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Foreword

The editors are grateful to Professor Dr Paul Ponsaers who really stimulated this project and encouraged us to bring it to full fruition. We would also like to thank the authors for their contributions and patience with the ensuing editorial process and the anonymous reviewers for their excellent comments. Without the necessary facilitation and extra time granted by the publisher, this volume would have perished as a pile of papers gathering dust on our office shelves. Many, many thanks to all who have supported us: they have acted as indispensable midwives who witnessed the birth of this androgynous baby: a book on the fuzzy boundaries between police and military.

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1. Introductory notes:

*Exploring blurring boundaries between the military and the police.*

Easton, M., Den Boer, M., Janssens, J., Moelker, R. & Vander Beken, T.

In our contemporary, late modern society, several authors have pointed out the blurring boundaries between different actors within the control and security domain that includes such organisations as the administrative authorities, special inspection services, municipalities, the police, intelligence services, the army, private security services and non-governmental organisations (see for example Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Bigo, 2005; Loader, 2002; Lutterbeck, 2005). The blurring military and police roles are just one piece of ‘the play’ in this ‘theatre’ called security. The increased importance of military-style police forces and the use of military-style technology and equipment, the deployment of police officers in peace and related stability operations and the military involvement in domestic issues (controlling the border in the USA, for example, or maintaining law and order in Canada and Italy) are just a few forms which such blurred boundaries can assume.

These ‘blurred boundaries’ are based on the assumption that some institutions adopt a larger amount of tasks, while the range of duties and tasks of others are shrinking. As a result, several tasks and activities are overlapping traditional boundaries and objectives. Simultaneously, agencies increase or decrease in importance. The blurring of boundaries can therefore be interpreted in two ways, as either complementary or competitive. The aim of this book is simply to further explore the blurring boundaries between the military and the police from different perspectives without having the pretention of being exhaustive in any way.

The idea for this book emerged from the working group on ‘blurring military and police roles’, active since 2008, within the European Research Group on Military and Society. The complex relationship between the military and the police, and the observation that

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1 [www.ergomas.ch](http://www.ergomas.ch)
police researchers were and are quite often insulated from military researchers, were at
the heart of this initiative. As in any discipline, these researchers have their own
conferences and journals and most but not all of them remain safe and warm inside their
own habitat. This comfort zone might be considered an outcome of some disciplinary
institutionalisation. Still, there are important and urgent issues to be addressed by both
professional groups. First, both represent institutional strongholds in a continuously
changing society. While both institutions are still central components in the power
structure of any state, the architecture of the security landscape is changing profoundly.
Moreover, the relationship between the military and the police emerges on the today’s
political and academic agenda, as these institutions face common security challenges as
well as budgetary clampdowns.

The way this book project was realised is mainly the reason why there was no
pre-set and guiding outline for the book at the start of this project. The editors gathered
together contributions in order to explore some of the challenges and issues related to the
blurring boundaries between the military and the police. As there are many interesting
perspectives on this issue (historical, institutional, operational, …), the book reflects an at
random compilation of these. In 2009 some of these papers were presented at the bi-
annual conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed forces and Society in
Chicago and/or at the conference of the European Research Group on the Military and
Society in Stockholm.

As an appetiser for this book, we will now briefly outline its ten chapters. They
are presented in two parts each consisting of five chapters and wrapped-up with some
concluding reflections on the blurring boundaries between the military and the police. The first part of this book sketches some of the current challenges related to the blurring
boundaries. It offers conceptualisation and historical contextualisation of this process.

In Chapter 2 ‘Police and Military: two worlds apart? Current Challenges in the
Process of Constabularisation of the Armed Forces and Militarisation of the Civilian
Police’ Marleen Easton, professor at University College Ghent (Belgium), and René
Moelker, associate professor at the Defence Academy of The Netherlands, sketch two
main processes central to the blurring of military and police roles. In their opinion, the
blurring of military and police roles generates new challenges for both institutions. On
the one hand, the constabularisation of the armed forces renders the military more suitable for domestic security tasks. On the other hand, the capacity of police forces increases, and so does the use of military tactics, organisational concepts and equipment for operating successfully in violent environments. The tasks and functions of the two security organisations are increasingly overlapping and they seem to become collaborators in a merging security market.

This chapter focuses on the causes of the blurring of military and policing roles and examines the mechanisms that result in a certain convergence. Easton and Moelker put some of the current questions on the table such as: What are the societal, organisational and operational challenges that the two organisations are confronted with? Which operational problems is the military facing in deployments? Is there a paradox between community policing and military policing? Do we want the police to militarise or should the armed forces have a more distinct role in national domestic security? Should the military’s involvement in national security prevent a further militarisation of the police or should a further militarisation of the police stop an increasing military interest in public security? The objective of this chapter is to sketch and categorise some of the current challenges in the process of constabularisation of the armed forces and militarisation of the civilian police.

In Chapter 3 on ‘Blending through international deployment’, David Last, Associate Professor of Politics in the Royal Military College of Canada, addresses police and military roles in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations. Last argues that police, paramilitary and military functions have emerged historically to meet the needs of states, and the way in which they are blurring reflects the political economy of international intervention within states. As forces have evolved towards an extraterritorial missionary mandate they begin to take on new combinations of roles that blend military and constabulary or policing roles. Last opens his chapter by exploring the etymology and comparative history of police and military functions, and then explores the blending of these roles through the application of military and police forces in the international community, first in the imperial era, then under United Nations Mandates, and finally in the current century’s coalition stabilisation operations. Imperial policing and coalition operations with limited consent tend to share more characteristics with coercive military
and paramilitary operations, even when police are deployed with a mentoring and training role. Last concludes his chapter with observations about consent, legitimacy, and the public good.

In Chapter 4 on ‘Civilised Coercion, Militarised Law and Order: security in Colonial South Asia and the Blue in Green Global Order’ Beatrice Jauregui, research fellow at Emmanuel College at the University of Cambridge and visiting fellow at the Center for the Advanced Study of India at the University of Pennsylvania, adds a political anthropological perspective to the central topic of this book. Her assumption is that the police and the military have co-developed in both theory and practice as the primary institutional means of coercion providing security and order within and among states, as the nation-state has become the standard unit of governance. While an idealised distinction between these modes of security remains globally hegemonic, an historical philosophical analysis shows us that in fact, they are always already muddled. Moreover, the line allegedly distinguishing police and military institutions is not only ‘blurry’ but also manipulable. Jauregui demonstrates this first via discussion of the development in the West of a concept of ‘civilised’ security. Her analysis then proceeds to explain how this concept of civilised security—or, more to the point, civil forms of coercion—played out in practice in various European colonies, and specifically in the British Raj in South Asia. It observes how colonial administrators fought long and hard about how best to organise a police force that would somehow simultaneously resemble and be distinct from the military; and most importantly how a militarised security apparatus was legitimised by labelling it a civil police. The insights gained from this historical analysis of the co-development of police and military institutions in colonial South Asia are then applied to contemporary issues of policing in India as well as problems of transnational policing and policing of ‘transitional democracies’ across the globe. Jauregui ultimately concludes that we must denaturalise and ‘historicise’ our assumptions about the moral ascendancy of ‘the civil’ discussions of providing security and order, especially with regard to state coercion.

In Chapter 5, Jelle Janssens, academic assistant at the Department of Criminal law and Criminology at Ghent University in Belgium, does not examine the nature of the
blurring boundaries but questions why the boundaries between the military and the police are blurring and he analyses the underlying rationalities.

As the provision of public security has generally been recognised as a key element in peace and related stability operations, the problem facing the international community is who is to be made responsible for that security during the transition towards a peaceful and stable society. When no effective or acceptable local security arrangements are in place (as was the case in, for example, Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Iraq), the international community will be called upon to provide public security. In contemporary operations, numerous actors (such as the international civilian police, gendarmerie forces, private security companies, custom agents and the military) are involved in the provision of that security. Whereas each more or less has a well-defined role in their home countries, they are now summoned to be as flexible as possible. This flexibility is needed because contemporary peace operations address a broad range of security areas (such as border, police, defence, intelligence, prison and justice reform), but lack the sufficient number of qualified personnel to do it. Janssens’s contribution is dedicated to the blurring of boundaries between security providers in these operations. He answers the question why the boundaries are blurring and refers to rationalities tracing back to policy decisions, assumptions and ideological dogmas and to more pragmatic solutions to personnel shortages.

In Chapter 6 on ‘Striving for symmetry: Constabularisation, security and security complexes’ Michiel de Weger, researcher on ‘Policing by the Military’ at the Defence Academy in the Netherlands, seeks to answer why constabularisation has happened and whether it will continue. He does this by focusing on the relationship between changing security conditions and changing security organisations. Although much has been written on the constabularisation of the military, little conceptual clarity has been created about the fundamental change taking place in Western defence forces. De Weger identifies six definitions of constabularisation and concludes in all of these that a transformation has indeed taken place. As constabularisation of the military tends to be a Western, recent and armed forces oriented concept, De Weger proposes a universal, timeless model which encompasses the entire national security complex, linking security changes and security organisations.
The second part of this book contains five chapters that cover the implications of blurring boundaries, and the challenges accompanying this process. These topics are illustrated by descriptions of cases.

In Chapter 7 Peter Neuteboom, Director of the National Staff to the Dutch Prosecutors Service, asks the question whether a constabulary force is a viable solution to close the security gap. The swift restoration and provision of public order and security in the early stages of a crisis management operation is crucial for its long-term success. Very often these operations are confronted with a deficit of international or indigenous police forces. Such deficit creates a security gap which can only be filled by international forces deployed in the mission area. Regularly, these forces are not trained and equipped to perform these police-like duties. The concept of constabulary force is often presented to be a viable solution to this problem. Although there is no agreed definition of a constabulary force, there are roughly three different models to discern. First there is the expeditionary force which is based upon Janowitz’ classic constabulary concept. A second model is the hybrid military which is a mixture of the police and military organisation. The third is the gendarmerie-based constabulary, a military force with a police background and expertise. Neuteboom raises the questions of whether these models offer a viable solution to the closure of security gaps, of which of the three models is the best alternative, and whether there should be a mixture of the three.

René Moelker, Netherlands Defence Academy, is adding a cultural touch to the central issue of this book with his contribution on ‘Cultures converging upon constabularisation’. In Chapter 8 he compares cultural differences between the police and the armed forces, but also the communalities are taken into account. His objective is to determine whether the armed forces are hampered in their performance because the characteristics of soldiering have come to resemble police work more and more. He also questions whether they require a policing mind-set and likewise cultural make-up. According to Moelker, perhaps the two organisations can benefit from a more hybrid culture that encompasses elements of both cultures. In his opinion the parameter of proximity is decisive in the changes that pertain to the armed forces. In some cases the police need to be able to escalate its use of violence and adopt a more military approach.
For Moelker, acquiring cultural competences will necessarily lead to changes in education and training.

Chapter 9 adds an organisational psychological analysis to the main theme of this book. Wendy Broesder, researcher at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, Ad Vogelaar, professor at the Netherlands Defence Academy, Martin Euwema, professor at the University of Leuven, and Tessa op den Buijs, assistant professor at the Netherlands Defence Academy, present the peacekeeping warrior as a theoretical model.

After both world wars and the end of the Cold War the role of the military shifted significantly from ‘war operations’ towards ‘Operations Other Than War’ [OOTW]. The role of the military in these operations, here defined as the ‘peacekeeper role’, certainly differs from the traditional ‘warrior role’. After 9/11, the military role seems to have changed again. Especially in the USA, an ‘all soldiers should be warriors’ appeal and a ‘Warrior-Ethos’ have become the dominant military attitude. Contemporary missions, however, demonstrate the need for both warriors and peacekeepers. Not only do these roles demand different approaches and attitudes, they are, at least partly, contradictory and changing over time and through experience. Although research does support the idea that tensions may result from the combination of these two roles, the origins and consequences of these tensions have not yet been studied. In this chapter Broesder, Vogelaar, Euwema and Op den Buijs present a theoretical frame, the Peacekeeping Warrior Model. This model proposes (a) that role strain occurs when a soldier’s role identification differs from the tasks executed during deployment, or when the two roles or two types of tasks conflict; (b) that this role strain affects attitudinal, emotional and behavioural outcomes; (c) that unit characteristics, in particular cohesion and morale, moderate the relationship between role strain and individual outcomes.

In Chapter 10 Suzanne Huiberts, lecturer at the Netherlands Defence Academy, discusses police reform and ownership in Bosnia and Herzegovina by focusing on the concept of ownership. The European Union Police Mission, established in 2003, addresses the issues of local institution and capacity building, in which sustainability and local ownership are promoted. Imposed police reform measures are difficult to maintain if they are not supported by those affected. How to get people to accept reform and restructuring is a heavily debated issue and there exists a huge gap between rhetoric and
practice, caused by the many difficulties that attend changes in any organisation, but particularly in organisations like the police. It is shown that the use of ownership as an instrument brings along three mutually reinforcing dilemmas: the intensity of international involvement, spoiler behaviour and local dependency and passivity. This chapter focuses on the role of these ownership dilemmas in the police restructuring process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is argued that the urge to restructure the police was coming from international actors and it touched upon the most sensitive political debates in the country. Consequently, the promotion of ownership empowered those actors who pursued their own political interests that overshadowed the arguments of operational necessity, and slowed down the process. A breakthrough was only realised by strong international pressure and conditionality, which contradicts the philosophy of ownership.

In Chapter 11, Henk Sollie, researcher and lecturer at Twente University, describes experiences of the Dutch gendarmerie in 1989 as an illustration of police reform by the military in post-conflict states. Besides the aim of preventing or ending conflicts, military interventions since the 1990s have usually been initiated to develop or maintain the rule of law. There are many types of international peace missions and interventions in which local police reform is an important component. The Netherlands has also contributed to these kinds of intervention. During the last two decades the Dutch Army has conducted 17 missions in which Dutch soldiers contributed to police reform. This chapter outlines their experiences, more specifically those of the Koninklijke Marechaussee (Dutch Gendarmerie), in post-conflict Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan. In line with Lammers’ theory of occupations, these interventions can be considered ‘constructive occupations’: foreign rulers can only successfully occupy another territory in the long run if they are capable of forging co-operation with local people. With regard to police reform in these constructive occupational contexts, the local people become responsible for their police. For local policemen, cooperation creates both benefits and risks. An important aspect in deciding whether they should cooperate or not, and to what extent, is the expected duration of the occupation. Time does not work in an occupier’s favour. With the passage of time, foreign actors are more likely to be seen as occupiers, diminishing their legitimacy and as a consequence their power to enforce reform.
These chapters are wrapped up by some concluding notes by the editors on the blurring boundaries between the military and the police and some lines for future research are sketched. As this book is meant to be an exploration, not an exhaustive overview, of some elements in the current discussion on the blurring boundaries between two very important institutions in the landscape of security, we hope these contributions may further stimulate the academic discussion of this theme. The editors hope these contributions represent one step forward in gaining insight into this fascinating area of research, which is perpetually in motion and constantly changing in nature and the way it manifests itself. We therefore hope there will be a sequel to this book about ‘security androgyny’.

References


PART I CONTEXT & CONCEPTS

2. Police and Military: two worlds apart?

*Current Challenges in the Process of Constabularisation of the Armed Forces and Militarisation of the Civilian Police*

Marleen Easton & René Moelker

**Introduction**

Nowadays, the ‘architecture’ of security involves a large number of semi-public regulators and authorities, private security, investigations, military companies and intelligence. In this complex environment it seems like ‘one hundred tiny theatres of punishment’ (Foucault, 1978) are at work. The very notion of policing and security is being dispersed throughout society. Concepts such as ‘plural policing’, ‘policing quilt’, ‘plural security’ or ‘security continuum’, on which a vast and growing number of actors operate are, being used to describe the new realities of security. Increasingly, new forms of cooperation between these different security actors are evolving. Operational boundaries between the public and private sector, but also between civil, police and military organisations are blurring. In the prevention of street crimes, the investigation of organised crime and anti-money laundering, the fight against terrorism, and international peacekeeping operations, hybrid arrangements emerge, leading to questions about privacy, transparency and democratic control (Bigo, 2000, 2005; Sarre, 2005). This paper focuses explicitly on the blurring boundaries in the field of security by addressing the relations between the police and the armed forces and the challenges that go hand-in-hand with this evolution.

The armed forces and the police share a long history (Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Fijnaut, 2007). Both are uniformed government services that have the mandatory power to use legal force and contribute to state authority. Combined they provide the state’s strong arm. With the rise of the nation state since the late Middle Ages, monarchs and later civilian politicians developed the state’s security institutions. The armed forces and judiciary were among the first. Up to the early 1900s, military personnel outnumbered police troops. Military units were stationed along borders and in almost all major villages and towns. Most villages had one police officer or sometimes none, while larger cities had only a few dozen. For any serious disturbance they called upon the nearest military commander to send soldiers to back them up (Wal, 2003). With the emergence of the urban working classes and the rising tensions between western European states at the end of the 19th century, the development of modern and professional police forces started. As police forces grew in number, the role of military forces in internal security diminished, especially in larger cities. The roles of the police and the armed forces were codified in a growing number of laws and regulations.

