic or indeed pragmatic grounds that could not simply be related to
independently existing facts about the language system or its use or to
general aspects of our reasoning—or, if the existence of two or more dis-
tinct categories did follow from previously established linguistic or cogni-
tive principles, they were nonetheless always relevant in one way or an-
other to the full understanding of the higher-order category to which they
belonged.

Moreover, when Declerck proposed several ‘meanings’ for a linguistic
form, he made it clear that this was not necessarily meant in the technical
sense of the word and tried to indicate at which level in a semantics-prag-
matics hierarchy a particular ‘meaning’ is to be located. His discussion of
the present perfect (Declerck (2006)) will serve as an illustration. We do
not give example sentences now, for we are only concerned with showing
that Declerck did not treat the different kinds of present perfect as equally
semantic in nature and, accordingly, that he made a serious effort to be
precise about their grammatical status. In particular, he made a distinc-
tion between (i) the ‘core meaning’ encoded by this grammatical form
(namely, ‘situation time located in the pre-present zone’) and two semanti-
cally based interpretations that are compatible with it (‘situation time
holding before now’ and ‘situation time continuing up to now’); (ii) in the
middle of the hierarchy, three possible pragmatic interpretations with
respect to the temporal interpretation of the full (as opposed to the pred-
icated) situation: the ‘indefinite reading’ (i.e., the full situation ends some
time before now), the ‘up-to-now reading’ (i.e., the endpoint of the full
situation is adjacent to now) and the ‘continuative reading’ (i.e., the time
of the full situation includes now); (iii) even further down the hierarchy,
two more ‘functional readings’ of the up-to-now interpretation and a few
distinguishable ‘usage types’ that often arise with the indefinite perfect,
including the ‘resultative perfect,’ ‘hot news perfect’ and ‘perfect of expe-
rience.’ Such levels find a clear echo in Depraetere’s paper (this volume)
on how to give the various meanings/readings of modal auxiliaries a place
in an encompassing framework of modality.

There are also—rarer—examples of Declerck making generalisations
across categories. One such example concerns his doctoral work on
phrasal verbs. In his dissertation (Declerck (1976a)), he argues that a
causative structure similar to that underlying McCawley’s (1971) famous
semantic decomposition of the verb *kill* as ‘*DO CAUSE BECOME NOT ALIVE*’ “is a general pattern which underlies a great many constructions in English—constructions involving a verb and an adverbial particle, a prepositional phrase, an adjective, a noun phrase and an infinitive” (Declerck (1977: 298)). Thus, *walk in* can be paraphrased (albeit rather stiltedly) as ‘*do something, namely walking, which causes the situation of you being in to come about,*’ just like *paint the door green* allows the analysis ‘*do something with paint, which causes the situation of the door being green to come about*’ (cf. Declerck (1977: 331)). Obviously, such a causative-resultative paraphrase only works for literal phrasal verbs, not for the many idiomatic verb-particle combinations that learners of English have a hard time mastering. For example, *give up* is not equivalent to ‘*do something, namely giving, which causes the situation of you being up to come about.*’ Some linguists therefore argue that literal phrasal verbs as in *pull off the tablecloth* (*yank it from the table*) and idiomatic ones as in *pull off a stunning victory* (*succeed in accomplishing one*) “are not instances of the same phenomenon” (Fraser (1976: 3)), the former being loose, ‘syntactic’ sequences of a verb and a free adverb, the latter being tight, ‘lexical’ verb-particle units. Fraser adduces a number of arguments for a structural distinction between these two kinds of phrasal verbs, based on differences in syntactic properties. For instance, free adverbs can often be conjoined (e.g. *walk in and out; jump up and down; pull clothes on and off*), while true verb particles cannot (e.g. *freak in and out; *give up and down; “*pull the deal on and off*).

Declerck (1976b), however, skilfully refutes Fraser’s arguments for a syntax-based distinction and demonstrates that there is, in fact, “overwhelming evidence that the two types of phrasal verbs function syntactically alike” (Declerck (1976b: 8)). His counterarguments were later adopted and extended by Lindner (1981: 32), who concludes “that there is no line based on syntactic behavior which corresponds to an assumed line separating two discrete classes of literal and idiomatic combinations.” However, for the past thirty years, the phrasal verb debate has not abated, and many linguists have had a say about whether they are essentially words or word phrases and whether or not an answer to that question should depend on whether the combination is semantically transparent (literal) or not. In Cappelle, Shtyrov and Pulvermüller (in preparation), it is suggested on the basis of a neuro-physiological experiment that phrasal verbs trigger brain responses similar to those associated with words, not phrases, and that these responses occur with both directional and semantically more abstract particles. This appears to confirm Declerck’s and Lindner’s claim that *walk in* and *give up* should be seen “as instances of the same phenomenon differing only in terms of semantic characteristics” (Lindner (1981: 31)).