At first glance, both institutions fulfil a different function and have their own history and culture. The most obvious functional difference is that the armed forces are responsible for the protection of the state against external enemies and the police are responsible for the internal security and the preservation of internal public order. Traditionally the army is focussed on warfare and the international rule of law, and the police are focussed on public order, service delivery and the national rule of law. Nevertheless, this distinction in functions and tasks has

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1 Thanks to the anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
never been clear in practice. The establishment of the English Modern Police in 1829, for example, was in fact a reaction to the blurring boundaries between the military and police functions in British society at that time. The creation of the Modern Police meant the end of the military as primary agent for internal public order. The rise of the French Gendarmerie is another example. Originally this corps was a police corps within the French army. Only later was their authority extended to deal with military personnel and civilians. The model of the French Gendarmerie was ‘exported’ throughout the world, the so-called ‘Napoleonic heritage’.

Evidently, the blurring boundaries between the military and the police are not at all new topics. Nevertheless, through the years the relation between the police and the military is being influenced by a changing society in which new security threats, such as terrorism, emerge. Combating terrorism calls for a comprehensive approach by both police and military organisations. Besides terrorism the military can be asked to assist the police in maintaining public order. Moreover, the peacekeeping missions of the military in post-conflict regions are centred on bringing stability and security and have many elements of public order management in them.

In societies that call themselves democratic, questions are raised on the implications of the blurring boundaries for the legitimacy of both institutions. It has been a concern for policymakers but also within the armed forces and the police questions are raised regarding the challenges these blurring boundaries pose for their performance and positioning within the changing security ‘market’. This chapter aims at identifying current challenges in terms of the organisational, educational and operational implications for both institutions and their role and position in our societies. We study the blurring boundaries between the armed forces and the police by conceptualising and analysing the process of constabularisation of the armed forces and militarisation of the civilian police.

2.1 Militarisation of the police

2.1.1 Academic debate on the militarisation of the police

The academic debate on the militarisation of the police concentrates on two paradoxical trends. On the one hand, attention is being paid to the military character of police organisations, an issue which has been discussed since the advent of modern police forces (Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). The core of this discussion is the impact of the military structure and culture on different aspects of our society. In the 19th and 20th centuries and up until now, military organisational principles are for example implemented in different kind of organisations such as religious groups, youth associations, hospitals and the police (Van Doorn, 1956; Kraska, 1994). On the other hand, the development of democracies raises questions about how to democratise/demilitarise police forces to meet all the requirements of a modern constitutional state. The concept of community policing is at the centre of this trend (Friedmann, 1992; Ponsaers, 2001). Both trends are useful to conceptualise the impact of the blurring boundaries between the police and the armed forces upon the organisational and operational functioning of police forces all over the world.

Within the trend that focuses on the impact of the military culture and structure on the police, we still find Boëne’s distinction between the military’s functional and socio-political
uniqueness very useful to further discuss the process of the militarisation of the police (Boëne, 1990 a, b).²

The military’s functional uniqueness refers to the characteristics that are needed to be successful as a military organisation. The preparation for and the ever present possibility of ‘primitive’ war generates typical military characteristics such as obedience, loyalty (political neutrality in liberal democracies), availability, cohesion, physical strength, low recruitment age, minimised participation of women, restriction of civil rights (precluding the use of the right to strike, freedom of expression, etc.) and the possibility to use violence and the orientation towards violence in training, motivation and indoctrination. These elements are considered to be the most typical military characteristics, often found explicitly in military training (Lang, 1963; Teitler, 1972, p. 11). Boëne has pointed out that this military uniqueness has been influenced through time by the evolution in types of warfare.³

The military socio-political uniqueness refers to the view of nation states on the role and position of the armed forces. This view is influenced by different factors such as political culture, social structure, economic development and strategic position of every nation state (Hauser, 1973). Since WWII many Western countries have tended to evolve from an organic/national ideal to a liberal type of military-civil relations.⁴ In the organic/national ideal there is a clear distinction between civil and military responsibilities: the armed forces are a bureaucratic public service to the civilians, officers are an impartial instrument in the hands of political regimes and the armed forces do not intervene in politics. This ideal is seen as the highlight of military uniqueness with the military being a ‘total institution’ (Janowitz, 1965; Goffman 1969). The liberal ideal reflects the delicate balance between internal and external integration of the military. Internally there is a professional mix of bureaucratic rationalism and elements of the traditional culture of warfare. Externally the military needs effective social and cultural relations with society to guarantee social legitimacy and hence to ensure its own survival.⁵ In each country the perception of the role and position of the armed forces in society interacts with the functional uniqueness of those forces, as mentioned above. Recent developments in security matters, such as terrorism since 9/11, have had a major impact on the nature of warfare these days, for example in Iraq, and on the functional uniqueness of the armed forces being deployed (see e.g. Challans, 2007).

Both dimensions of military uniqueness crucially influenced the process of institutionalisation of the police in Western societies. When establishing police organisations, the military model tends to be very popular (Monet, 1993). The influence of the military uniqueness can be situated at three levels: the role and position of the police in society, the organisational level of the police (structure, discipline, decision-making, etc.) and the operational level of the police organisation (set of duties and implementation principles).

The first level is of great importance in the debate on the militarisation of the police. The vision of the role and position of the police in society encompasses finding the right balance between the rights and liberties of every individual, and the public interest and public order as a challenge for every democracy (Keith, 1993, p. 228). By managing public order the police is directly confronted with this challenge. From a traditional point of view (influenced by the

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² Both dimensions can be divided for analytical purposes but in reality they interact.
³ Boëne describes an evolution through time from a primitive kind of warfare to a complex kind of warfare and finally to an abstract kind of warfare. For more on these types see Boëne 1990a, p. 27-41.
⁴ Boëne (1990a, pp. 44-47) makes a distinction between the feudal, imperial, organic, liberal and ideological type of socio-political uniqueness in the West.
⁵ These reflections are regularly made in for example The Advisory Council on International Affairs (www. Aiv-advies.nl).
military culture and structure and often implicit in many state policies towards policing) the police are seen as an embodiment of the power of the state, legitimated by the Law. From this instrumental point of view, policemen implement law and order for which they need the monopoly on the use of violence. This may create a police force that is an instrument in the hand of state authorities and which lacks any sense of critical reflection on its own performance. This instrumentalism invites policemen to use the law in a coercive (dura lex, sed lex) and restrictive manner (because it allows them only to act after violation of the law). Besides, this instrumental view on policing gives police forces an a-political status that eventually leads to a police force that is separated from society (Reiner, 1992; Monet, 1993; Monjardet, 1996; Della Porta & Reiter, 1997; Van Ryckeghem, Huens & Hendrickx, 1998; Van Ryckeghem & Hendrickx, 2002).

This traditional view on the role and position of the police in society, which may vary in its consequences from state to state, influenced to a great extent the operational and organisational dimension of the police. On the operational level this traditional view may lead to an operational militarisation of the police, defined as performing military duties and/or implementing military principles in performing police duties. The performance of military duties by the police implies that the military power of a nation state is strengthened against foreign enemies and can therefore be referred to as a strategic militarisation of the police. The implementation of military principles in the performance of police duties leads to the use of violence and arms as an appropriate means to solve problems; thinking in terms of ‘enemies’ resulting in an approach that does not solve problems but only combats symptoms. These principles are mostly applied and highly visible in public order policing and the reactive style of police in interventions performed as a ‘fire brigade’ (Cordner, 1978; Horn, 1996). On the organisational level, the traditional view on the role and position of the police in society implies that the police are being managed as an army (Goldstein, 1977). This may lead to characteristics such as army officers in command, military rank and hierarchy, military discipline, military training, military culture, and the restriction of rights and liberties of personnel.

2.1.2 Military policing versus community policing
The traditional view on policing and the consequences on the three levels mentioned above have been questioned since the second half of the 20th century. The instrumental perspective generates a few problems. The first problem of instrumentalism is the illusion that the police can solve societal problems by addressing symptoms, for example by handling the disturbance of public order. This creates high expectations of the police that cannot be fulfilled because the causes of societal problems are difficult to address. This may threaten the legitimacy of the organisation.

The second problem is that instrumentalism can threaten democracy because it generates a police force that is mainly steered by internal orders and guidelines from police authorities. In this process, the responsibility of the police constables on the street is neglected and there are fewer possibilities for input from the people who are being served, the citizens.

The third problem is that the police can never be a perfect instrument in the hands of authorities. Studies indicate that the interpretation of laws and guidelines are being influenced by organisational mechanisms, informal rules and the culture of police constables on the

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6 The famous discussion between Waddington and Jefferson (White 1994) reflects the essence of this issue: does the use of violence by the police provoke violence in society?
7 This has once more been a topic of discussion during the riots in the ‘banlieues’ of Paris in 2005-2006, which were an outburst of complex social problems.
Policemen/women do have an operational autonomy, called discretionary power, when performing their tasks on the street (Monjardet, 1996; Van Ryckeghem et al., 1998).

Apart from this, operational and organisational aspects of military policing have been subjected to an ever-growing flood of criticism. The use of the police to strengthen the military, the effect of the paramilitary approach to maintaining order and the efficiency of using military organisational principles to guide police constables in their daily work are being increasingly questioned. It became clear that there was a gap between the police (organisation) and the people being policed. Since the end of the 20th century awareness has grown that a different style of policing is required to meet the changed needs and expectations of democracies. Meanwhile community policing is seen as a possible answer as far as it is a philosophy that deals with the question of how to make the police more democratic. One of the basic ideas of community policing is that the police should first understand the nature of societal problems before they decide what kind of answer the police can or should provide. It implies a critical reflection on the role of the police in solving complex societal problems. Community policing can be a challenge to military policing if the underlying cultural assumptions of the traditional view on policing are questioned (Van Ryckeghem & Hendrickx, 2002). The challenge relates to the three levels already mentioned: the role and function of the police in society, the operational consequences and the implications for the police organisation.

Regarding the role and position of the police in society, community policing implies a totally different view on policing. The police needs to be a part of society like institutions such as schools, churches etc. ‘The police can no longer be viewed as commandos, parachuted into a community to rescue it from the forces of evil. The police are the community and the community is the police. Police officers come from the community and reflect its values’ (Cadieux, 1989). The major objective of community policing is to establish an active partnership between the police and the community through which crime, service delivery and police community relations can jointly be analysed and appropriate solutions can be designed and implemented. By consequence five central principles are distinguishable in community policing at the operational level: service orientation, partnership, problem solving, accountability and empowerment. Service orientation refers to the idea that the community is the client and the police the service provider. Partnership is seen as a co-operative effort to facilitate a process of problem solving. Problem solving as such is related to the joint identification and analysis of the actual and potential causes of crime and conflict in communities. Accountability can be realised by creating mechanisms through which the police can be made answerable to addressing the needs and concerns of the communities they serve. Empowerment refers to the creation of a sense of joint responsibility and a joint capacity for addressing crime, service delivery and safety and security amongst members of the community and the police (Van Ryckeghem, et al. 1998, 2002).

Crucial is that these principles challenge the traditional operational level of policing, for example, partnership is in contrast to the idea of the ‘enemy’, and problem solving is opposed to the approach that only deals with symptoms. Nevertheless, these five principles are complementary and should be taken into consideration together to be able to challenge the traditional view on policing. Moreover on the organisational level community policing asks for principles such as decentralisation, diversity in human resources, democratic decision-making and an ethical police code to be able to ‘integrate’ the police into society.

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8 The introduction of only a few of these principles is one of the reasons why the implementation of community policing fails in several police stations (Van Ryckeghem, et al., 1998).
Meanwhile, community policing is not the only police model that challenges military policing. Ponsaers (2001) developed a frame of reference on police models to structure the actual discussion on policing in a more transparent way. A police model bears clear basic assumptions in itself about the role and the place of the police in society, and in this way generates clear answers to key questions with regard to discretionary power for policemen, the role of the law, responsibility, the relationship with the population, professionalisation, legitimacy, prevention and pro-active and reactive police force policy. On the basis of these eight core themes, Ponsaers distinguishes four police models: the military-bureaucratic model, lawful policing, community policing and the public-private police model. The military-bureaucratic model, builds on the logic of military policing mentioned above, and scores on the eight topics respectively as follows: internal rules and hierarchy, law and order, internal responsibility in particular and no external responsibility, a large gap between population and police force, the obedience of rules, absence of disorder and monopoly on physical violence, emphasis on repression and control and reactive actions. The figure below reflects his latest conclusion on the logic of reasoning in the current discussion (Easton, Moor, Hoogenboom, Ponsaers & Van Stokkom, 2008).

![Model of policing](image)

**Figure 2.1: Models of policing © Ponsaers P.**

The figure shows that the military-bureaucratic model is one of the traditional models that has been challenged by modern and post-modern police models. Ponsaers stresses that it is essential that these police models are not considered as consecutive in time. The described models are logical diversions, not chronological episodes. This means that the choice for a model during reforming a police order is not a necessary consequence of the time in which we live, but a programmed choice. Thus ‘Community Oriented Policing’ for example is not a post-modern phenomenon, but a voluntary and conscious choice from various options (Ponsaers, 2001, pp.490-492).

From this, according to Ponsaers, it immediately follows that each reform process of the police is not a unilateral process where alternative possibilities are impossible. After all, a ‘point of return’ is never reached; there is a constant tendency to return to more conservative models. Hence, it is possible to conceptualise reform as an ongoing process which is never completed. During this process the police models are continuously evaluated with respect to their social effectiveness and in particular with respect to the degree to which they actively contribute to crime reduction. Moreover, the way in which a police model is dominant in an
overall police structure also implies developments in the social environment of the police organisation. Important is that each concrete police organisation can be considered as a combination of police models. After all a police organisation is not synonymous with a police model (Ponsaers, 2001, pp. 490-492).

For our discussion on the blurring boundaries between the police and the armed forces it is important to notice that the military-bureaucratic police model, inspired by the logic of military policing mentioned above, is just one of the possible outcomes of police reform. Due to the changing security agenda, the model is still very much present in current discussions on police reform.

2.1.3 Changing security agenda and current challenges of the militarisation of the police

Bowling and Newburn (2006) indicate that the security agenda is increasingly becoming a hybrid containing internal, external, military, criminal and civil threats. In addition, the problems that the police are faced with are on a larger scale, are increasingly international in character and more often involve violence. Evolutions in organised human trafficking, the trade in weaponry and drugs, criminality and terrorism require collaboration that implies the crossing of the existing boundary of internal security and the use of special methods, techniques and of ‘adjusted’ violence. Moreover, the braiding of organised crime and terrorism is increasingly seen as the ‘real’ police work.

This evolution tends to make the military-bureaucratic police model, with the organisational and operational elements from military policing (as mentioned above), quite popular. The war metaphor, central in military policing and ‘used’ in the past to restore public order, appears in the struggle with the new security challenges. The international ‘war on terrorism’ that started after the 9-11 terrorist attacks has caused a paradigm change regarding national security. To give an example, the massive presence of armed policemen after the July 2005 terrorist attacks in the London tube invokes a revival of the war metaphor within the realm of policing. It appears that the terrorist attacks drove the unarmed ‘Bobbies’ off the street.9

At the operational level, the transition from ‘crime control’ to ‘war on crime’ and ‘war on terrorism’ reflects a transition from a routine job to a crisis. The ‘war’ against criminals, disturbers of public order and terrorists legitimates the use of operational principles such as the symptom-approach, thinking in terms of ‘them and us’ and the use of violence. Furthermore it stimulates centralisation and specialisation as organisational principles. The expression ‘war on organised crime/terrorism’ legitimates the use of certain methods and gives policemen the capacity to ‘play’ war, which can be conceptualised as a process of militarisation of the police (Bittner, 1970; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Kraska & Kappeler, 1997). At the organisational level, police units and gendarmeries worldwide are strengthening their anti-terror units such as the American SWAT (Special Weapons And Tactics), the Austrian GEK (Gendarmerie-einsatzkommando), the German ‘Grenzschutzgruppe 9’ and the French GIGN (Groupe d’intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale). Moreover, in countries such as Italy, France and Portugal, voices are raised to use the armed forces to support the police in this ‘war against terrorism’. Striking is the contrast between the revival of the ‘war metaphor’ on the one hand and the importance of community policing on the other hand. There is some debate on the question of whether both trends are complementary or paradoxical. In a nutshell non-believers (paradox)

9 ‘Hundreds more armed police to join London’s terror fight’. The Independent on Sunday, 7 August 2005.
refer to the competing basic principles of both trends such as partnership versus ‘them or us’ attitude as believers (complementary) refer to the necessity of community policing in daily police practices to avoid the need to apply any ‘war metaphor’ in dealing with current security challenges. There is not much empirical research on this specific issue. Nevertheless, research on the application of the ‘war metaphor’ on public order policing indicates that it has a big influence on the structure and culture of the police applying those principles (Easton, 2000). In researching the process of demilitarisation of the Belgian Gendarmerie it became clear that both trends are actually interacting. The presence of an often latent, traditional approach within a police organisation influences, to a great extent, the way in which community policing is interpreted and implemented. The traditional perception of the role and position of the police in society is part of the prevailing culture in the police organisation and it is inherent to the functioning of the police force. It refers to a vision which impacts on the implementation principles that are adhered to when discharging the remit. Hence, manifest civil implementation principles, such as problem-oriented methods of working and partnership, are being usurped by latent militaristic implementation principles, such as symptom-driven methodologies and a ‘them or us’ attitude. The observations above do generate concern.

The question arises about whether it is possible to combine both styles of policing in one police corps to be prepared to address the increasing demands of the changing security agenda. To some extent the ‘war’ on terrorism seems to ask for a remilitarisation of the police while good relationships with different neighbourhoods (and the ‘cry’ for community policing) is one of the elements needed to be able to deal with terrorism as a societal problem. If both trends are not paradoxical at the level of society as they are two sides of the same coin, this may nevertheless generate paradoxes on the organisational and operational level of police management and may ask for a reconsideration of the current process of militarisation of the police.

2.2 Constabularisation of the military

2.2.1 The academic debate on the constabularisation of the armed forces

Being tasked with international peacekeeping duties, the western armed forces have gradually developed into constabulary forces. The concept of a constabulary force was introduced in 1960 by the American sociologist Morris Janowitz (1960). Janowitz based his concept on the policing missions that the British Army conducted in the former colonies. According to Janowitz, ‘the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory.’ (Janowitz, 1960, p. 418) The role of the military is changing from a more absolute into a more pragmatic focus on practical conflict resolution. Janowitz’ constabulary force concept ‘encompasses the entire range of military power and organisation. At the upper end there are the weapons of mass destruction; those of flexible and specialised capacity are at the lower end, including the specialists in military aid programmes, in paramilitary operations, in guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare’ (Janowitz, 1960, pp. 418-419). A constabulary force is the solution to what Geser sees as an immediate need for international peace operations. More troops, a mixture of police and military, are needed to operate in micro (police), meso (counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism) and in macro violence (warfare) environments and who are able to execute both police and military functions (Geser, 1996, p. 70).
The concept of a constabulary force implies that the military is able to operate in a great variety of situations at the higher end of the continuum of military force, and at the lower end of the spectrum. The military thus has to be able to vary and fluctuate the intensity of its use of force. This requires competences to escalate and de-escalate in the application of force within a short period of time, and within short intervals. A constabulary force also needs the ability to deal with a range of different environments and specific security scenarios. In addition to their classical warfare task, military organisations are turning into instruments for creating international order and nation building (Haltiner, 2003, p. 179). The modern soldier is developing into a diplomat, policeman, social worker, conflict manager, and advisor of local authorities (Moelker & Soeters, 2003, p. 33).

The functional uniqueness and the socio-political uniqueness discussed above not only influenced the process of institutionalisation of the police in the direction of instrumentalism, it also caused the armed forces to develop in the opposite direction to that of police forces. In the debate between Huntington and Janowitz, it is Janowitz’s thesis that is supported in the sense that the military is drawing nearer to civil society and is not separated from society by instrumentalism. Huntington (1957) advocated ‘objective civilian control’ stating a strict separation from politicians, who control the armed forces. In this paradigm the military is the apolitical instrument of the state. According to Huntington, professionalism means not only being a skilled soldier, but also being politically neutral. In the academic debate this stance became known as the divergent model: keeping politics and soldiering apart. In contradistinction, Janowitz (1960) propagates the convergent model. Rather than separated from wider society, Janowitz sees the military as necessarily integrated. Political spheres and the military converge upon each other and ‘in this convergence it is the military that draws closer to the mainstream of the society to which it belongs, gradually and continuously incorporating the values that gain broad acceptance in society’ (Caforio, 2003, p. 18).

As a result the organisation of the armed forces no longer fits the model of a total institution (Goffman, 1969), the profession is losing many, but not all, of its institutional characteristics (Moskos, 1977), and instead of being a traditional top-down organisation, much information that influences decision making travels from the bottom up. Consultation models in many countries have been modelled upon a pluralist framework of negotiations (Bartle & Heijnecken, 2006). Whereas the military traditionally is described as a machine-bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1983), this characterisation does not hold true any more. These changes emanated as early as the sixties because of the reasons given by Janowitz, but they are even more identifiable in the present military organisation whose main task, referring to the medium and smaller military powers, is predominantly devoted to operations other than war.

2.2.2 National tasks of the military
Before turning to tasks abroad, the national tasks will be discussed. As Huiskamp & De Weger (2009) tentatively sketch, these tasks are rapidly changing. The clear division between policing and military tasks is fading. According to these authors the armed forces could be more important in combating crime and drugs trafficking, especially since these issues relate to border crossing and international cooperation between authorities and law and order organisations. As an instrument for state building, the armed forces can contribute to citizenship and the integration of newcomers. Other issues that are likely to cross borders and that require the assistance of the armed forces relate to contagious (human or animal) diseases or disaster management. Catastrophes can be large scale and the infrastructure of the armed forces might easily be necessary to relieve human suffering caused by non-military threats. Non-traditional threats like terrorism or ethnic tensions or the spread of nuclear, chemical or
biological weaponry might also require the use of the military organisation within national borders. Digital paralysis, stemming from internet terrorism, or transport and/or safeguarding energy sources are certainly part of the new domain for the military. Often the military are used as auxiliary forces because of their infrastructure that can deal with large-scale operations but at the same time it is also expected of the military that they contribute to national tasks, especially in times when the sovereignty of the state and national integrity are not at stake.

2.2.3 Military intervention versus community policing

Meanwhile, in contrast to the police, where developments regarding the operational level tend to move in a direction of military policing, the armed forces are moving away from the use of military force, especially regarding their international operations. Whilst not denying that fighting occurs during peace enforcing operations, theory and practice of military operations are directed at conduct that comes close to community policing. The logic stems from a counterinsurgency doctrine that was developed by the British in Malaya, a doctrine that was also adopted by the Dutch in their ‘doctrine for irregular adversaries’, e.g. in the form of what we currently label ‘asymmetric warfare’. The British general Thompson (1966) formulated five principles that are preconditions for success:

1) find a political solution;
2) act in accordance with the law, use minimal force;
3) fight the cause of the insurgency;
4) separate the fish from the water/offer safety to the population;
5) support the government.

After 12 years of campaigning for the hearts and minds (1948-60) and the combined effort of 300,000 soldiers, the outcome in Malaya was positive. Giving them land, creating decent living conditions and citizenship and preventing the squatters from supplying the insurgents with food met the basic needs of the Chinese squatters. Insurgents were offered the opportunity for rehabilitation. A committee system was implemented in the new villages where the efforts of military, police and civil institutions were coordinated. The political solution offered was independence for Malaya.

Thomas Mockaitis (2003) effectively argues that the principles derived from the Malayan experiences apply also to the present war against terrorism in general: ‘Trust and cooperation depend in turn on recognizing and as far as possible addressing the real needs and addressing the legitimate grievances on which the insurgency feeds. Good intelligence allows the security forces (military, paramilitary, and police) to use force against the terrorists in a limited and focused manner so as not to further alienate the general population. This strategy has generally been described as “winning hearts and minds”’.

By use of the committee system, by providing economic alternatives for the local population and by supporting the government, the British contributed to public order management, and to a large degree it was police work. Examples from Dutch missions in Iraq show parallel experiences. During the operations in Iraq, a Dutch commander, Lt. Col. Richard Oppelaar, drew international media attention by putting forward the concept of the Dutch ‘softly, softly’ approach (Blanford, 2003). Oppelaar stated: ‘I expect a professional conduct during all our operations and activities, during which the population should be approached in a friendly and respectful manner. … it is important to win (and keep) the hearts and minds of the local
population and their leaders ... It's all about respect. Respect for the locals and other cultures and their values, ... . If you don't grasp the culture, you won't grasp the problem.’

One of Oppelaar’s successors Lt. Col Kees Matthijssen elaborated upon the best practices in Iraq and made it into the New York Times (2004): ‘Part neighborhood police officers, part social workers, the soldiers managed to practice in Iraq what the Netherlands has come to call the Dutch approach to patrolling. ... Instead of armored vehicles, the Dutch drive vehicles that leave them exposed to the people around them. To encourage interaction with residents, they go bare-headed and are forbidden to wear mirror sunglasses. Making soldiers accessible and vulnerable to their surroundings increases their security, they contend’.

In Afghanistan the Dutch soldiers do not wear mirror sun glasses in order not to remind the Afghan population of the Russians, they prefer to patrol on foot if possible, wear the minimum of protective clothing and when driving the soldiers use open roofed vehicles or lightly armoured cars that allow the soldiers to show themselves. The British Times states that the Dutch ‘aim to beat Taleban by inviting them round to tea’ and the ‘Military HQ is run as open house’ (Page, 2007). In contrast to the British who hide in fortresses, the Dutch are building clay huts in which they receive Afghan guest and host them with tea, nuts and dried fruit. A quote from the news clipping: ‘You don’t want it to look like a fortress — there has to be a balance between accessibility and defensibility’, Colonel Vleugels [the commander, RM] said. ‘You have to be among the people to influence them. By offering them help and work, they can make a choice. If they then decide to fight, we’ll fight back, but that should be a last resort’. The newspaper clipping was from early 2007. Unfortunately, six months later, the Taleban started putting on a big fight and the Dutch have been forced to abandon their approach temporarily, hoping that they can return to it later.

Basically the strategy during peace keeping missions is mixed and, according to the Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Development and Defence ‘a number of priorities are clear. These are ordered following the three ‘D’ dimensions of the ISAF (International Security Afghanistan Force) mandate for the province: defense (security), democracy (governance) and development (reconstruction)’ (Bot, Kamp & Van Ardenne-Van der Hoeven, 2006, p. 41). Military operations resemble police operations when they are in the lower spectre of violence. When some degree of security is established the military prefer to patrol their area of responsibility in the manner of a constable. Members from the Marine Corps patrolled Tarin Kowt on mountain bicycles in December 2009 in order to establish contact with the population more easily and to cover more ground (bicycles increase the action radius considerably compared to patrolling by foot).

2.2.4 Challenges to constabularisation of the armed forces
One of the most important challenges to constabularisation of the armed forces relates to the problem of professional identity. The concept of constabularisation was never really popular among the military who often associated it with the armed forces losing prestige. Janowitz (1960, p. 419) predicted low acceptance in the armed forces because it has to operate:

on a double standard of ‘peacetime’ and ‘wartime’ premises. Since the constabulary force concept eliminates the distinction between the peacetime and the wartime military establishment, it draws on the police concept. The professional soldier resists identifying himself with the ‘police’, and the military profession has struggle to distinguish itself from the internal police force. ... the military tends to think of police activities as less prestigious [sic] and less honorable tasks ...’.
The constabulary concept rivals and seems contradictory to the professional identity of the military, but according to Francke, the solution has to come not from denouncing or denying one of the two identities (more specifically, Francke refers to peacekeepers instead of policemen), nor from over-investment in one of the many aspects of identity, or even from some sort of differentiation in the soldier’s identity, but from an integrated super-identity (Francke, 2003).

An integrated super-identity that amalgamates the ‘warrior identity’ and the ‘peacekeeper identity’ can be induced by training and by socialisation techniques. During socialisation, soldiers can be made aware that they must make deliberate choices in diverse situations that vary in the degree of violence that is involved.

However, the double role of the soldier in present day conflict regions often leads to cognitive dissonance. When a soldier is only trained to engage in war and then all of a sudden he or she has to work on development and play the diplomat’s role, it would seem to him/her like ‘teaching a dog to walk backwards’ (Francke, 2003, p. 31).

A strong super-identity helps in preventing tensions between the warrior and peacekeeper identity, and cognitively justifies behaviour that fits the superidentity. This model assumes that soldiers will think of peace missions as equally important as traditional warfare and it will prepare the soldiers better at meeting the requirements of the diverse tasks to be dealt with, without endangering the objective of the mission nor the mental stability of the soldier (Francke, 2003, p. 46).

Another challenge to be met, besides finding a balance between the soldierly and the constabulary aspect of the changing military profession, lies in the preparation and execution of the police-like tasks and the effect on the armed forces’ competencies. The required competencies would also qualify them for national security tasks, especially in the higher ends of police power. Preferred soldiers will be trained in police operations as well as in warfare and fighting techniques. De Weger, Grashof & Douma (2007) strongly recommend that soldiers be trained in crowd and riot control because those skills are necessary in dealing with protesters and rioters. The same recommendation would apply for the use of non-lethal weapons by the military in conflict regions. Now they are forbidden to use the baton, forcing soldiers to use their guns instead, even in situations that are only mildly threatening.

Also related to training and education is the matter of attitude towards the inhabitants of conflict regions. Soldiers often lack empathy and cultural sensitivity in dealing with people from countries that are culturally distant from their homelands. Cultural awareness training is being implemented more and more in the training programs of soldiers simply because it proves to be a critical success factor (Simpson, 2007). As in community policing, the military will have to find a way of communicating with local residents and accepting them. This is already difficult in one’s own culture, let alone when operating in a culture that one is not acquainted with.

The composition of the force poses yet another problem. UN resolution 1325 states that more attention to the gender aspect of peacekeeping missions should be given. In order to do so, the social composition of the peacekeepers force should have a larger percentage of women in it. The composition of a peacekeepers force is relevant to the process and outcome of conflict resolution itself. An Israeli example may prove the point. Authors such as Van Creveld (1991) have observed developments in their homelands – in Van Creveld’s case Israel - that point at
the simultaneous occurring phenomena of a blurring of the internal and external security and
the need for the military to take upon their shoulders non-military tasks. Increasingly soldiers
have been taking on tasks that are related to preserving the domestic order within the borders
of their states, or they are executing policing tasks abroad in so-called failed states: observing
truces, elections, educating local police forces. In order not to escalate violence during the
clearing of the Gaza strip in the summer of 2005, female soldiers were tasked with the job and
all soldiers were extensively prepared for the task that emotionally burdened them. Typically,
preparation and composition of the soldiers was directed at preventing the use of violence.

After the international armed forces have successfully intervened in a military conflict, in the
stabilisation phase, they are the dominant international authority for some time. The security
situation does not always allow the deployment of international police forces, even when the
international community is willing to deploy sufficient numbers of them. Therefore, the
military is obliged to fill the so-called security gap (Dziedzic, 1998, p. 14) in a stabilisation
phase. The military has to be willing and prepared to execute law enforcement and public
order tasks.

Peace-enforcing, peacekeeping, nation building, civil-military co-operation, humanitarian
assistance, but also assisting civilian authorities in situation of crises and disaster, and battling
terrorism are tasks of the military that result from the linking of internal and external security,
much increased in the 1970s and again in the 1990s. The military no longer operates
exclusively at the high end of the spectrum of violence but also at the middle (crowd and riot
control, anti-terrorist squads etc.) and even the low end (i.e. theft and violence by individuals).
At this low end the tasks are converging on the tasks of police officers. The ‘war’ on
terrorism, reconstruction of war-ridden countries, state-building, and the training of local
security forces, demand a further constabularisation of the armed forces.

Reflection

It is clear that the police and the armed forces are two institutions currently confronted with
complex (and often competing) competences to deal with the new requirements related to the
blurring boundaries between internal and external security. This reality is one of the
challenging policy questions related to the changing ‘architecture’ of security. There seem to
be three options possible with respect to the relationship between both institutions: Separation, cooperation or merger.

The first option is the preservation of the difference between the police and the armed forces
leading to a separation of both institutions. Then the question arises of what kind of criteria
this distinction can be made? Internal and external security does not seem to work anymore.

The second option is to elaborate on the possibilities of cooperation between both institutions.
Questions such as: Should the armed forces deploy activities in relation to the protection of
internal security? Is cooperation with the police necessary for this? If the armed forces deploy
these activities, which new boundaries will come to the surface and whom will they be set?
Do we want a police force that is capable of deploying a hard/military style of policing within
the border of our state as well as in a supporting position towards the armed forces in
international peacekeeping operations? What kind of challenges does this pose regarding the
implementation of community policing? Can the police get rid of its military character by
calling in the armed forces to deal with challenges that require a tougher approach? Does it
provide a solution for the tension between the military analogy and community policing? Can the armed forces make an appeal to the civil police instead of educating themselves in policing?

The third option is a *merger* between the police and the armed forces, for example into one security organisation under the auspices of one Minister of Security Affairs? What would be the main characteristics of this kind of security organisation? Would it have to conform to the format of gendarmerie forces? Are the recently (2008) established European Gendarmerie Forces a forerunner for this organisational lacuna in the security structure?

The choice for one of these options implies critical thinking and discussion on some further related questions. Various developments in the international and European arena indicate the emergence of a fused field of security and careful thinking needs to be invested in finding an optimal way to deal with the challenges that this brings. In this reflection, crucial criteria are social legitimacy, the impact of institutional action on the safety and security of citizens. These are issues that need to be addressed urgently when elaborating the challenges of the blurring boundaries between the armed forces and the police.

**References**


3. Blending through International Deployment

*Police and Military Roles in Peacekeeping and Stabilisation Operations*

David Last

Introduction

Inspector Roch Deroy of the Service de police de la Ville de Montreal took over leadership of the Civilian Police Section in Kandahar in March 2009. ‘We are teaching them to be a professional police force that lives in the community and is close to the people,’ he told reporters, ‘This training program is key to our success here since our objective is to eventually transfer the entire security responsibilities to the local authorities.’ The training includes weapons skills, first aid, human rights and good policing behaviour, but Afghanistan is in the middle of a protracted war and the first job is survival. Deroy’s Afghan counterpart was clear about the value of the ‘police’ training: First Lieutenant Khalil was very pleased with the target practice and first aid skills acquired – ‘Now, we can use bandages effectively and keep fighting before ever needing a medical doctor,’ he said (Godin, 2009). That is not a sentence Deroy would expect from his Montreal police colleagues, but it makes sense in Afghanistan.