As Goldberg (2006: 45) writes, “Language contains both large generalizations and idiosyncratic facts, and therefore we unavoidably find those who favor lumping, and those who favor splitting.” The above example cases have demonstrated that Renaat Declerck was definitely not a lumper but that he was not exclusively a splitter either. While he may have developed an aptitude for perceiving minute differences between superficially similar phenomena in the course of his career, this does not mean that he ended up being a splitter rather than a lumper. Goldberg argues that the distinction between splitting and lumping may be artificial in certain approaches to language, such as Construction Grammar, which denies a sharp distinction between syntax (‘rules’) and lexicon (‘words’): “The constructionist approach to grammar offers a way out of the lumper/splitter dilemma: the approach allows both broad generalizations and more limited patterns to be analyzed and accounted for fully” (Goldberg (2006: 45)). Except for his earliest work, which was couched in Generative Semantics, Declerck’s output was never influenced by the fashion of the day. Accordingly, Declerck was not a construction grammarian. In a sense, he constituted a class of his own. Yet, it is clear that even when Declerck made fine-grained distinctions, he did not lose sight of higher generalisations. For instance, his treatment of the English tenses is not an unstructured enumeration of highly specific usages of
When a Linguist Draws a Line

2. Distinguishing between Distinctions

Whether one follows trends in linguistics closely or tries to steer clear of them, no linguistic analysis can be carried out without distinctions. It is by virtue of distinctions based on semantic, syntactic, morphological, etc. criteria that linguists can make use of a set of terms denoting conceptually differentiated grammatical classes and categories. Most of these categories have clear, widely agreed on definitions; using these categories is uncontroversial and the distinctions by which one such category is kept apart from another are not questioned—nor should they be.

Other distinctions, however, are not part of a general linguistic consensus. It goes without saying that these are the most interesting distinctions. Linguists may have different opinions on whether a particular distinction is necessary or superfluous. Consider, for example, parts of speech in English, where the distinction made between open classes and closed classes is probably unanimously agreed on among linguists, the former consisting of nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, the latter consisting of prepositions, pronouns, conjunctions and the like. Our use of “the like” suggests that grammars differ in the exact distinctions that are made. Some distinguish a class of ‘demonstratives’ (e.g. this and that), while others subsume the items of this class under either pronouns or determiners, depending on whether the demonstrative can be used as a noun phrase (NP) on its own (e.g. these look fantastic) or whether it precedes a noun (e.g. these cactuses look fantastic). The saddest fate of a closed-class item is to be relegated to grammar’s waste bin category, ‘particle.’ As one linguist writes, “If it’s small and you don’t know what to call it, call it a particle” (Hurford (1994: 153))—though ‘adverb’ is another cover term for a wide variety of grammatically disparate items (cf. Buyschaert (this volume)). Sometimes, linguists do not even bother giving a specific name to elements in what is perceived as the margin of grammar: in 2000 an international conference was held in Brussels under the title “Discourse particles, modal particles, focus particles, and all that stuff.”

Linguists may not have the same motivation for making a distinction. Put differently, a distinction is sometimes made if it helps us to make sense of data. Let us take verbs as an example. In traditional grammar, the class of verbs is divided into transitive and intransitive verbs: the former take two arguments, namely a subject and an object, while the latter take just a subject argument. Since Perlmutter (1978), especially in generative grammar, intransitive verbs are further subdivided into unaccusative verbs, whose sole argument is an internal one (i.e. an object at a deeper level of syntax), and unergative verbs, whose sole argument is an external one (i.e. a subject even at such a deeper level of syntax). This distinction enables us to explain many grammatical phenomena and in this sense is motivated. In resultative constructions, for example, unaccusative verbs can appear without a postverbal NP, as in (1a), but unergative verbs cannot, as shown in (1b):

(1) a. The river froze solid.
   b. He ate *(himself) sick.