The blurring of police and military functions may be more stark and obvious in international interventions than in the domestic division of responsibilities. This chapter suggests that it is increasingly necessary to see police, paramilitary and military forces as part of a single continuum of state instruments to provide for security – whether human security, national security, or international security. It is often in the tasks performed far from home that we see the blurring of police and military distinctions most clearly, while in a stable domestic setting they become more differentiated.

Police, gendarme, and military forces are institutions that developed over time to meet the needs of states.¹ They are shaped partly by the community of states, and partly by the society in which they develop, but they can also change as they operate away from home, across international boundaries, in other states, or with international organisations. This has been the case for the police and military organisations of many states that have participated in international missions during the post-Second World War period under the auspices of international organisations like the UN, NATO, and OSCE (The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).

In this chapter, I explore the blending of police, paramilitary and military roles in international operations. How have they adapted to international missions, and how have international operations changed as a result of new combinations of roles and tasks? Military

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forces have been employed in a constabulary role under rule of law in some deployments, and international police forces have been deployed outside their national jurisdictions, both with and without executive mandates. One of the consequences of these deployments has been a growing appreciation for paramilitary or gendarme roles that blend rule of law with robust self-defence and crowd-control capacities. But this coercive capacity in international police forces raises questions about consent, legitimacy, and the public interest in international missions.

3.1 History and Etymology

Police, paramilitary, and military forces have evolved within Western states in two directions – as instruments to serve the public, and as instruments to support the authority of the state. These directions are both competing and complementary; they are at odds when the state seeks to manage, control, or repress groups or populations, and complementary when social cohesion and good governance preserve the unity of the state and people. The ambivalent legacy of the coercive arms of state is that they are not always used in the interests of citizens. Perception of their impartiality, their utility, or their predatory nature, is often divided. These threads are evident in the evolution of forces within states, and their projection into the international community.

3.1.1 Police

Radzinowicz (1968) traces the origins and functioning of police back to mid-sixteenth century Germany, which puts the evolution of police as social institutions into the same historical timeframe as the evolution of modern armies and the evolution of the state (Bobbitt, 2002). In the sixteenth century, the word ‘police’ appeared as a synonym for ‘policy’ in England – a course of action in civil administration. In mid-sixteenth century Saxony, it was the epitome of government and community – ‘identical both with the government and with the nature and object of the community as a whole’ (Dean, 1999). In the eighteenth century, the word police came to mean both policy and the means to enforce it, first in parts of Germany and France, and then increasingly in the cities of the United Kingdom. The modern police forces of the Anglo-American world probably date from the Scottish enlightenment, with Queen Ann’s Commissioners of Police in Scotland (1714) beginning an ambivalent heritage – six noblemen representing the monarchy’s interests, and four gentlemen representing the rising community of the Scottish middle class. It was a tension resolved in favour of the community when the 1805 police bill gave Edinburgh its first community police board, empowered to direct policing (Keir, 1966).

In the Anglo-Saxon world, the study of modern policing usually begins with Sir Robert Peel’s Police Bill of 1829, establishing the New Police in Metropolitan London. This sharpened the distinction between urban police and deployed forces in rural areas. The unarmed preventive police pioneered by the first Commissioners, Rowan and Mayne, competed with the earlier field forces, like continental gendarmes and the Royal Irish Constabulary, and with later innovations like McHardy’s paramilitary police (the Essex model discussed below). Both appeared in various efforts to police the empire abroad (Anderson & Killingray, 1991) - foreshadowing modern peacekeeping. Reith’s (1956) seminal history of British policing traces
and juxtaposes ideas of prevention and enforcement, which are important for the expanding ambit of peacekeeping and international policing.

By the mid-nineteenth century, two themes in policing were evident. First, in continental Europe, separate branches of police emerged in many countries to address the needs of state security against internal subversion (or high policing) and the need for public safety, or low policing (Donner, 1980; Brodeur, 1983). Second, in Europe's relations with the rest of the world, international military action short of war came to be known increasingly as policing, though it was often indistinguishable from war. The connection between these two themes was that international military actions short of war, or imperial policing, took on the character of 'high policing' in the international community. Coercion in the interests of European elites included breaking down traditional authority in peripheral areas, and establishing economic links that benefited Europe. At home, it involved limiting the powers and freedoms of those who might oppose dominant interests – breaking up protests, arresting activists and organisers, and protecting property from the envious and the poor (Lustgarten & Leigh, 1994).

But there was an alternative to coercive policing, which was based on the consent of the community. Sir Charles Rowan's preventive policing model was inspired by liberal democratic ideals, and marked a new approach to the maintenance of order in the interests of the community, primarily through prevention of crime, relying on the active cooperation of the policed community. Intriguingly, the image of the 'firm, fair, and friendly' police constable has its origins in the new discipline and changing social climate of Britain's armies raised for the Napoleonic Wars (Reith, 1956). While Wellington and the Guards regiments continued to espouse the old discipline of the whip and noose, newly raised regiments like Sir John Moore’s 52nd Light Infantry were infused with non-conformist evangelical Christian sentiment, and the resultant self-discipline permitted light infantry and rifle regiments to take advantage of initiative and dispersed deployment – essential to deal with Napoleon’s francs tireurs and levée en masse. Rowan served under Sir John Moore in the Peninsula campaign and on internal security duties in Ireland, and brought the new ideas with him to the London Metropolitan Constabulary (Reith, 1956).

Preventive civil policing has spread gradually and somewhat unevenly through the English-speaking world over the last two centuries. Whether there can be an effective international analogue to preventive civil policing remains an open question. One of the sources of blurring distinctions between soldiers and police is the international deployment of soldiers on 'policing' duties.

3.1.2 Paramilitary Forces

From the earliest employment of police there has been the potential for them to be used as armed paramilitary forces for social control (Jefferson, 1990; Bayley, 1985b). In 1550, gendarmes were men-at-arms in the king’s household who preceded him to ensure good order. During the Napoleonic era, mounted gendarme companies were established to police and administer areas under French control, eliminating banditry and threats to the state. Like the

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2 The use of the term ‘policing’ might be thought of as a euphemism for easier public consumption at the beginning of the era of mass media, but it also carried with it ideas about civilizing missions and the humane conduct of such operations, often honoured more in the breach than the observance.
Royal Irish Constabulary, gendarmes helped to incorporate colonised or peripheral areas by blending military and policing functions. Their responsibilities in war included supporting the army and navy in reconnaissance and route control functions. Nation-building tasks such as the safety of commerce and orderly conduct of elections were also a gendarme responsibility (Houte, 2000; Alary, 2000).

In Great Britain, even as the unarmed New Police were firmly established in London, the County of Essex advocated plans in 1853 for armed police, garrisoned in barracks, equipped with light artillery and rifle companies, and commanded by regular army officers. Police officers in Essex were also appointed as Assistant Relieving Officers under the Poor Laws, and helped to drive vagrants from the county, ensuring according to one report that just 100 of 2,605 destitute applicants received aid, relieving property owners of considerable expense (Reith, 1956).

Although McHardy’s justification was national defence, coercive power was applied in practice to protect property and profitability. The Royal Irish Constabulary and the Essex model had some influence in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In New Zealand, the constabulary manned artillery and fortifications and fought in the Maori Wars (Hill, 1991). Paramilitary forces thus span a range of functions from social enforcement, to commercial and military subjugation.

Jefferson and other critical police sociologists use the terms ‘paramilitary’ and ‘quasi-military’ as adjectives to describe the deployment of armed bodies of police, targeting a particular group. ‘The difference between the quasi-military and the civil policeman is that the civil policeman should have no enemies. People may be criminals, they may be violent, but they are not enemies to be destroyed...’ (Jefferson, 1990, p. 1). This sentiment parallels the constabulary view of military peacekeepers: ‘UN peacekeepers have no enemies...’ (Nordic UN Tactical Manual, 1992). Lutterbeck (2004a, b) has written more recently of the blurring of domestic and international security that brings police and military responsibilities into the same sphere in which there are enemies.

3.1.3 Military Forces

Soldiers in formed military units have historically been employed by states to pursue policies of the sovereign or to protect citizens from external threat. Thus two of the earliest professional armies of the modern era met in the Netherlands at the end of the sixteenth century when the Spanish Tercios of the Hapsburgs confronted the small mercenary army of the Netherlands. Edicts of pope and sovereign legitimised the Spanish efforts, while a government of middle-class merchants financed and legitimised the force fielded by Maurice of Nassau (Feld, 1977). Control of the potentially destructive military instrument was central to the evolution of professional armies to serve rather than prey upon communities. The Burghers of Amsterdam paid their mercenaries annual salaries and insisted that they do useful work on dykes and ditches when not engaged in defence.

Soldiers may carry out police functions such as community patrols, search and seizure, or crowd control (Carpenter, 1970). It is common in the British Commonwealth for armed forces to have both ‘aid of the civil power’ and ‘assistance to civil authority’ functions. These are spelled out in the National Defence Acts and in Regulations and Orders of countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Nigeria. Aid of the civil power typically involves formed units of troops deployed under police command, usually with small arms and light weapons, to put down a threat to the power of the state. Riots and violent insurrections beyond the coercive capacity of the police are typical cases calling for military aid to the civil power. Assistance to
civil authorities typically involves military manpower, usually without weapons but often with specialised equipment (e.g. for engineering or communications), deployed to help in humanitarian disasters such as fire, flood, or earthquake. In the first case, soldiers may be deputised as peace officers, but in the second they are typically just a pool of disciplined and specialised labour.

Police may sometimes carry out military functions such as the fortification of buildings or border posts, or reconnaissance of defensive positions. This is often the case in new nations like Israel in 1950s (Burns, 1966), or Slovenia in the 1990s and Kosovo even more recently. Nevertheless, there has generally been a distinction between the framework of law, organising concepts, governance, social functions, and the structure and equipment of police, para-military and military organisations. International peacekeeping has begun to blur some of these distinctions, just as nineteenth century imperial policing slid into warfare.

3.2 Taxonomy of Security Forces

If we are to discuss the blurring of security forces, it is useful to derive from the forgoing descriptions a clear theoretical taxonomy of forces in order to see what distinctions are being merged or lost in the process of blurring. Figure 1 provides such taxonomy based on capacity for violence, size of component units, and bodies of applicable law in routine operations. I have found this a useful model for cross-national comparisons in various international assignments, and have not yet encountered police, paramilitary or military organisations which do not fit in the scheme somewhere, although there is enormous national variation in the organisations which carry out these functions.

**Figure 1: Violence, Size, and Law**

The first distinction is size. How big are the typical units or components of an organisation? Do they work individually or in small groups, or are they employed primarily as part of a larger organisation? Sir John Moore’s innovative 52nd Light Infantry in the Peninsula campaign mimicked Napoleon’s franc tireurs by deploying in pairs and small groups, but always as parts of companies and battalions controlled and directed through a military hierarchy. Soldiers typically work in large organisations or battalions, brigades, and divisions – consisting of thousands of troops. Police constables, on the other hand, consistently operate individually or in pairs or small teams. This appears to be true across a wide variety of cultures. Bayley (1985a) describes broadly comparable police functions in the Authoritarian, Anglo-Saxon, and Oriental modes of policing.

The second distinction is the level of violence that an organisation is capable of controlling, either to inflict or prevent, because these are two sides of the same coin. Police typically address individual criminal violence and social misdemeanours, while military forces often control very sophisticated military capital – warships, armoured vehicles, fighter-bomber aircraft – intended to maximise their coercive potential, even if these are very rarely used.
Military forces are optimised to break things and kill enemies, while police are limited to self-defence.

The third distinction is the framework of law that guides each force in its planning and conduct of daily operations. For police forces, civil and criminal law applicable to citizens at large govern their behaviour in domestic operations. When they are deployed to monitor and assist police of another state under an international mandate, they need to be able to relate their own experience of domestic law to the body of law applicable in the host nation (Linden, Last & Murphy, 2007) Paramilitary forces charged with securing the state against subversion and organized threats are concerned with criminal law, but also with the limits of acceptable political behaviour, depending on the nature of the state. Their role is ‘high policing’ as described by Brodeur (1983), encompassing politically motivated riots and disturbances at the low end of coercive force, and counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency warfare at the upper end, often governed by executive edicts or emergency legislation.

Military forces usually have their own bodies of military law, such as the US Uniform Code of Military Justice, or the Queen’s Regulations and Orders authorised by Canada’s National Defence Act. This means, in effect, that soldiers are subject to a second layer of legal constraint, generally harsher than that applicable to civilians. Beyond the governance of individual members of the armed services, the conduct of military operations outside national boundaries is subject to international law. To the extent that there are codes of desirable conduct for soldiers and police, these rule-sets converge (table 1).

Table 1 Police, Military, and Peacekeeping Codes of Conduct

The layering of civil, criminal, political, and international bodies of law makes for a complex legal environment when coercive force is applied in the international arena. The establishment of international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court also raises new questions about the responsibilities of police or soldiers deployed outside national boundaries to execute warrants for arrest or to enforce international norms (Breau, 2005). For example, in July 1997, British soldiers attached to NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina executed a sealed warrant to arrest Bosnian Serb police chief Simo Drljaca near Prijedor as a ‘person indicted for war crimes’. It is interesting to note that this was conducted as a military rather than a police operation, similar to the principle of military aid to the civil power.

Figure 1 illustrates two other generalisations related to size, violence and law. Smaller organisations with less capacity to manage violence, like the police (or unarmed military observers), rely more on the application of rule sets and direct communication with those they must deal with. Larger and more coercive organisations like armies (or the interior ministry troops of authoritarian states) rely more on coercion and less on the communication and rule of law.

3.3 Blending Across Boundaries

David Last 6/22 3/02/2011
In this section, I compare police, paramilitary, and military functions against the taxonomy above in three archetypal forms of intervention, which might be labelled imperial policing, UN peacekeeping, and coalition stabilisation operations. In the first case, the data is anecdotal and descriptive, drawn mainly from the experience of British and French colonial policing in Africa. UN Peacekeeping offers more opportunity for systematic comparison of mandates, roles and tasks, and here I have focused on the tasks assigned to UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL, more recently called UNPOL) and the extent to which they have assumed (or not) military and paramilitary functions. Finally, I examine NATO’s Implementation and Stabilisation Forces [IFOR and SFOR] as examples of transitional security roles in stabilisation operations.

3.3.1 Imperial Policing

The word ‘peace-keeping’ entered modern political discourse when the Berlin correspondent of the Times of London referred to Bismarck’s Germany as the ‘peace-maker and peace-keeper of Europe.’ (Times of London, 6 September 1883, cited by the Oxford English Dictionary). The final decades of the nineteenth century, and the period preceding the First World War, was in some ways a period similar to the end of the twentieth century. It was a period of globalisation, relatively free movement of people, goods, and services, and competition for control of peripheral areas through trade and investment. But the trade and investment had to be secured according to law and rules that were compatible with European ways of doing business, and so colonialism was directly linked to forms of policing that extended the nineteenth century European liberal idea of policing an orderly society into the international arena.

Palmer (1988) describes the coercive origins of colonial policing in the Dublin Police Act of 1786, which preceded community-governed police in both Edinburgh (1805) and London (1829). Food exports from Ireland’s well-policed estates were important fuel for the industrial revolution and rising living standards in Great Britain. It was natural to extend the model to other colonial holdings, where the structure and tasks of the colonial police followed naturally from the economic activities and interests of the colonial power.

In colonial Kenya, the protection of European persons and property, numbering only about 20 thousand before the Second World War, was a ‘near obsession’ and all elements of colonial administration were, in some senses, involved in policing. The police force comprised European Inspectors, with some Asian juniors, and an entirely African rank and file. In the early nineteen hundreds, while the East African protectorate was still being ‘pacified’ the police were as much military as civilian, with recruits up to 1920 drawn mainly from a military background, and priority given to drill and riflery exercises. Reforms in 1907 and 1908 established the Kenyan national police force as an armed paramilitary body responsible for white-settled areas, while colonial administrators established tribal police in the black areas. Kenyan policing became less military with the introduction of community and night police patrols in 1925, but continued to be used as a means of controlling the population, collecting taxes and fines, and limiting internal movement (Anderson, 1991). It moved quickly back towards a paramilitary function during the Mau Mau insurgency (Joes, 2004).

The blurring of commercial, military and paramilitary functions with policing was even more evident on the Gold Coast in West Africa. Killingray (1991) describes the evolution of a
dual system of police in the British Gold Coast territories. An armed frontier force secured the territory as European control expanded inland, while a smaller unarmed civil police force expanded social control over coastal towns and villages. Continuing instability led to reliance on a paramilitary force. Frontier police officers had military training, and recruits were often from different regions, therefore mercenary rather than local, living in barracks and being deployed in platoons and companies under European officers:

‘Large areas of the Gold Coast could still be defined as “frontier” well into the twentieth century. Unlike the frontiers of settlement in Canada, Australia and parts of South Africa, where generally policing was with the consent of the community, the Gold Coast and the other colonies in West Africa had frontiers of administration with a mobile paramilitary police presence. Military discipline and armaments, especially artillery and machine guns, introduced in 1888, were seen as essential to repress and intimidate a truculent and unreliable population.’(Killingray, 1991, pp. 120-121)

The War Office in London resented the imperial commitment to policing the Gold Coast when the burden fell on the regular army, and eventually separate forces were established, wholly subsidized by commercial interests. The Railway and Mines Police, established in 1901, and the Escort Police, established in 1902, were composed mainly of ex-soldiers responsible to the companies exploiting the territory for gold, gemstones, timber, and plantation products. Killingray describes these privatised paramilitary ‘khaki police’ as hated and distrusted aliens, and a step backwards from civil policing. By 1913, most police were regarded as agents of an occupying commercial power (Killingray, 1991).

As European attention was absorbed in the First and Second World Wars, and with the intervening economic disruption, police administration in most European colonies in Africa settled into a common pattern. Relatively more consensual unarmed police in the coastal urban areas, supported by local elites, were concerned mainly with social control. Commercial interests subsidised paramilitary police, in areas of economic interest, directly or indirectly. These interests usually benefited from political connections in the colonial power. Finally, tribal police under civil administration were responsible for reserves and black homeland areas.

The examples could be multiplied from other colonial policing experiences, but this may be sufficient to generalise about imperial policing. The first function of imperial police, historically, has been the coercive control of populations and territories, which are of economic interest to an imperial power. This seems to be as true of internal nation building in the British Isles, in France and Italy, as it was later in their colonies. Anecdotally, the emergence of civil policing in colonial areas (usually in coastal cities) was blended with continuing paramilitary functions of population control (in the interior), and the extent of this control was linked to the economic interests of the classes directing colonial policy and managing the police.

3.3.2 UN Peacekeeping and police

In contrast to imperial policing, UN policing occurs almost exclusively within the framework of international peacekeeping. International peacekeeping is legitimised by mandates from the United Nations or regional organisations, and typically enjoys the consent of the host nation,
voluntary contributions, and reimbursement of some or all expenses from assessed financial contributions to the organisation. Although some have labelled peacekeeping as a form of neo-imperialism (for example Razack, 2004), the record is that most missions have focused on improving security within a framework of rule of law. UN peacekeeping—with soldiers, police, or both—tends to look like community policing at the international level. It is more like the London Metropolitan Police and less like the Royal Irish Constabulary.

From the early days of international supervision of peace processes under the League of Nations in the nineteen-twenties, unarmed military observers with diplomatic status have been employed to provide information to the international community (Wainhouse, 1966). As missions expanded and became more ambitious in their mandates, military observers and police both became more numerous, but police have a distinct advantage in reporting on human rights and supporting the protection of civilians, and have grown exponentially since the mid nineteen-nineties, as shown in Figure 2, while the deployment of military observers [MILOBS] has remained relatively static.

**Figure 2: Increasing Prevalence of Police**

The character of international policing is partly revealed in the roles typically assigned to international policing missions. These are summarised in Table 2 indicating the number of times each role occurs in a sample of more than thirty peacekeeping missions including police.

**Table 2 International Policing Roles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A – Assist, train, develop</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M – Monitor, observe, investigate complaints</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V – Verify compliance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H – humanitarian, human rights, and refugee assistance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P – Active policing (e.g. ‘assist in maintaining law and order’)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E – Electoral role</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I – Investigation (related to international law and prosecutions)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C – Monitor or inspect correctional services and prisons</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L – liaison</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R – Riot control and paramilitary functions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D – Assist with, monitor, or supervise demobilisation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J – assist with or monitor the judiciary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S – security of leaders of key people</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The list above is derived from a review of international police missions with UN mandates, and a smaller sample of those mandated by regional organisations, from 1960 to 2003. The sample of 36 missions follows as Table 3. Table 2 is arranged according to the frequency with which roles occur. Of the 36 missions in the sample, all but four include training assistance (A), monitoring (M), or both. Three of those that do not are small liaison missions under political rather than peacekeeping mandates (UNOGBIS, UNOA, and BONUCA). Only the

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3 Michelle Malenfant and Nancy Reid assisted with collation of data.
4 United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau; UN Observermission Angola; Bureau d’appui des Nations Unies pour la consolidation de la paix en République Centrafricaine
Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe in 1979 included both an executive policing mandate and an election monitoring function. Another exception is the close personal protection role assigned to police teams in MONUA\(^5\)—a consequence of specific threats and the lack of specialised protection skills amongst the military forces contributed. These anomalies aside, it is reasonable to conclude that most international policing missions focus on developing local police forces that conform to international standards, and support human rights and rule of law. Table 3 is arranged chronologically, and shows that neither policing nor executive policing are post-Cold War phenomena.

**Table 3 Sample of International Police Missions**

The more ambivalent cases of international policing are those in which police operate with executive authority or have public order responsibilities. In these cases there may be disputed authority, limited consent, and little influence over the governance of the police by the host nation, whose legitimacy may be in question, often due to protracted conflict or civil war. Table 2 shows nine missions with executive mandates (P), and three with public order (R, riot control) responsibilities. These can be labelled executive policing missions, and in every case, the authority of the host nation is necessarily diminished by the mandate of the international force.

Three caveats about executive policing are required. First, the role codes in Table 2 and Table 3 do not reflect the wide range of policing or constabulary functions typically carried out by military units, including crowd control, presence patrols, confidence-building, mediation in local disputes, traffic control, assistance with displaced populations, and so on (Peacekeeper’s Handbook, 1978). One of the earliest multifunctional peacekeeping transition missions—UNTEA\(^6\) and UNSF\(^7\) in West Irian (1963)—included a battalion of Pakistani light infantry assigned to policing and public order duties under the supervision of Dutch colonial police, who in turn were monitored by the Transitional Executive Administration (Blue Helmets, 1997). Table 3 shows UNSF as including 120 police, because of the company-sized group assigned to policing tasks. Policing in peacekeeping operations is not the exclusive preserve of the police.

The second caveat is that the total in Table 2 does not include units assigned to coalition forces like NATO’s IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because the Multinational Specialised Unit [MSU] operated under the military command of SFOR rather than the International Police Task Force, it is not reflected in this table, or the larger table, where UNMIBH IPTF (UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina International Police Task Force) does not reflect an ‘R’ function. The MSU did, however, include civilian police and investigators. On the other hand, the Polish riot control company assigned to UNTAES\(^8\) is associated with the ‘R’ function in Tables 1 and 2. Thus, when an alliance or coalition deploy troops or paramilitary units with policing functions, simply listing police mandates does not reveal the full complexity of international policing. Examples like the MSU suggest that military organisations may find it

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\(^5\) UN Observer Mission in Angola

\(^6\) United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

\(^7\) United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea

\(^8\) United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia
easier to shift down the scale to perform paramilitary or policing functions than the reverse, but they still need the specialised expertise of embedded police, lawyers, and investigators.

The third caveat concerns UNFICYP in Cyprus and ONUC\(^9\) in the Congo. In each case, the ambit of international policing came to be geographically limited. In the Congo, the riot control company was responsible for public order only in the capital, so the police-to-population ratio in Table 4 is really meaningless. Cyprus is more interesting. Although UNFICYP’s mandate remained substantively unchanged (preserving the status quo), the circumstances in which it executed this mandate changed dramatically in 1974 with the Turkish Peace Operation (or invasion), which divided the island. From 1964 to 1974, UN police had an executive mandate and public order function throughout the island in support of the military force. After 1974, however, policing was limited to the buffer zone between the Turkish Cypriot north and the Greek Cypriot South, within which soldiers assumed responsibility for crowd control. Within the communities of north and south Cyprus, indigenous police and judicial institutions have evolved since 1974 along trajectories established prior to independence, secured in part by the buffer zone established by UNFICYP. In 1967, Australian police officers advised British and Canadian company commanders who served as arbitrators in local disputes in their company areas (Harbottle, 1970). After 1974 this executive policing role for soldiers and police alike was confined to the buffer zone and unequivocal local sovereignty was established in both north and south. Thus, mandated executive policing functions for an international force can be eclipsed by the emergence of local capacity or changed circumstances.

With these caveats in mind, we can examine executive policing missions, usually accompanied by international military forces. We are interested not just in the mandated tasks, but also the way in which the tasks are executed, and the degree to which international policing supplants or replaces local policing. The ratio of police to the local population is a useful indicator, if it is correctly interpreted. Ratios between 1:500 and 1:800 are common in states at peace. When international police are deployed with ratios much below this and a non-executive monitoring mandate, then we can assume that most of the policing is being done by local police.

If we exclude ONUC and UNFICYP for the reasons discussed above, each of the missions with an executive or public order mandate exhibits a high ratio of international police to local civilians, because the international police are actually fulfilling the function of local police forces that may be compromised or non-existent. The average ratio of police to local population is 1:1.1 million for the larger sample of missions in Table 3, while for police missions in Table 4 it is just 1:790.

Each of the territories listed in Table 4 was literally policed by the international community, within a framework of international force that effectively contains and limits the sovereignty of the host state, while the status of part of its territory changes. Although UNTAG in Namibia did not have an executive mandate, it had a large police force that deployed throughout the country, and the upshot of the mission was a change in the territorial status of Namibia, from eristwhile mandated territory under South African governance to independence.

The UN Guards Contingent in Iraq [UNGCI] is the only example of a non-national UN civilian deployment. Recruited directly by UN Headquarters in New York in the same way as the Headquarters’ security guards, the 500 uniformed civilians were responsible for policing the refugee camps in northern Iraq, under the implicit protection of the US-imposed no-fly zone.

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\(^9\) organisation des Nations Unies au Congo
Limiting the extent to which Saddam Hussein’s security forces could impose rule from Baghdad enhanced the relative autonomy of the Kurdish region of Iraq, and has shaped the region’s political evolution in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s defeat.

Table 4 really reflects two different kinds of circumstances. The Congo and Cambodia are examples of internationally supported political change within a state. All the others represent changing territorial status. In most cases, this involves taking territory away from the control of a capital or government, and giving the territory new status, autonomy, or even independence. Often the capital or government has lost its legitimacy through abuse or changing norms, and usually the change of status has the broad approval of the international community. The Netherlands lost West Irian to Indonesia, Britain lost Cyprus and South Africa lost Namibia to independence. The UN supported Kurdish autonomy as they wrested control from Baghdad, Croatian sovereignty as Eastern Slavonia was reassigned from Belgrade to Zagreb, Kosovar autonomy as Belgrade was cut out, and Timorese independence from Indonesia. In these cases, executive policing, combined with internationally sanctioned military force, has been used as a vehicle for changing the status of territory in the international states system.

Table 4: Executive and Public Order Policing Missions

Even where there is not an executive mandate, the isolation of territory from its erstwhile capital city, and the creation of new ‘community-based’ police forces may, de facto, precipitate a change in the status of the territory, and certainly facilitates devolution of powers. It is arguable that this is what has happened in Kosovo and is going on now in South Sudan and Northern Iraq. Populations that have been marginalised and abused have appealed to an international community, which has afforded some protection from abusive sovereignty while local institutions develop that provide for local policing and security. In the case of South Sudan and Kosovo, international assistance actively developed policing institutions, which have been subsequently used to buttress local claims for autonomy. Drawn largely from volunteers from a liberation movement, the Kosovo police force evolved into a paramilitary security force while the status of the territory remained undecided, and in 2009 Kosovo declared independence unilaterally.

If imperial policing is about the control of populations on behalf of economically interested outsiders, international policing seems to have two faces in support of international norms. As a lighter presence, international police support rule of law and international standards of human rights and civil control. This seems to apply to the majority of international police missions. As a heavier presence, when their role appears to be policing on behalf of the international community rather than the host nation, they tend to support internationally approved changes to the status of territory. These heavier presences tend to be supported by significant military forces, often organized as coalitions rather than UN peacekeeping forces.

3.4 Modern Coalition Operations

Polemicists like Noam Chomsky are wont to label American-led efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as imperialism (Chomsky, 2007). There is some evidence that economic interests have played a role in strategic decisions in both conflicts but coalition operations exhibit a pattern different from imperial policing. Empires generally competed, while coalitions cooperate. Coalition operations are usually authorised by resolutions of the UN or regional bodies (Chapter 8 of the
UN Charter) like the EU, NATO, or the OSCE. While imperial policing aimed at population control to support economic exploitation, coalition operations aim to stabilise conflicts, extricate themselves as quickly as possible, and return control of policing and security to acceptable local authorities. In this process they deploy military, paramilitary, and police forces, which perform various combinations of functions to support the transition from military to civilian and from international to local control. I will illustrate this with the single case study of NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1996 to 1998. As in cases of imperial policing, population control is central. As in cases of UN-led executive policing, building (internationally) acceptable institutions for the locals to conduct their own policing proceeds in parallel with military missions.

Malainey (2009), a Canadian Forces intelligence officer, examined the sequence of transition in security management from military to civilian and from international to local control in Bosnia-Herzegovina from December 1995 to June 2000. During this transition the Serb, Croat and Muslim (Bosniak) entity forces resisted reform and sought to continue to control their own populations, using security rationales that paralleled those of the international community. Malainey describes three phases in the transition, labelled by NATO as Operation Joint Endeavour (December 1995 to December 1996), Operation Joint Guard (December 1996 to June 1998) and Operation Joint Forge (June 1998 to June 2000).

Table 5 shows the relative strength of international military, paramilitary and police forces over these three periods – declining military forces and rising police and paramilitary levels.

Table 5 International police and military levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Dec 95-Dec 96</th>
<th>Dec 96-Jun 98</th>
<th>Jun 98-Jun 00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military (IFOR/SFOR)</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>22,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paramilitary (MSU)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVPOL (UNMIBH/IPTF)</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>1,832</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Over the same period, the General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Accords) provided for reduction and eventual unification of the entity armed forces. Prior to the civil war’s outbreak in 1992, Yugoslavia had civil police, special (paramilitary) police, and a national army with both regular and reserve components. During the war, the special police, or MUP, deployed light armoured vehicles and heavy weapons, while the police were engaged in paramilitary tasks including route security and surveillance. Political influence in police and special police of all three entities was pervasive, and throughout the five years following the war, the police associated with each community resisted the return of displaced minorities of other ethnic groups. The sequence of tasks assigned to international military and police forces, and the impact of these tasks on local police, paramilitary and military forces demonstrates both the blurring of distinctions during conflict, and the effort to re-impose distinctions through the process of security sector reform.

The critical perspective is that rich developed countries cooperate to impose a neo-liberal order on disorderly peripheral areas. This critique, by polemicists of the left like Chomsky (2007), and Chossudovsky (2002, 2005) is not at odds with the descriptions of American strategic writers like Phillip Bobbit (2002) and Tom Reich (1991) both of whom served in Clinton’s cabinet and Tom Barnett (2004) who advised the second Bush administration. They differ on their assessment of whether it serves the interests of peripheral states.

I am grateful to my student, Janice Malainey (2009), for her original work on this subject.
The military mandate in December 1995 included cantonment of factional forces, ensuring safety and security of the public, providing for the safe return of displaced and refugee populations. The provision of policing services and arrest of persons indicted for war crimes remained the responsibility of the police forces of the parties to the Dayton Accords, under the supervision of the IPTF reporting to the UNMIBH. UNMIB/IPTF was responsible for assisting the local forces in establishing rule of law and achieving international standards of human rights. During this first phase, almost 300,000 conscripts were voluntarily demobilised by the three entities. Although the majority had served with military units, this number included reservists who had served with police and special police units.

Notwithstanding the heavy international military presence in the first period, local police in each entity continued to serve a paramilitary population control function, running sentry and surveillance posts, vehicle control checkpoints and aggressive patrols (on and off duty) in mixed ethnicity areas. NATO IFOR was concentrated on cantonment and supervision of military forces, and did not devote much effort to monitoring civilian police, although fewer than 1,500 of the IPTF had deployed as late as June 1996. The activities of the entity police and special police can be seen as coercive ‘high policing’ in the interests of the established political authorities. In contrast to imperial policing, the aim of the international coalition operation was to prevent this coercive high policing and instil community-controlled low policing, sensitive to the needs of minority groups. The Bonn-Petersburg Agreement of April 1996 initiated the police reform process in the Bosniak-Croat Federation, but not the Serb Republic. Police forces in all three entities continued to be implicated in human rights abuses and civil violence aimed at deterring minority return (Bair & Dziedzic, 1998).

It was in the second period under Operation Joint Guard that concerted cooperation by NATO’s Stabilisation Force [SFOR] and IPTF set the conditions for genuine police reform, by removing both individuals and capacity for coercive high policing. Serb special police chief Simo Drljaca was killed by British Special Forces when they attempted to arrest him on a sealed indictment from the International Criminal Tribunal in July 1997. SFOR’s seizure of the Serb-controlled radio-television towers at Kozara, and the special police headquarters in Banja Luka further weakened paramilitary resistance, and accelerated the IPTF’s program of vetting and certification of entity police in the Serb Republic. The Office of the High Representative designated special police units as military forces in July 1997, allowing the cantonment of arms and equipment and demobilisation of many of the troops who had been involved in population control in Serb Republic. By December 1997 more than 400,000 people had returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina, though still mainly to areas in which the returnees were a majority.