Together with the direct-object constraint, namely that it is the referent of a direct object at a deeper level of syntax which must undergo a change into the resultant state represented by an adjective phrase or prepositional phrase (cf. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995)), the distinction between the two intransitive verbs explains the grammaticality difference in question: Since the subject the river is a direct object at a deeper level of syntax, the resultative sentence with an unaccusative verb in (1a) observes the direct-object constraint, and is therefore grammatical; by contrast, since the subject he is a subject both at a deeper and at the surface level of syntax, the resultative sentence with an unergative verb in (1b) is un-
grammatical in that it violates the constraint.2

Making clear-cut distinctions in grammar is sometimes difficult, even if there is a good reason to make a distinction. Let us consider again the parts of speech. No one will deny that it is necessary to distinguish between nouns and verbs, as such a linguistic distinction cannot only be defended on grammatical grounds but arguably also corresponds to the basic, pre-linguistic distinction between physical objects and processes. What is problematic to a simple noun-verb distinction, though, is the existence of gerunds, which are said to have characteristics of both nouns and verbs. In the sentence She enjoys singing, the gerund singing resembles a noun in that it functions as the object of the verb enjoys, while it is also considered to be a verb in that it can itself take an object (e.g. She enjoys singing jazz standards). Members belonging to the category labelled ‘gerund’ are not uniform. For example, gerunds can further be divided into nominal and verbal gerunds, as exemplified in (2a) and (2b), respectively, both of which are taken from Declerck (1991a); see also Dekeyser (this volume):

(2) a. For several days the convoy continued its steady traversing of the desert.
b. One can spoil one’s business relations by constantly cancelling

The unaccusative/unergative distinction has even been applied to the non-verbal part of phrasal verbs (Svenonius (2003)), although verb particles obviously are not verbs themselves, let alone intransitive ones. However, particles have sometimes been considered as ‘intransitive prepositions,’ since they do not take an NP complement as (other) prepositions do. Thus, He jumped across could be said to contain an intransitive preposition while He jumped across the river contains a transitive preposition (cf. Cappelle (2005) for discussion). This captures a generalisation, since both across and across the river are resultative complements, as Declerck (1976a, b) had already pointed out (cf. Section 1). Moreover, He jumped across (the river) essentially means ‘He crossed the river with a jump,’ which proves that the particle (or preposition) has a verbal function (Declerck (1976b: 307)). Therefore, applying ‘verbal’ terminology to particles is not outrageous. It also illustrates how splitting (in this case, further subdividing intransitive verbs) can go hand in hand with lumping (in this case, making the subdivision in another ‘intransitive’ category than just verbs).

These observations suggest that the distinction between grammatical categories can be fuzzy or gradual. Since Rosch (1978), prototype categorisation has been gaining ground in analyses of grammatical phenomena (cf. Taylor (1989), Aarts et al. (2004), and Aarts (2007)). In such an approach, members having more attributes of a category are more typical examples of that category than members with fewer attributes, but these latter members still belong to the same category, though they are more peripheral ones. What is noteworthy is that less prototypical members of a category can have some attributes of another category, leading to indeterminacy as to which category they should actually be considered to be members of. One category can imperceptibly glide into another by sharing peripheral members. Thus, a prototype or gradience approach can accommodate the above-mentioned grammatical phenomena concerning gerunds.

Which distinctions to make, how fine to make them and on which basis to make them may depend crucially on one’s grammatical theory of choice. Consider, for example, a few of the possible analyses of the sentence The most obvious differences between British English and American English concern the choice of lexical items. In traditional grammar, linguists would decompose this simple transitive sentence into ‘S(subject)-V(erb)-O(object),’ where ‘S’ and ‘O’ are functional notions linked primarily to the structural position of a constituent in a sentence. The same sentence can also be represented as ‘N(oun)P(hrase)-V(erb)P(hrase),’ using
phrasal categories defined in terms of the part of speech of their heads, as is done in generative grammar. Yet other approaches focus on ‘thematic roles’ or ‘cases’ which are associated with clause constituents, such as ‘agent,’ ‘theme/patient,’ ‘experiencer,’ ‘recipient,’ ‘instrument,’ ‘goal,’ etc. An analysis using such terms is rather hard to make in the case of our example sentence, and we will not attempt it here. The point we hope to have illustrated is that different linguistic theories can make use (to different extents) of different sets of categories which are defined on rather different grounds (e.g. grammatical position, syntactic form, or semantic role).

As an illustration of how, depending on the linguistic theory adopted, related grammatical phenomena may also be distinguished at different linguistic domains (syntax, semantics, pragmatics), let us first consider the following pair of sentences and their analyses in generative grammar and cognitive linguistics:

(4) a. It is easy to grow cactuses.
   b. Cactuses are easy to grow.

In earlier generative grammar, these two sentences were regarded as semantically equivalent and only distinct at a superficial formal level. That is, they were not distinguished as different at a deeper level of syntax where much of a sentence’s meaning was encoded. As is well known, in (4a), the non-finite clause to grow cactuses was seen as having undergone a movement rule which ‘extraposed’ it to the end of the sentence, while in (4b) the NP cactuses was said to have been ‘raised’ from the object position it occupied in that subordinate non-finite clause to the subject position in the main clause. As Chomsky (1965: 162) wrote with respect to such sentences: “The deep structures of the paired sentences are identical in all respects relevant to semantic interpretation (…), so that the transformational analysis accounts for the (cognitive) synonymy.” On the other hand, cognitive linguistics regards the two sentences as semantically distinct: (4a) and (4b) exemplify two separate constructions each of which forces a specific conceptualisation or ‘construal’ on what is, in this case, one and the same situation (cf. Langacker (1995))—much like John bought the car from Mary and Mary sold the car to John represent a single situation from different perspectives. In this case, the semantic difference between (4a) and (4b) is explained by the assumption that the entire process of growing cactuses is given focal attention in (4a), while it is the relevant undergoing participant in that process (cactuses) which is foregrounded in (4b). The difference between the two approaches is nicely formulated by Lee (2002: 80): “whereas the generative analysis involves movement, the cognitive analysis involves the imposition of a particular ‘imaging’ on the various components of meaning in the form of differences of focal prominence, associated with the different constructions. While this operation is conceived of as a purely syntactic operation in the generative approach, in the cognitive framework it is primarily a semantic distinction with syntactic consequences.” Put differently, in generative grammar, sentences (4a) and (4b) are not distinguished at a semantic level, but distinguished at the level of surface syntax; in cognitive linguistics, they are distinguished in both meaning and form.

Next, as regards two (more or less) distinct concepts conveyed by a single form, it is notoriously hard to decide whether two senses or usages associated with a word or construction should be considered as ‘fundamentally’ distinct, i.e., whether they pertain to semantically completely separate concepts, whether they are distinct but semantically related, or whether their difference is to be treated as ‘only’ a matter of pragmatic shifts. These choices relate to the subtle distinction between homonymy, polysemy and vagueness (cf. Tuggy (1993)), which leads lexicographers to treat words with multiple meanings either in separate dictionary lemmata, as a single lemma with different numbered meanings or as multiple, closely-related senses mentioned in the same numbered meaning.

Let us consider the term distinction as a purely lexical example. Two rather different meanings that are listed, among some other meanings, in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED; Simpson (2000)) are (i) “The action of distinguishing or discriminating; the perceiving, noting, or making a difference between things; discrimination” and (ii) “The condition or fact of being distinguished or of distinguishing oneself; excellence or eminence that distinguishes from others; honourable preeminence; elevation...
of character, rank, or quality; a distinguishing excellence.” The dictionary does well not to treat these meanings as belonging to separate lexical entries, as there is a clear link between the two. Interestingly, now, the OED adds to the former meaning, not using a different number, “the result of this action (…)”. This seems to be a metonymical extension which arises naturally in language use—comparable to using the word construction for either the process of building something (as in still under construction) or its product (as in a magnificent late gothic construction)—and it might therefore righteously be treated as being part of the same (sub)meaning of distinction. However, there is evidence that this seemingly natural extension should not be taken for granted: in the closely related language Dutch, the basic ‘action’ sense of (i) is conveyed by the word onderscheiding while the extended ‘result’ sense is ideally expressed by a different (but formally related) word, namely onderscheid—similar, in fact, to the contrast between the noun construction and the noun construct. Dutch, one might then say, makes a formal distinction between two very closely related senses of the English distinction. (In practice, though, the word onderscheiding also appears to be used in the metonymically extended sense of (i).) A perhaps even subtler semantic distinction is revealed in two different ways linguists use distinction when they deal with grammatical phenomena: We need to make a distinction between a and b and A clear distinction between a and b is…. Or, to use two authentic examples from this very volume:

(5) a. These pieces of evidence seem to support the distinction of two subclasses, i.e. theme dislocated WH-clefts and focus dislocated WH-clefts. (Seki, this volume)
b. A third distinction between EQs and reported speech is obvious perhaps, but important nonetheless (…) (Vandelanotte, this volume)