The demilitarisation of entity police forces, and efforts to reduce their capacity for population control, left the international forces holding that responsibility, with little capacity for crowd control or the management of riots and public disturbances that continued to be a feature of Bosnian politics. In the third period, Operation Joint Forge, NATO introduced a 600-strong Multinational Specialised Unit [MSU] consisting of Italian Carabinieri, with integral intelligence as well as police, civil affairs, and US Psychological Operations in support (Perito, 2004). By this point, the focus of SFOR operations had begun to shift to professionalisation of the entity armed forces. I vividly remember my contrasting impression of Bosniak officers in 1994 and 1998; they had progressed from thin and dangerous-looking young men worried about machine guns and tanks, to plumper and more relaxed young men worried about PowerPoint, pensions, and budgets. The entity armed forces were not yet integrated, but they had probably passed the point at which there was imminent danger of renewed hostilities. Police were
making a comparable transition, although as late as 2000, Canadian police advisors were reporting ethnic segregation in police stations (Chenier, 2000), and this was not a problem for which NATO military support was helpful.

The NATO-led coalition operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina had begun as a military mission, and moved progressively towards a civilian-led mission aimed at achieving European standards of community policing and human rights for minorities. As the transition from military to civilian priorities was effected, local leadership and priorities increasingly eclipsed those of the international community, sometimes slowing and reversing progress, but necessarily accommodating the real fears of groups that perceived themselves to be threatened by the changes to policing and security. This transition process from military to civilian and from international to local also had an impact on the suite of skills deployed by international military and police forces. No officer who served in the Balkans of the late 1990s could be oblivious to policing functions and principles; no police officer could deny the necessity of military back up. The continuity of security services offered by military and police, and the necessity of a paramilitary function to fill the gap between them have been widely observed by international participants. Police-military relations in western countries have been affected for a generation by veterans of the Balkans, who have imparted a new understanding of the interplay between police and military functions.

3.5 Consent, legitimacy, and blurring of police and military responsibilities

In this chapter I began with the historical evolution of the distinction between police, paramilitary and military forces. This evolution is a function of the way in which states manage populations. In urban areas, which benefited from evolving economies, community policing emerged under the control of the middle classes. As empires expanded, the police in cosmopolitan coastal cities were more benign than the paramilitary police who secured internal trade routes and extraction of commodities. Here police took on paramilitary forms, and paramilitary forces performed more coercive functions. In turn, they took on more military roles in wartime.

As decolonisation proceeded after the Second World War, and international rule of law expanded under the United Nations, military forces were generally deployed with the consent of local populations, and enjoyed the legitimacy of international mandates. They were frequently referred to as constabulary forces, and performed patrolling and community liaison functions that mirrored those of police forces at home. Police forces (or light infantry with policing functions) were a feature of UN missions as early as the nineteen-sixties, and have become increasingly common since. By the mid-nineties, international civilian police had begun to eclipse the much older institution of military observers (Figure 2). But there is a subset of international peacekeeping missions in which international police have executive powers over the local population, and in these missions they are deployed in ratios that approximate the police-to-population ratios of western democracies, backed up by coercive military force that constrains the sovereignty of the erstwhile capital (Table 4). These missions look more like coalition missions. Indeed, UNMIK\(^{12}\) coexists with KFOR in Kosovo in the same way that UNMIBH worked with IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina.

The pattern of coalition missions is that a heavy military presence establishes unequivocal international sovereignty in a territory, separating it from control of its former

\(^{12}\) Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
government, then the military presence diminishes over time while increasing police and civilian development efforts attempt to establish a new rule of law that conforms to international standards. In this process, military forces shift from intimidation and cantonment of local armed forces to patrolling and confidence building measures aimed at the civilian population. Civilian police, meanwhile become increasingly numerous and pervasive, until they are confident that local police can assume their functions impartially. This anodyne description omits important details about the political and economic beneficiaries of the new order, and the extent to which the forces under the control of the international community may overrule legitimate local security and economic interests. If, when the dust settles, the country’s resources are under international control, local politicians are impotent to address their citizens’ concerns, then coalition stabilisation operations will be indistinguishable from imperial policing, and Afghan police will wonder who they have been fighting for.

References


Chossudovsky, Michel (2002), *America’s War on Terrorism*. Ottawa: Centre for Research on Globalisation.


Figures

Figure 1: Violence, Size, and Law

What violence does the organization address?
- Maximum violence to defeat an enemy threatening the state
- Organised criminal activity and threats to public order, internal security
- Individual and criminal violence and social misdemeanors

What bodies of law are applicable to the duties of the organization?
- International
- Military
- Paramilitary
- Special forces and counter-terrorist units
- Special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams

Developed from Last, 1997

* Political laws are those which constrain acceptable political behaviour in a state, such as counter-terrorism or homeland security legislation that triggers special provisions for defence of the state.

Figure 2: Increasing Prevalence of Civilian Police

CIVPOL and M

Figures compiled by Nancy Reid from UN DPKO Sources

David Last 19/22 3/02/2011
### Table 1 Police, Military, and Peacekeeping Codes of Conduct

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prevent crime rather than repressing it</td>
<td>1. Consent or request of the parties to the conflict</td>
<td>1. Fight only enemy combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Secure willing observance of laws</td>
<td>3. Voluntary contributions from non-superpowers</td>
<td>3. Do not torture or kill POWs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cooperation reduces the need for physical force</td>
<td>4. Impartiality</td>
<td>4. Collect and care for all wounded, friend or enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Impartial service to law rather than pandering to public opinion, friendly good-humour and courtesy</td>
<td>5. Control by the Secretary-General</td>
<td>5. Do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Use force only as a last resort, and use only the minimum amount of force necessary</td>
<td>6. Destroy no more than the mission requires</td>
<td>6. Treat all civilians humanely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. All citizens have police responsibilities</td>
<td>7. Treat all civilians humanely</td>
<td>7. Respect private property and possessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Do not judge guilt or innocence</td>
<td>8. Respect private property and possessions</td>
<td>8. Prevent and report violations of the law of war</td>
</tr>
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### Table 2 International Policing Roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Assist, train, develop</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Monitor, observe, investigate complaints</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Verify compliance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Humanitarian, human rights, and refugee assistance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Active policing (e.g. ‘assist in maintaining law and order’)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Electoral role</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Investigation (related to international law and prosecutions)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Monitor or inspect correctional services and prisons</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Riot control and paramilitary functions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Assist with, monitor, or supervise demobilisation</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Assist with or monitor the judiciary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Security of leaders of key people</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Table 3 Sample of International Policing Missions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>roles</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>report to</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>P,R,A</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>FC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSF</td>
<td>West Irian</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>P,R,A</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>HM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>P,M,A</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>FC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>P,E</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>CW-HM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>M,V,E</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>M,V</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>FC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNBRO</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>M,H</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CM</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>CM</td>
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<td>UNGCI</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>500</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>M,V,E</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>P,A,I</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
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<td>M,V,H</td>
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<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>A,H</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>SRSG</td>
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<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<td>A,D</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>A,H,I</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>54</td>
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<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>M,H</td>
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<td>M,A,V,E</td>
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<td>Albania</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>M,A</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>M,V</td>
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<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>P,A</td>
<td>4700</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
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<td>P,A</td>
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<td>A,H</td>
<td>30</td>
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## Table 4 Executive and Public Order Policing Missions

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<th>Mission</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Police/Population</th>
<th>Roles</th>
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David Last

21/22

3/02/2011
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>strength</th>
<th>strength¹</th>
<th>on ratio</th>
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<td>Congo</td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>West Irian</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1,500</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>1964</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>6,411</td>
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<td>(UNITAG)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>4,493</td>
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<td>UNGCI</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Northern Iraq³</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>5,561</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>E. Timor</td>
<td>1640</td>
<td>7,687</td>
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<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>E. Timor</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>4,776</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Maximum strength of accompanying troops; NATO KFOR in the case of UNMIK
2. No executive or public order mandate, but large and ubiquitous police deployment
3. Backed by US air strikes to deter Baghdad interference
4. UNGCI deployment was limited to refugee areas of northern Iraqi Kurdistan, with a population of about 600,000
4. Civilised Coercion, Militarised Law and Order:

*Security in Colonial South Asia and the Blue in Green Global Order*

**Beatrice Jauregui**

**Introduction**

The essays in this volume are generally concerned with analysing empirical cases of apparent or potential ‘blurring’ of the roles and responsibilities of military and civil police organisations. If we consider the problem historically and philosophically, we realise that conflation and recombination of police and military forms and roles has been a social fact across time and space, and especially in the West and Western-influenced regions, since security forces began to be organised (Mann, 1993). Overlap and integration of military and police forces is not a recent phenomenon. Moreover, this phenomenon should *not* be conceived as a matter of inherently distinct institutions converging or resembling each other in specific contexts. Rather, their convergence is a function of this social fact: as the bounded nation-state has become the standard unit of governance, the police and the military have *co-developed* in both theory and practice as the primary institutional means of coercion providing security and order within and among states.

Political scientists and other scholars of civil-military relations have long imagined a neat and natural division between martial and civil spheres of security and order, marking the former as using lethal force against foreign foes and encroachments, and understanding the latter as employing minimum force as necessary to preserve order in the domestic sphere (see
Huntington, 1957; Bittner, 1970; Welch, 1976; Feaver, 2005; Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006). However, when both theory and practice of security organisations are pressed, it becomes clear that the gap between military and civil spheres has rarely been either stark or stable. Rules vary across time and space regarding deployment of military forces in domestic spaces and use of civil police across international boundaries. Moreover, an expanding congeries of more or less official-legal and legitimate coercive apparatuses dedicated to security and order has developed, including transnational governmental organisations like Interpol and UNCIVPOL [United Nations Civilian Police], private security services, paramilitaries, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism forces.

Nevertheless, there remains an idealised bright line distinguishing the means and ends of military forces and civil police as the coercive conduits of legal or legitimate authority. Samuel E. Finer (2002[196]) has observed that, ‘there is a common assumption, an unreflecting belief, that it is somehow “natural” for the armed forces to obey the civil power’ (p.5). As indicated by his choices to use the words ‘unreflecting belief’ and to flank the word ‘natural’ with inverted commas, distinct spheres of civil and military authority to deploy force are not ontological realities, but ideological assumptions. Building on Finer’s observation, I have demonstrated elsewhere that among proponents of liberal democracy there exists a ‘Blue in Green’ paradigm of security, which presumes that even if military might is deemed necessary in a specific instance, ultimately the peace and public order ‘internal’ to a state ought to be secured by an institutional means of coercion that is not only controlled by but also embodied in a civil authority (Jauregui, 2010a; 2010b). Part and parcel of this now globally hegemonic paradigm is an assumed moral ascendancy of civil authority to deploy coercion, which is represented not only by the civic statesman (or politician) but also by the police officer. Like the professional
soldier, the professional police officer ideally answers to a ‘single recognised source of legitimate authority’ (Huntington, 1957, p. 35); but unlike the soldier, the police officer also represents the very incarnation of this morally superior civil authority, not just another tool in the kit to be used when necessary.

The Blue in Green security paradigm is operationalised according to a logic that ‘civilisation’ of practices and persons indexes both human progress and the mode through which the general will of ‘the people’ (howsoever defined) is best expressed. Significantly, the division marking the moral ascendency of ‘the thin blue line’ is not merely constructed, but also manipulable, and indeed regularly manipulated by authoritative actors according to political ideologies, cultural beliefs, and historical contingencies. Thus, a crucial task for the social theorist is to de-naturalise and re-historicise the distinction between ‘Blue’ and ‘Green’ forms and spheres of coercion, and to investigate who controls the definitions of these categories, by what means and toward which ends, and under what circumstances. In this vein, I will here analyse how the Blue in Green paradigm has developed and manifested in political theory and practice in the West, with special attention to its manifestations in European colonialism. Then I will examine with some specificity how this emerging security paradigm configured debates regarding security, order-keeping and good governance among British colonists of South Asia, especially in the earlier phases of colonisation. I do this to provide an illustrative historical example of the paradoxes inherent to the paradigm, not with a view to describing or explaining ‘recent exercises of projecting foreign power abroad in the language of imperialism and empire’ (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007, p. 16). Finally, I will discuss how assumptions of the supremacy of what I am calling ‘civilised coercion’ have become sublimated and
institutionalised in discourses on police in post-colonial India specifically, and in the politics of international interventions in policing ‘developing’ or ‘transitional’ democracies generally. ¹

4.1 A Brief Philosophical History of Security-cum-Civility in the West

The globally hegemonic Blue in Green paradigm propping up a civil-ised coercive apparatus in Western regimes has a long and complex history, the details of which are beyond the scope of this essay. But I will gloss some key moments, figures and concepts here as orienting signposts. By the 16th century in both Continental Europe and Great Britain, there was already clear evidence in written texts of idealised distinctions between civil and military spheres, and between citizens and soldiers (OED, 2009). As stated above, beyond a mere dividing line, one may also discern the linguistic spread of an assumption that virtue and moral supremacy suffuse the civil or civilian realm far more than they do the military realm. Norbert Elias provides one of the most extensive treatments of the increase and intensification of the moral value of ‘civility’ and ‘civilisation’ in Europe from the medieval period to the 20th century, and how this relates to major social changes not only in manners and fault lines between classes, but also in war-making, state-making and political economy (Elias, 2000[1939]). Even Thomas Hobbes, whose Leviathan is understood to control with sceptre and sword a natural war of every man against every man, insists that, ‘manners... those qualities of man-kind that concern their living together

¹ Throughout this essay, in certain moments I purposely write civil-ised, civil-ising, or civil-isation with a hyphen rather than the far more popular – and uncritical – terms civilised, civilising, or civilisation in order to indicate an idealised social process of shifting (or having shifted) from a sphere of influence defined as military in character to one defined as civil in character, usually though not always with reference to administrative coercion. At other times—including in the title of the essay—I purposely use the unhyphenated terms to indicate either their use by others, or the idealised completion of the above mentioned process of ‘civil-isation’. While some may find it awkward, the distinction is neither arbitrary nor trivial.
in Peace, and Unity’, or what may be called the building blocks of a civil order, are immanent to the authority of the sovereign and the willful obedience of its subjects just as much as, if not more so than, war-making and military conquest (Hobbes, 1968[1651], p. 160-1, 185). Hobbes makes abundantly clear his understanding that the will of the political subject is not merely a matter of necessity in enduring a ‘nasty, brutish and short’ life, but rather a question of consciously trusting the sovereign to oversee a time-space in which individuals may not only survive, but also thrive and realise opportunities to ‘live well’ (cf., Foucault, 2003[1976]).

Simultaneously, there are philosophies contending that while civility and manners may matter, legitimate coercion by violence is necessary (if not sufficient) to governance and security (Weber, 1958a, 1978[1919]). Historian J. G. A. Pocock has argued that although, ‘the classical [republican] citizen... insists that he is living in the realm of freedom and not that of necessity,’ in actual fact, the citizen’s ability to remain virtuous necessitates specific material foundations, namely, ‘arms first and property after’ (Pocock, 1985, p. 44). It is worth comparing Pocock’s analysis of this particular conception of virtue (‘chiefly in the eighteenth century’) with Machiavelli’s notion of virtù, which seems at first blush to have a very different meaning in its application to political leaders — i.e. to princes and military generals alike — who must be ruthlessly strategic in order to guarantee the vitality and longevity of the state (Machiavelli, 1966[1513], 1965[1520]). Machiavelli’s concept of virtù and his name itself have become virtually synonymous with a militant lust for absolute power, and with this end justifying any violent means; but what often gets lost in this simplification of the Florentine administrator’s political theory is that he, too, bestowed a kind of moral privilege to the realm of the civil over that of the martial. Recall that Machiavelli was a civil servant and a diplomat; he was a classical republican (or civic humanist), not a proponent of military despotism. This is particularly clear,
if ironically so, in his claim that a military comprised of soldiers and leaders with virtù is not simply necessary in moments of exigency but rather an integral part of the strong civic life of a people. Indeed, he averred that any state without a strong military is, ‘like a magnificent roofless palace which, though full of jewels and costly furniture, must soon moulder into ruin since it has nothing but its splendour and riches to defend it from the ravages of the weather’ (Machiavelli, 1965[1520], p. 4). Perhaps he was simply more clear-sighted or transparent in articulating the centrality of strategic use of violence to statecraft than English liberal counterparts like John Locke, and later John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, all of whom vehemently opposed standing armies based on a belief that professional militaries would only serve to foster corruption and tyranny among free political subjects.

Debates over professional standing armies raged as long and hard as some wars in Enlightenment Era Europe, especially in revolutionary-era England. Over time they morphed into contentions over how best to professionalise the army and how to ensure sufficient civilian control of the military (Clausewitz, 1989[1832]; Huntington, 1957). These debates over best practices of the military were paralleled by homologous contestations over whether and how to found professional police forces to keep internal order (Rawlings, 2002). In 18th century Britain, constabulary and gendarmerie organisations like those established in France, Germany and other parts of continental Europe, were popularly viewed as potentially limiting or denying the cherished liberties of post-1688 subjects. Over time, however, the tides turned to a general (if still-contested) view that the best way to secure civil liberties - especially the freedom to accumulate and own property, and expand capitalist enterprise - was in fact to create centralised government institutions that controlled and implemented the means of coercion. Sir Robert Peel’s 1829 Metropolitan Police Act rode into law on this wave of civil security discourse, which
grew alongside public disenchantment with military and military-alternative responses to public disorder, à la the 1819 Peterloo Massacre in Manchester in which the royal cavalry fired on civilians protesting economic depression and rising food prices (Reid, 1989). It is crucial that these complex changes in theories and practices of security not be conceived as inevitable, nor be mistaken for a revolutionary overhaul from a violent order maintained by the military to a moral order preserved by the civil police. Rather, we must understand that both civil police and military forces have historically co-developed and co-existed to maintain the supreme ideal of order in the modern state. The concomitant logic has become that maximising the capacity of the free subject to exercise his political will requires stability, security, and restraint of both the Self and the Other (cf., Sheptycki, 2007).