The sense of distinction in (5a) is that corresponding to the meaning of Dutch onderscheid mentioned above, i.e. the result of being perceived and treated as different. In (5b), the same term is used in a sense which could be seen as a different metonymic extension of the basic (sub)meaning in (i), namely, ‘reason to make a distinction,’ in other words, ‘difference.’ The OED does not even use a semicolon to separate these senses: “the result of this action, a difference thus made or appreciated.” In Dutch, it would be possible to use onderscheid again here, which proves that the senses are indeed closely related, not just in English. Many people might never even have been aware of the fact that distinction is used in slightly different ways in (5a) and (5b). But note, however, that Japanese reserves different words for these concepts: distinction in (5a) is conveyed by kubetsu(suru koto) while in (5b), the word chigai/souten is used. Following Croft’s (1999) reasoning, this must be taken as evidence that the sense of distinction in (5a) and its sense in (5b) cannot simply be linked by a pragmatic, language-independent rule, in other words, that we need to postulate more than “a universal cognitive construal operation whose application is completely predictable” (Croft 1999: 158).

Linguists encounter the same difficulty in making careful decisions when describing the various closely related meanings of grammatical items (function words) or constructions. Again, the dilemma is between splitting and lumping: between (a) judging two uses as sufficiently distinct so as to warrant describing them at a semantic level and (b) perceiving them as close enough to treat them as the product of a pragmatic operation. In biology, two sexually reproducing organisms are treated as belonging to the same species if they show the ability to interbreed and produce fertile male and female offspring. Unfortunately, such a straightforward solution is not readily available for grammatical phenomena. Yet, a kind of grammatical breeding test sometimes presents itself. Let us give one example from this book: the case of modal auxiliaries. It is well known that can, may, should, ought to, must, etc. each have a variety of meanings and uses. A basic distinction is between root and epistemic meaning, the former having to do with notions such as ability, permission, obligation, etc., the latter with the degree of likelihood that a statement is true. It can now be tested whether these two meanings are independently stored meanings or whether they are just a matter of interpretations based on pragmatic inferences. This test involves coordination with complement sharing—indeed a close analogue of animal mating:
The sentence is ambiguous between ‘John has the permission to leave and so has Mary’ and ‘John is likely to leave and so is Mary.’ Note that for both readings, the meaning which may has in the clause with John as a subject has to remain identical to the meaning it has in the coordinated clause with Mary as a subject. In other words, the root and the epistemic meaning cannot be combined in this sentence pattern and they can therefore not be seen as merely pragmatic manifestations of a single semantic concept (possibility). They are therefore distinct semantic ‘species.’ The same test can be used to find out whether submeanings of root modality (e.g. ability and permission in the case of can) are similarly distinct or whether their boundaries are more fuzzy.

3. This Volume: Scope and Overview

This book consists of fifteen original papers, whose authors are in sympathy with Declerck’s approach. That is, distinctions are made by the contributors on an as-needed basis to account for observations, rather than being ‘forced’ on the data to serve some theoretical agenda. Some of the papers in this volume provide new insights into English grammar by introducing, discussing, redrawing or abandoning boundaries between grammatical classes. Some others also draw the attention to more fundamental, meta-theoretical distinctions, such as those between traditional Western and graded categorisation, between interpreting on the basis of invariant semantic schemata and interpreting from a context-dependent perspective, and between the presence and the absence of an evolutionary dimension in language description.

Each paper tries to (re-)analyse grammatical phenomena belonging to grammatical areas that Declerck has been deeply concerned with. However, given the range of topics that Declerck has covered, it was not feasible to produce a book whose scope in any way reflected all of his research interests. We have nonetheless tried to give a hint of the breadth of Declerck’s legacy by our division of the book into two general thematic parts. Part 1 discusses “Distinctions in the Grammar of the Verb Phrase in English,” in an attempt to acknowledge Declerck’s achievements in this domain. The title of this part provides a clear reference to his publication project The Grammar of the English Verb Phrase, which was meant to be his magnum opus, containing four volumes but which, unfortunately, had to be prematurely aborted. Part 2 goes beyond the verb phrase and deals with “Distinctions in the Grammar of the Sentence and Utterance in English,” thereby again trying to do some justice to the significance of Declerck’s work in this large area of English grammar. Indeed, most of the papers in the second part, too, deal with topics on which Declerck has shed light during his academic career.

For coherence reasons, we have further subdivided the two parts of this book into a number of thematic clusters. Within part 1, the first section is appropriately devoted to tense in English, since this is the area of English grammar treated in the first published tome of Declerck’s above-mentioned large-scale analysis of the verb phrase and arguably also the area which Declerck has most definitively put his stamp on. The second thematic section deals with modality, which was to be the topic of the second planned book in Declerck’s multi-volume grammar. The third section brings together papers on -ing form constructions and nominalisations of verbs and verb phrases. Part 2 falls into a cluster of four papers on word order and information structure and, finally, two papers dealing with reasoning and dialogic interaction.

In the following two sections, which follow the structure of the book, we provide a brief overview of the contributions. It will become clear that our two-way division into phrase-level and sentence- or utterance-level phenomena is inevitably artificial and therefore definitely not meant to be as sharp as it may seem. For example, adverbials, treated in the first paper of Part 2, are not restricted to sentence level but can be phrasal level, so the last article of Part 1 is in that respect connected to the first article of Part 2. Moreover, the last paper of Part 2 is connected to the first part, since both consider discourse factors as crucial. In short, the distinction is gradual and the articles are in a sense linked to form a circle.
3.1. Distinctions in the Grammar of the Verb Phrase in English

Within the thematic cluster on tense in English, Kazuhiro Tanaka’s paper “On the Non-Perfect Tense in the Temporal Since-Construction in Discourse” considers the distinction between the uses of the ill-described non-perfect (present) tense and the more generally acknowledged perfect tense in the main clause of this construction (e.g. …ever since then, I (don’t want / haven’t wanted) sex very much). Tanaka looks at tense selection from a discourse point of view, an angle which Declerck also thought fruitful and important, as witness for example the very title of Declerck (1991b), *Tense in English: Its Structure and Use in Discourse*. Tanaka concludes that the speaker chooses the tense which does not disrupt discourse progress and coherence.

Naoaki Wada’s contribution “On the Distinction of English Past Tenses” examines the ten arguments for Declerck’s distinction between absolute and relative past tenses (compare, e.g., was in *Mary was sick* and *John said that Mary was sick*). Wada claims that Declerck’s key arguments can also support his own polysemous approach to the English past tense based on his theory. He argues that all English past tenses, including Declerck’s absolute, relative and ‘pseudo-absolute’ ones (the latter illustrated in *John will say next week that Mary was ill*), share the same schematic semantic structure—they all meet the ‘necessity condition,’ which is that the event time is located somewhere in the past ‘time-sphere,’ a stretch of time grammatically represented as anterior to the deictic centre (i.e. the time of orientation)—but that they range from prototypical to more peripheral members depending on how many of three attributes stated in a ‘typicality condition’ they satisfy, one of which for instance being that the deictic centre is the present time of speech.

The thematic section on modals in Part 1 consists of three articles. Ilse Depraetere’s paper “Some Observations on the Meaning of Models” is a programmatic text concerned with the foundations for a full-scale treatment of the semantics of modal verbs. Depraetere distinguishes three layers of modal meaning which should be considered: first, each modal has a lexically encoded core meaning which remains quite abstract (e.g. *can* expressing ‘possibility’); second, each modal also comes with a number of more specific, context-dependent meanings (including, for *can*, such semantic subclasses as ability, opportunity, permission, etc.); third, the way these meanings play out and are further modulated in context (as in, e.g. *You can forget about a desert if you go on like this!* is determined by various pragmatic factors, whose weight and impact differs from modal to modal.

Next, Bert Cappelle and Gert De Sutter take a close look at “Should vs. Ought to,” with the aim of finding out which factors, if any, play a role in the choice of these near-synonymous modal auxiliaries. Scrutiny of corpus data reveals that *should* and *ought to* can be distinguished in their use on the basis of eight factors, out of a great many more candidate factors, which exert a significant influence, including whether or not there is inversion (cp. *should you … vs. ought you to …*), whether or not a contracted perfect infinitive follows (cp. *you should’ve come vs. you ought to’ve come*), etc. Cappelle and De Sutter adopt a multivariate method which allows them to rank these significant factors and to separate unique factors (e.g. inversion) from correlating but superfluous ones (e.g. interrogative sentence). They also critically review the common claim, endorsed by Declerck (1991a), that *should* is less objective than *ought to*.

Johan van der Auwera and Astrid De Wit’s “The English Comparative Modals—A Pilot Study” explores grammatical distinctions between and within two families of ‘comparative modals,’ namely the *better* and the *rather* modals ({{*had’d*}/0} *better*; {would’d} *rather*). A between-family distinction is that the *better* modals typically express advice or occasionally hope while the *rather* modals express a preference of the subject. Within-family distinctions for the *better* modals, for instance, include the observation that the ‘advisee’ is typically a third person for *had better* but the hearer for ‘d better and ‘bare’ *better*. Van der Auwera and De Wit’s corpus evidence of spoken and written British and American English suggests, moreover, that these two varieties of English also display some noticeable differences with respect to how the comparative modals are used. For example, the association of bare *better* with a second person advisee is stronger in British English than in American English, where the advice expressed by bare *better* can more easily in-
clude the speaker. Such findings add to the growing awareness that British and American English have different grammars, not just different vocabularies and pronunciations.