4.2 Civil-ising Security and Colonising the Global South

It now generally goes without saying that contests over how best to organise institutions of security and order were not restricted to the European geo-space — although some scholars who have provided alternative histories of nineteenth-century policing would point out that this understanding has not always been taken for granted (see, for example, Arnold, 1986; Brogden, 1987). As imperial expansion took hold across much of the globe in the 18th and 19th centuries, a transnational traffic of concepts and practices of security and law and order arose among the various metropolises and their many colonies (Hussin, 2009). For many administrators and policy-makers of the time, the colonies constituted natural laboratories for producing evidentiary claims about the most effective and fair ways to govern both ‘here’ and ‘there’. But while the Occident was conceived as a space fully permeable to — and theoretically permeated by —
practiced ideals of republican virtue, civil liberty, rational law, and ultimately, democratic participation, the Orient represented rough and mysterious hinterlands, home to ‘backward’ traditions and threatening ‘savage’ inhabitants of ‘Other’ races. Such an unknown and insecure space would at least initially require a militarised instatement of authoritative control over the Other by colonial settlers, or a conquest phase of instituting security (Anderson and Killingray, 1991, p. 12). This would then be followed by an idealised and naturalised (read: ‘evolutionary’) reduction from a military order of oppressing and occupying via destruction and devastation, to a rational legal order secured by a civil-ised coercive apparatus embodied in police.\(^2\)

Writings of French military reformers like marshals Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey and Joseph Simon Galliéni, who participated in colonising North Africa and Southeast Asia, show that colonial warfare was often seen as distinct from conventional warfare or Clausewitzian total warfare. A key component of colonial conquest is not annihilation of the enemy but rather, ‘civilisation... [and] organisation of the conquered people and territory under a particular control’ (Gottman, 1986[1943], pp. 234, 240-1). For Lyautey, author of the essay *Le role social de l’officier Français* (written in 1891), ‘the principal qualities that make the good [military] officer and those which make the good colonial administrator are very much the same’ (*Ibid.*, p. 241). Lyautey argued that this officer/administrator should be responsible for shaping all aspects of society — economic, political, intellectual and otherwise. Galliéni was another vocal proponent of occupation-cum-civilisation, and argued that the colonial soldier is ‘primarily a soldier’ only until he has pacified the population he is charged with conquering. Thereafter, ‘he becomes an administrator... a delicate function, requiring greater diligence, effort and high personal qualities,

\(^2\) Cf., Goldsmith and Sheptycki 2007, p. 15 regarding ‘phases in state-building’. Again, my analysis does not argue that current projections of power, by the US or other Western nation-states, are structurally the same as the imperial designs of previous centuries (cf., Kelly, 2003). However, there are productive points of comparison (and perhaps ideological homologies) between colonial-era and contemporary ‘stage theories’ of various forms of civilisation.
since reconstruction is far more difficult than destruction... During the period following the conquest, the part of the troops is *reduced to policing...* (Ibid., p. 244, emphasis added).

Herein lies what today might appear to be a paradox: a military organisation and its leadership are charged with producing and preserving internal security and order, indeed charged with the authority to govern itself (cf., Koonings and Kruijt, 2002). In this conception of what Galliéni deems to be the real role of the colonial officer as a kind of soldier-administrator, there is a clear integration of military forms and functions with those of both civil police and political authorities. But the take home point is that if we view this critically through a Blue in Green lens, the apparent contradiction is glossed over, *inter alia* it is *legitimised* by an appeal to the fact that ultimately civil authority will maintain order and the conquered people will (somehow) become ‘civilised’ (cf., Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007, p. 16). This contradiction of colonial conquest bringing civilisation and progress is not limited to military theory and practice. Christopher Miller (1994) has explained the more general political paradox of French colonialism’s *mission civilisatrice* praxis, which subjugated people and denied them political will and agency in the name of spreading universal principles of liberty enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man (see also Fanon, 1963[1961]). Such paradoxes, the at-best questionable legitimacy of administrative apparatuses established by foreign occupiers, and the concomitant blurring of military and civil spheres of authority and security, certainly were not limited to French colonial projects. They were also key aspects of other imperial designs and administrative apparatuses, including those of the British. Next, we will analyse in detail how the emerging Blue in Green paradigm evinced itself in the controversial co-development of civil police and military bodies in the ‘crown jewel’ of the empire on which the sun never set.
4.3 Order and Civil-isation in Early Colonial South Asia

When servants of the British East India Company (from here on ‘the Company’) began trading across South Asia in the early 17th century, they focused primarily on producing profits and left the maintenance of law and order mostly to the Mughal rulers and other regional authorities. Persons responsible for local-level order-keeping included chaukidars and other village watchmen, servants of local zamindars (landowners), and armed sepoys (soldiers) hired by the local kotwal or faujdar, officials whose roles were somewhat similar to that of a sheriff (Cohn, 1971, 1987[1960], 1996[1989]; Gupta, 1974). Many persons in these groups also conducted and performed military duties, both offensive and defensive, and generally maintained their own weapons for personal use (Kolff, 1990). There was no clear monopoly on the legal and legitimate means of coercion, and there was no straightforward distinction between public and private spheres, or between military and police organisations and functions.

Even after the pivotal victory of the Company army at the Battle of Plassey in 1757, Company leaders were very slow to form anything resembling a civil police force as separate from the army. One might interpret this as evidence that there were clear designs for the military conquest of South Asia all along (Alavi, 1995); but while there is some historical evidence supporting this claim, it seems ideologically over-determined, and no more robust than other equally plausible explanations. The first and perhaps most significant of these alternative explanations is that in Britain during the latter half of the 18th century, there did not yet exist a

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3 While Anandswarup Gupta asserts that, ‘the Moghal government was essentially a military despotism’ (Gupta, 1974, p. 6), others dispute this claim as too simplistic. See, for example, Kolff (1990), as well as an insightful analysis by Bernard Cohn regarding how Company leaders — including Governor General of Bengal Warren Hastings and Sanskrit/legal scholar William Jones — concluded through their interactions with both Hindu and Muslim legal actors that ‘Indic civilisation’ was in fact not despotic, but just had notions of law that were different from those of Europeans, notions which needed to be respected and incorporated into British administrative apparatuses (Cohn, 1996[1989]).
unified professional police force with clear duties of maintaining order and investigating crime. As Rawlings (2002) demonstrates, the task of maintaining public order was generally carried out by designated guard groups — usually parish councils or community watches, and sometimes standing armies. Tasks like detection of criminals, extraction of confessions, and handing over of the evidence and the accused to the courts were often conducted by professional ‘thief-takers’ who were paid rewards by either private citizens or public officials if their investigative efforts succeeded in identifying and punishing a wrongdoer. In fact, most people with an audible political voice in mid-18th century Britain opposed calls for organising a professional police force, due largely to a shared sense that such responsibilities were best met by volunteer members of whatever local community in which an offence occurred. The second explanation countering a presumption that the colonisation of South Asia was a wholesale military conquest has already been mentioned — namely, early British colonists were more interested in markets and profits than in political and territorial control. Company directors ensured tight control over revenue collection, but historical accounts show that they initially did not want to assume the responsibility of organising security more generally. However, as certain obstacles to their mercantile efforts increased and intensified — especially problems of dacoity (indigenous banditry) and conflicts of interest with the above-mentioned local authorities — British colonists moved to expand their regional control over the means of coercion, so as to render a more secure order in which to conduct business.

Colonial American towns and settlements had similar decentralised systems of security by local militias and fee-for-service sheriffs, marshals, constables and vigilantes, with more centralised public police forces only beginning to crop up in large metropoli in the mid-19th century (see Forst and Manning, 1999).

For further reading on the complex history of dacoity, the classification of ‘criminal’ tribes and castes, and the centrality of these issues to the development of colonial-era laws and security organisations in South Asia see Yang (1985), Arnold (1986) and Singha (2000).
By the turn of the 19th century, Company servants generally seemed to agree that establishing a professional police force would be more cost-effective than relying on the army for maintaining internal order. There was also a strong contingent — including members of one of the earliest police committees formed by Lord Bentinck in 1806 — who argued that founding a civil police organisation was necessary because order-maintenance by an army would potentially, ‘excite alarm and disaffection in the minds of the people’ (Gupta, 1974, p. 90).

Following this vector of thought, Mike Brogden has stated unequivocally that ultimately, ‘colonial policing functioned to legitimate central rule from Westminster [although this was not even an issue until 1858]. Colonial police work, and perhaps in turn British police work, was pre-eminently missionary work to legitimise external governance’ (Brogden, 1987, p. 9). This may be true up to a point; but the drives to organise a police force in colonial South Asia cannot be reduced only to matters of economy of scale, or to a conscious aim to legitimise foreign occupation to either colonised indigenous people or British colonisers themselves (and Brogden does not specify the subjects or the objects of the alleged legitimisation process). A sweeping claim that a professional police by definition or intention legitimises colonial conquest is not only anachronistic, but also stands on unstable ground because it tells us little about what precisely is being legitimised, how this legitimisation process works, and the latter-day effects and outgrowths of this alleged legitimisation.

If we examine the heated debates in colonial South Asia over whether and how to integrate or separate the army and police, then we begin to gain a clearer understanding of what was at stake in efforts to form a professional police force: namely, the moral ascendancy of ‘the civil’. Some British administrators and leaders believed in the necessity of a sharing or fusion of police and military functions, while others argued for complete distinction and a clear fission. In
the former camp fell the likes of General Sir Charles Napier, who in 1843 founded a ‘police force’ in Sindh with well-armed officers, a centralised bureaucracy, uniformed infantry, cavalry, and battalions of troops reputed to be extremely ‘efficient’ in performing their duties of ‘protecting’ the populace. In 1849, a security apparatus similar to that established in Sindh was devised in Punjab, but apparently militarised even more in response to ongoing combative unrest in the area. This organisation consisted of a ‘civil detective police’ and a ‘military preventive police’, and was commended for its thorough suppression of both violent crime and indigenous uprisings (Gupta, 1974).

But even amidst the establishment of these types of ‘mixed’ civil-military organisations in response to the exigencies of colonial administration, the ideal remained of a purely civilised police and a full civil-isation of order keeping. In the early 1850s, as calls grew louder for further decreasing of expenditure and demilitarising of security, some British officials proposed establishing a police organisation for the whole of colonial India that would be congruent to the divisions of the Punjab security apparatus. The proposed institution would consist of a detective police responsible for ‘preparation and production of evidence against criminals’, and a preventive police to keep the peace by thwarting crime and insurrection (Ibid., p. 356). But this division between detective and preventive functions within the police, a re-mapping of the division between civil detective and military preventive forces, never fully resolved the problem.

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6 I use inverted commas around the words ‘efficient’ and ‘protecting’ to index the fact that these kinds of positively charged terms were used as part of a self-serving discourse of colonial dominance, and may not accurately reflect the experiences of colonised subjects. Most historians and sociologists of colonial police seem to assume that Napier’s force in Sindh was modeled explicitly after the militarised and imperial Royal Irish Constabulary. However, other scholars dispute the view that there was even a distinct Irish model to follow (see Hawkins, 1991). This particular debate regarding Western ‘models’ for colonial constabularies has some relevance to reading the co-development of police and military organisations in colonial South Asia through a ‘Blue in Green’ lens; but it cannot be fully delineated here.
of how the structure and character of the emerging police organisation should somehow resemble that of the army and yet simultaneously differ from it.  

Controversy among colonial administrators in India over degrees of police-military fusion and fission remained throughout the 19th century, and it came to a head in 1860, when a Police Commission was formed consisting of four civil service officers and two military officers. Before going into more detail about the activities of this seminal commission, however, we must gain a sense of what happened in the years immediately preceding it. There had already been extensive discussions among colonial policy-makers over how best to reform the operating civil police organisations, especially following enquiries into torture by native officers in Madras in 1854 and debates in Bengal over how to address problems of inefficiency, corruption and extortion while still minimising cost (Arnold, 1986; Robb, 1991). But it was the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion, aka ‘The Mutiny’, that turned the tables and both spurred the establishment and shaped the outcome of the 1860 Police Commission. An in-depth discussion of the event here is not possible. But it is important to note that this was a multi-sited, multi-causal series of revolts by indigenous sepoys (soldiers) of the Indian Army, which occurred over several months and resulted in the deaths of thousands of British settlers and officials, as well as thousands of indigenous soldiers and civilians. It was an extraordinary moment of terror for the British; and following their eventual hard-won victory over indigenous rebels, there was a momentous overhaul in administration of the South Asian colonies.

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7 Space constraints preclude a fuller discussion of how functions of prevention of disorder and detection of crime became integrated under the umbrella of police duties (with exceptions of large-scale crisis management and investigations by military police). But it is crucial to note that this umbrella did not always exist, even in Britain and other parts of Europe (Rawlings, 2002). The integration of preventive and detective police functions, too, is arguably an outgrowth of the Blue in Green paradigm of security and order.

8 There are countless publications describing and analysing events related to the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion, which many people in India now call the First War of Indian Independence. For a relatively comprehensive literature review that attempts a day-by-day chronicle of these events, see Taylor, 1999. For further reading on how it affected the make-up of the police and army in the latter phases of the colonial period, see Gupta, 1974 and 1979, and Oldenburg, 1984.
Following the rebellion, a proclamation by Queen Victoria and the Government of India Act dissolved the British East India Company, and colonial administration was overtaken directly by the Crown in 1858. A key component of this transformation involved a re-organisation and centralisation of the coercive security apparatuses. Reform of the police in particular was considered, ‘an urgent necessity... on account of political, military and financial reasons and not because of its inefficiency and impurity in the prevention and detection of crime’ (Gupta, 1974, p. 377). This distinction is important: the British administrators desired a civil force to maintain internal order, exhibiting a larger pattern of, ‘colonial government[s that] aspired to move towards more distinctly civilian forms of policing... but within individual colonies the process could be uneven... [and] the choices were inevitably political’ (Anderson and Killingray, 1991, p. 6). Indeed, the process was not only ‘uneven’ and ‘political’, but also ideological and instrumental. Among governmental reformers in mid-19th century colonial South Asia, a clear if somewhat paradoxical consensus grew that the military and the civil police should be completely separate organisations, and also that the main focus of both bodies should be on the prevention of disorder and instability — both internally and at the frontiers of the colonised territories (on this point of the primacy of public order in post-1857 colonial South Asia see, among others, Kudaisya 2006).

Ironically, since the primary aim of the new colonial police would be maintaining peace and order rather than investigating crime, this complicated the task of putting into practice the idealised separation between the military and police. Some of those informing the 1860 Police Commission favoured a, ‘mixed system — partly Civil and partly Military... [with one part or the other predominating] according to local circumstances and needs (Gupta, 1974, p. 377)’. Others argued, ‘the duties of the Police should be entirely Civil, not Military’ (Ibid., p. 380). But even
among this latter group, it was admitted that such a stark division was next to impossible to maintain. It is worth quoting at length a set of passages from official memoranda to and among the commission members, which demonstrates the muddling in theory and practice of military and police forms and functions in colonial South Asia:

The line which separates the protective and repressive functions of a Civil Police from functions purely Military, may not always, in India, be very clear … the duty of a Civil Police (is) to protect the community against all local criminal classes … and to put down all riots and local disturbances. But when … riots become rebellion … and when the police of ordinary peaceful times, aided by a temporary special [armed] Constabulary … becomes unable to meet the exigency, then … the task of protection or repression becomes a Military duty … the Police should be no stronger than is needed for purely police purposes […] . The functions of a Police are either protective and repressive or detective, to prevent crime and disorder, or to find out criminals and disturbers of the peace […] . The organisation and discipline of the Police should be similar to those of a Military body […] but] the Military arm should confine itself absolutely to the occupation of the country … the peace and order of the country should be preserved on every occasion of tumult and apprehended disturbance, by the civil power and not by a Military Force. (Ibid., p. 380-3, emphasis added, ellipses in original text unless in brackets).9

These statements as an aggregate represent the emergence of the arguably contradictory notion of ‘protective and repressive’ security, which renders the so-called civil police always already inextricable from the military, or at least conceived to be on some sort of continuum or scale of balance.10 I will limit my analysis of this apparent contradiction to two specific issues: 1) the problem of transition from ‘ordinary peaceful times’ (and means) to conditions of ‘exigency’, and the concomitant moment of a presumed necessary shift from police to military response; and

9 Cf., David Arnold’s point that, ‘To the colonial regime crime and politics were almost inseparable: serious crime was an implicit defiance of state authority and a possible prelude to rebellion; political resistance was either a ‘crime’ or the likely occasion for it’ (Arnold, 1986, p. 3).
10 Cf., Mann’s ‘four levels of domestic repression’, wherein ‘The second level is ‘policing in the modern sense — combating crime and disorder by a disciplined force possessing only simple weapons without recourse to a show of military force’’, the third level is the ‘riot’ where para/military troops could be called in, and the fourth level is ‘‘full scale military repression’’ which is ‘undesirable because it represents “the failure to provide routinised order”’ (Sheptycki, 2007, p. 35, internal quotes Mann, 1993, p. 403).
2) the notion that ‘the Military arm should confine itself absolutely to the occupation of the country’. On the first question, there is a clear indication that if some fine balance tips such that an event previously categorised as a riot – or what some might call ‘civil unrest’ (Jauregui 2010b) – becomes categorised as a ‘rebellion’ or ‘insurgency’ (that is, when the colonised Other appear to have become exceedingly politicised), then it becomes a military rather than a police matter. The 1857 Rebellion was an extraordinary example of a moment ‘when riots become rebellion’ in colonial South Asia; and it had the effect of moving many administrators away from a model separating the military from the police toward a security scheme involving a single body in a semi-military or quasi-military organisation. At the same time, there was a vehement anti-military sentiment among reformers, fostered both by the threat of seditious indigenous soldiers and also by the strength of Western political ideas of the time regarding civil liberty and despotic oppression. But how could British colonists continue to reap the economic rewards of their occupation of a foreign country (point #2) and also establish a properly civilised police in conditions such as those predominate in South Asia in the late 1850s and early 1860s? They had to find a way around doing what they saw as a military duty with a civil police. Thus, a militarised police as the means of ‘civilised coercion’ came to be the dominant institutional mode of maintaining law and order in the colony. And this is the crucial point: the narrative and rhetoric of a distinct and supreme sphere of civil security adhering to the rule of law concealed, and congealed in tandem with, the bedrock of maintaining order becoming more militarised.