The third thematic subsection of Part 1, concerning -ing forms and nominalisations, contains four papers. Bas Aarts, Joanne Close and Sean Wallis’s paper “Recent Changes in the Use of the Progressive Construction in English” rejects the traditional Saussurean distinction between synchronic and diachronic linguistics (i.e. between studying a single ‘time slice’ of language and studying changes in a language over (usually large) periods of time). Synchrony and diachrony are both represented in familiar outlines of the history of English in terms of great shifts between assumedly stable phases—Old English, Middle English, Early Modern English and Modern English. However, this well-established dichotomy does not do justice to the reality that language can be observed to be constantly undergoing transitions, even if the time scale is kept as small as a few decades. Aarts et al. illustrate this by documenting the recent increase in the use of the progressive, including its growing appearance with stative verbs, as in McDonald’s slogan ‘I’m lovin’ it!’ Methodologically, Aarts et al. warn us that we should make a distinction between changed frequency relative to sheer corpus size and changed frequency relative to opportunity of use, which is a more labour-intensive but also more revealing measure.

Raphael Salkie’s paper “On Going” investigates the intriguing question why you can go drinking (as well as go for a drink and have a drink) while you can’t ??go eating (nor *go for an eat or *have an eat). Salkie argues that the fundamental distinction between drinking (in the sense of drinking alcohol) and eating is that the former focuses on the experience of the subject, making this verb suitable in constructions in which the subject’s state rather than the action is given focal prominence, whilst the latter is too much concerned with the effectiveness of an action to be allowed in such constructions. In his paper, Salkie also considers to what extent this ‘expeditionary go’ construction can be distinguished from various related go constructions (such as those instantiated by The tumbleweed went bouncing past, She went vomiting out of the house, Don’t go break-

ing my heart, etc.). It appears that these various constructions cannot always be neatly separated in that they select different but partially overlapping subsets from a list of recurring properties.

Xavier Dekeyser’s contribution deals with “The Category of the Gerund in a Diachronic Perspective.” As we have seen in Section 2, the gerund has been known to bridge the distinction between nouns and verbs and comes itself in more nominal and more verbal variants. Dekeyser fine-tunes the terminology and represents gerundive constructions on a scale ranging from nominal gerunds via what he calls ‘verbal(ised) gerunds’ to his newly-introduced category of ‘semi-gerunds’ (e.g. We heard Renaat cracking jokes), which occupy a middle position between gerunds and present participles. Dekeyser further sketches the evolution of gerunds as items that are in origin verbs turned into nouns which then have increasingly acquired (again) verb-like properties through time.

Finally, in her paper “Nominalisation Research—A Bird’s Eye View,” Liesbet Heyvaert surveys previous analyses of nominalisations (not just gerunds but also deverbal nouns in -er, -ee, -ion, etc.) and then presents a cognitive-functional approach to address some of the major extant shortcomings. Heyvaert argues that there are important parallels between nominalisations and clauses, though she shuns an approach which collapses these categories. In particular, if further progress is to be made in our understanding of nominalisations, then their description should integrate typically clause-related categories, such as tense, modality, finiteness and subjecthood. Heyvaert’s paper thereby forms a nice transition to the second part of the book.

3.2. Distinctions in the Grammar of the Sentence and Utterance in English

As mentioned before, the first cluster of papers in the second part of the book deals with word order phenomena and information structure. Joost Buysschaert’s contribution “Adverbial Distinctions that Matter and Others that Don’t” discusses some of the distinctions that have been made in the heterogeneous class of adverbials, with special attention to singling out which of the many possible distinctions are useful in accounting for
Shigeki Seki explores the under- or even undescribed phenomena of “Left Dislocation and Multiple Focusing in Clefts.” In the three subtypes of it-clefts mentioned just above, the focused constituent can be left-dislocated and then linked with an accented anaphoric element in the actual it-cleft (e.g. Suggestible—it is in that word that the mystery of Mr. Cast consists! from an Agatha Christy novel quoted in Seki’s paper). Left dislocation also occurs in WH-clefts, where a distinction can be made between the (rare) subtype of theme dislocation (e.g. We all talk, but what we need, that’s the people who get something going (www)) and the subtype of focus dislocation (e.g. A dirty hound, THAT’S what you are (www)), each with distinct properties, as is clear from e.g. the different accenting of the anaphoric element. Seki also draws our attention to the existence of multiple focus in it- and WH-clefts, as well as in other specification structures, involving an anaphoric element (that, this or a pronoun) and a focused constituent presented in a kind of afterthought (e.g. I still haven’t got the balls to chat openly in Swedish yet, I think it’s my English Sensibility that holds me back—that and the fact that I’m a chicken shit. (www)). This special pattern merits further study.

When a Linguist Draws a Line

Anne Jugnet’s “Extraposed When-Clauses: Free Relative Clauses or Noun Clauses?” re-examines cases such as The students found it hilarious when Renaat told them jokes. Declerck (1997) analyses such a sentence as containing a free relative clause (cf. (v) in Section 1 above) which resembles extraposed noun clauses (e.g. extraposed that-clauses). Jugnet adduces numerous syntactic and semantic arguments to argue that such when-clauses actually are extraposed sentential complements. For instance, the element it is a non-referential sentential placeholder—it cannot be replaced by this or that—and the when-clause is definitely not a time adverbial but fulfils the function of a true object argument, describing the situation which the subject referent experiences and evaluates. Jugnet adopts Declerck’s notion of ‘sloppy simultaneity’ to describe the temporal relation between the time of the matrix clause (the experiencing situation) and the time of the embedded clause (the experienced situation). This relation of (near-)simultaneity accounts for the specificity of when-clauses, setting them apart from other kinds of extraposed noun clauses.
The volume is closed by two papers on pragmatic issues, one on perspective reasoning and another on a special type of utterances in verbal interaction. Theo Janssen and Frederike van der Leek’s contribution titled “The Let Alone Puzzle: A Question of Orientation” tackles a problem which has troubled some leading construction grammarians, namely that almost cannot substitute for barely in a sentence such as He barely wanted to travel as far as the Mediterranean, let alone Japan. Janssen and Van der Leek show that the solution to this problem lies partly in the realisation that the meaning of almost, unlike barely, is not ‘limiting,’ as has been presumed before, but ‘approximative’ in relation to a high rather than a low value on a scale (compare, e.g., He scored {almost / *barely} 100% of the votes). Let alone can very sporadically also be used in positive contexts (e.g. The rings that the Dwarf-sires possessed of old are almost certainly worth more than $5,000,000 a piece, let alone $5,000 (www)). The authors account for this by stripping the let alone construction of its assumed invariant semantic schema (roughly, ‘something negative can be said about scalar value A, so a fortiori something negative can be said about scalar value B’). In line with Declerck’s (1994) solution to the ‘only/already puzzle,’ they instead allow the interpretative work to be based on purely ‘non-representational’ concepts underlying scalar reasoning. This involves some crucial scalar distinctions, such as the opposition between contexts that are ‘scale preserving’ (which allow inferences from high to low values in a scalar model) and contexts that are ‘scale reversing’ (where the opposite is the case).

Finally, Lieven Vandelanotte’s paper “Is the Echo Question a Type of Reported Speech?” discusses questions which are typically used to check whether one has correctly heard what the interlocutor said (e.g. I’m out of here.—You’re out of here?). Such questions have been analysed as a kind of reported speech (Did you say you’re out of here?), but Vandelanotte argues against such proposals, in particular against the reduction of echo questions to what he has called elsewhere ‘distancing indirect speech’ (i.e. a type of indirect speech where the current speaker, often ironically, appropriates or echoes another speaker’s thoughts or utterances). Despite some commonalities—specifically, the property of ‘discourse distancing’—echo questions and distancing indirect speech can be distinguished on several grounds. In essence, echo questions are prompted by something in the immediate speech situation (not even necessarily a previous utterance) while reported speech, whether of the distancing type or not, always creates a difference between a present and a represented speech situation.

With this last paper, which in passing touches on ‘narrator-oriented’ distancing indirect speech versus ‘character-oriented’ free indirect speech, some of Declerck’s earliest research interests are even reflected: before his career veered off into linguistics, he was briefly occupied in the study of narrative perspective in fiction. As editors, we hope indeed that the issues covered in this volume represent and elaborate at least some, if by far not all, of the sharp views and broad interests of Renaat Declerck, to whom this volume is dedicated. The papers on distinctions in English grammar collected here are offered to Renaat as special distinctions, in the sense of tokens of honour in recognition of the very high achievements by which he has distinguished himself in his career as grammarian.

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