Ironically, even as they militarised their security apparatus, the British colonists spoke as if they truly believed that they were civilising not only the indigenous inhabitants of the colony, but also their own administration of the colony. And this paradoxical paradigm of a legitimate order protected by a civilised coercive apparatus only intensified and became more rigid as the
British Empire and its centrepiece in the Raj grew in strength and size. As colonial security was rhetorically civil-ised, and in its practices militarised in the name of anti-militarism, ‘reforms that had been maturing for many years with pragmatic, bureaucratic thoroughness were suddenly enshrined in law’ (Bayley, 1969, p. 44). Put another way, ‘a theory of authority became codified’ (Cohn, 1987[1983], p. 632). Crucially, most of the acts and codes that were ratified into law in the wake of the 1857 Sepoy Rebellion — including, but not limited to, the Indian Code of Civil Procedure (1859), the Indian Penal Code (1860), the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure (1861) and the Indian Police Act (1861) — remain in effect in India today with only minor modifications and amendments, if any. By 1890, official memos among colonial administrators in India stated that, in essence, ‘the Civil Police represented the staff employed for the purpose of law, i.e., detective work, [while] the Armed and Mounted Branch [of police] provided the agency for the preservation of order,’ i.e., protective or preventive work (Gupta, 1979, p. 135, emphasis added). Civil and military means and ends fused under the broader banner of civilisation as order.

4.4 Civilised Coercion, Militarised Law and Order, and Democratic Policing Today

What is gained by this ‘backward glance’ at some developments in security and order in colonial South Asia? And how does it speak directly to contemporary discussions and debates regarding the roles and relations of police and military organisations across the globe? I must reiterate and clarify that this brief analysis does not aim merely to blame colonialism as the origin of current deficiencies in the policing of India, or as the only source of various problems in other areas marked by an apparent blurring of police and military roles. Nor is this analysis intended to lay
the foundations for a polemical theorisation of transnational efforts to establish or reform
democratic police organisations in so-called transitional or developing nation-states as a ‘form of
re-colonisation or empire-building’ (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007, p. 1). Rather, it works to
produce a genealogy of the conceptual distinction between civil police and military forces that is
at once historically grounded and also critical of totalising philosophies of the ‘originary
violence’ of law or power and permanent states of war and exception (Foucault, 1976,
approach to considering the blurring of police and military organisations draws attention to: 1)
the problematic assumption of the moral ascendancy of civil-ised coercion underlying a Blue in
Green global paradigm of security and order, and 2) the way this paradigm has produced
paradoxical and sometimes unfavourable effects in the world, and especially in post-colonial
democracies (Jauregui, 2010b).

The first set of issues illuminated by an historicisation of police-military co-development
in colonial South Asia involves the dilemmas of policing, and especially the problem of police
violence in contemporary India and in many other former colonies, particularly those former
colonies that have been or remain part of the Commonwealth of Nations (see Anderson and
Killingray, 1991, 1992). Detailed analyses of many problems among the police in India today —
including systemic corruption, cronyism, politicisation, poor morale, lack of professionalism,
and abuses of civil and human rights — may be found in texts written mostly by sociologists and
political scientists, as well as by some practitioners and policy analysts (e.g., Raghavan, 1989;
Brass, 1997; Chande, 1997; Dhillon, 1998, 2005; Srivastava and Chauhan, 2002; Kapur, 2003;
Verma, 2005; HRW, 2009). My own ethnographic and historical research on police life in
India’s largest state, Uttar Pradesh, demonstrates that these analyses must be nuanced with an
understanding that police represent a paradoxical type of disempowered authority figure (Jauregui, 2010c). As much as police in India may be wont to abuse their authority to deploy coercion by violence, they are simultaneously *subject* to a variety of other forms of civil-ised coercion, and beleaguered by the demands of many types of actors, from elected officials and appointed civil service bureaucrats to local elites and even average citizens who manage to manipulate legal codes and social norms (cf., Ghosh, 1981; Baxi, 1982; Subramaniam, 1988).

Legions lament that in the world’s largest democracy, police tend to behave in ways that are anything but democratic, expressing a ‘ruler-supportive’ rather than rights-based ethic of policing (Arnold, 1986; Anderson and Killingray, 1991; Dhillon, 1998, 2005). Popular and scholarly historical explanations for these and other notorious faults of police in India tend toward totalising and reductionist claims that the organisation is simply a relic of foreign occupation and military domination, or the logical outcome of the proliferation of rationalised modern bureaucratic institutions (cf., Weber, 1958b, 1978[1919]). Even police officers themselves, especially in northern India, will often argue that most of the inadequacies and iniquities of their everyday practices derive from ‘the British system’; and many of them will claim that their institution’s ‘true origins’ lay in militaristic concepts and domineering habits stemming from the Royal Irish Constabulary more than in the civil policing philosophy of Robert Peel (see *supra-note* 5 and again, cf., Hawkins, 1991). One Senior Superintendent of Police [SSP] in Uttar Pradesh said to me, ‘That is why even today we still call the SSP ‘Captain’... because the first SSPs were recruited directly from the colonial army’ (see also Kudaisya 2006). This SSP and other critics generally maintain that the military roots of the police in India explain the institutional emphasis on ‘law and order’ at the expense of prevention and detection of crime,
and also explain officers’ tendencies toward excessively coercive treatment of common citizens and criminal suspects alike (cf., Jauregui, 2010c).

But as one historian of the police in northern India astutely reminds us:

To identify the abuses and instances of police coercion and violence, and then present them unproblematically as examples of the colonial regime, without adequate comparison to the policing of the mother country or other western nations, reveals no more about the nature of colonialism than it does about the problems of policing in general. The use of deadly force and the surveillance of the population, under certain circumstances, was and remains a legitimate function of the police of even the most progressive and benign governments. (Campion, 2003, p. 234 [sic]; cf., Arnold, 1986; Dhillon, 1998, 2005)

I would build on Campion’s vital critique to say that a carelessly assumed isomorphism of ‘colonialism’ and ‘coercion by violence’ as embodied in ‘the police’ does little to explain the predicaments and paradoxes of police practice in contemporary India, or elsewhere, especially with regard to their apparent militarised character. Clearly, there are direct historical links between the co-development of police and military organisations in colonial South Asia and the organisation and practices of police in India today. But presuming an unbroken continuity of colonial and post-colonial security institutions, and dismissing things like police brutality and an undemocratic police spirit as largely a legacy of the gradual metamorphosis of the colonial army into the postcolonial police, is worse than imprecise. Such presumptions and dismissals blind us to the fact that the conceptual and practical intersections of these bodies — the police and the military, and colonial and postcolonial social institutions more generally — are as much ideological and paradigmatic as they are structural or historical.

As we have observed above in the debates of colonial administrators, these institutional intersections and integrations have emerged from a paradigm broadly cultivated in
Enlightenment Era Europe, a paradigm presuming that the legal and legitimate means of coercion in any political system ought to be controlled and ideally monopolised by a civil authority. There is an uncanny irony to the fact that the police in postcolonial India are characterised by many people, both inside and outside of India’s national borders, as ‘too militarised’. In fact, I would argue that they are too civilised. They comprise troubled avatars of the paradoxes of the historical emergence of the Blue in Green paradigm of security and order, confused and confusing subjects who are authorised to coercively suppress internal disorder in a political clime that compels them to embody the moral ascendancy of civilised democracy governed by the rule of law. Crucially, this is an existential problem for police in democracies generally not just for police in India, or for postcolonial police more generally. That being said, the internal contradictions of the police as individual and aggregate institutional subjects are thrown into relief perhaps most starkly in a direct historicisation of police development in a colonial context.

What about other contexts? The second set of issues that the backward glance into colonial police organisation addresses includes emerging theory and practice related to democratic policing and transnational policing, especially though not exclusively in what common parlance now deems ‘transitional’ and ‘developing’ democracies. The Blue in Green paradigm of security and order that suffused controversies around civil police and military organisations in colonial South Asia remains with us today, even if it manifests in different terms and forms like ‘bringing democracy and freedom’ to oppressed peoples rather than ‘civilising missions’. And besides the facts that this paradigm is long-standing, and that its emergence dates back centuries, it is also now globally hegemonic and integral to the historical developments of unilateral and multilateral international interventions in reforming, constructing
and reconstructing security forces in more or less conflict-ridden or poor nation-states. A large set of literatures around these issues has developed over the last couple of decades, and its contours are still very much in a state of emerging. The ‘guiding principles’ publications and technocratic ‘how-to’ manuals for police organisation and reformation that are being published by the likes of UNCIVPOL, the US Department of Justice’s ICITAP [International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program] and other national and transnational governmental organisations, are too numerous to list. And that list is growing by the day. A number of scholarly works offering meta-commentaries on such programmes and practices have come out in recent years and — with different approaches and scopes, and with varying levels of theoretical sophistication — have described foundational principles of, and prescribed normative modes of effecting, democratic policing at the transnational level (e.g., Bayley, 2006; Pino and Waitrowski, 2006; Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007). More recently, and perhaps more significantly, critiques of such normative approaches have begun to take shape with calls for focused attention on how political exigencies, historical contingencies, and cultural differences work against universalist principles and smooth institutional transfers and transitions (Hills, 2009; Hinton and Newburn, 2009).

One thing that remains common to all of these analyses, however, is the underlying Blue in Green assumption of the moral ascendancy of civil-ised coercion, still generally embodied in the police. This assumption usually manifests in evaluations of the successful construction or reform of a democratic security apparatus through the institution of 1) a clear separation between police and military forces, and 2) strict limitations on the coercive authority of the latter. The opposite is also true: the blurring of these institutions, or an apparently excessive military authority in domestic security and governance, is considered a political failure or danger (see, for
example, Koonings and Kruijt, 2002). There is virtually no critical reflection on the ‘natural’ distinction between these two categories of legal and legitimate coercive force, and the morally-inflected but also contradictory and controversial legitimacy of the civilised coercion of the police. It is precisely this type of reflection that I wish to spark, because it compels us to reframe what we mean by democratic security and order. India is a crucial case in point. One retired senior police officer said to me, ‘Even if this is a “democracy” in name, realistically speaking, India is ruler-oriented, not people-oriented. In fact, it is probably more accurate to say that the Government of India is often “anti-people” to a great extent’ (see also Dhillon, 2005). Another senior officer, this one still serving and in a rather choice posting at that, echoes his retired comrade when he says, ‘What are the police supposed to be for? They are supposed to be for the people. Right now, the police are not for the people, but for the party in power... or just for themselves’ (see also Singh, 2000; Verma, 2009).

In some of the literature on transnational democratic policing, there are glimmers of the critical reflection for which I am calling; but for now these writings only hint at the possibility of advancing discussion through de-naturalising of ossified assumptions and categories. For example, David Bayley (2006) offers a critical caveat to his delineation of essential criteria of democratic policing, saying that ‘although it is a condition of democracy, order is not inherently democratic... [but also] consistent with very repressive forms of government’ (p. 22, emphasis added). Hinton and Newburn (2009) provide something similar if more broad-reaching in a brief discussion of how, ‘even in the advanced industrialised democratic context the role of the police is riddled with controversy and contradiction’ including problems such as the potential for abuse of power, discriminatory treatment, exclusionary fraternal-professional hubris, and political pressure (p. 5-6). Goldsmith and Sheptycki (2007) do a better job than most of historically
contextualising and carefully categorising some of these controversies and contradictions by drawing attention to the blurring of police and military boundaries in the transnational context. Such caveats and qualifications by police scholars begin to grapple with the complex tensions inhering in the relationship between liberal democratic principles and modes of realising security through force, especially the meaning and practice of civilised coercion. Even so, there remains a blind spot in the literature generally with regard to how police and military institutions serve both as emblematic and as embodiments of ideological assumptions inherent to universal principles and practices associated with democracy.

We must deconstruct, denaturalise and rehistoricise our own language and assumptions regarding the moral ascendancy of the civil in fashioning security and order. We must further craft new terms and frames that acknowledge the problems and paradoxes inherent to such assumptions, in order to better describe and explain problematic practices of police and other security agents, as well as to better prescribe and advise courses of action. Make no mistake: this is not merely a call by an ivory tower scholar to perform a ‘post-modern/-structuralist/-colonial’ academic exercise. This has immediate relevance to grounded realities of producing security and order in an age where, pace the insights of transnational studies, the bounded nation-state remains the primary unit of governance in a world dominated by US and other Western states’ projections of power and interest. Crucially, ‘Blue’ and ‘Green’ modes of coercion, and more to the point the ‘Blue in Green’ paradigm of civilised coercion, are not simply ideal juridical categories intended to ignite scholarly debate. These are practiced concepts with significant and often highly contested effects in the world. Instead of continually trying to ‘unblur’ the forms and functions of police and military organisations, and then calling this a success for democratic security and order, we would do well to take as given that the alleged dividing line between these
institutions is always already a construction, and moreover a manipulable construction. And this dividing line is manipulable *everywhere*, including and especially in what might now be called ‘developed’ democracies in the West. It is manipulable not merely across geostrategic space, but also across time including, to echo the British colonial administrators in South Asia, in ‘ordinary peaceful times’, whatever that may mean in an era coloured by the ongoing Global War on Terror. The question thus becomes: How, when, and by whom is the line between the military and civil police manipulated, and to what ends? How can too much control, or a particular type of civil-ised control, of a police (or military) organisation perhaps be detrimental, as some might argue to be the case in contemporary India... or in contemporary Iraq or Afghanistan, for that matter? And how does all of this help us to explain broader concepts and practices of security and order suffusing the discourses of nation-states that are, through a very problematic set of stage theories, considered to be transitional, or not yet fully developed, or not quite properly democratic according to rather vague criteria of what constitutes peace and prosperity for all citizens? The Blue in Green paradigm of security has been naturalised for so long that it now permeates virtually all debates on security and order. Analysis of the fruits, seeds and weeds of this paradigm and its cultivation across the world demands further theoretical and empirical study.
References


5. Blur the Boundaries!

_Policing in Contemporary Peace Operations_

Jelle Janssens

Introduction

As a result of several re-conceptualisations of the notion of security, it is no longer the exclusive research subject of international, war and security studies, but - until very recently - also that of criminological research (Zedner, 2009, p. 10). Influenced by international and domestic evolutions, such as globalisation and the ascendancy of neo-liberal ideologies, today’s criminological, political and social analyses of the concept go beyond the study of crime and its relation to the state (Loader & Walker, 2007, p. 1). Although crime, and especially transnational crime, is still perceived as an important threat to domestic security, the notion of security has broadened to include a multitude of aspects such as public nuisance, migration, global warming, energy dependence and the growing gap between rich and poor.

Notwithstanding the reassertion of the role of the state as a security provider after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Madrid and London (Loader & Walker, 2007, p. 2), the traditional role of the state as pre-eminent provider of security, which can be traced back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the ‘social contract’ (Rousseau, 1796, p. 42) and Max Weber’s notion of the modern state (Weber, 1948, p. 78), has gradually changed as well. In today’s society, the state has become merely one of many providers of security within what Daniel Lambach calls the ‘security market’ (Lambach, 2007). Non-state actors are increasingly involved in the provision of domestic security. Neighbourhood watches and commercial security companies, acting in support of the police or offering their services to private citizens directly, are a case in point. Private security companies are even engaged in contemporary peace operations such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo.

The security market, however, is not confined within national borders. Due to the influences of economic globalisation, exponential growth in information and communication technologies and the widespread transcontinental mobility, concerns about transnational crime have risen (Felsen & Kalaitzidis, 2005, p. 3; Passas, 2001, p. 28; Woodiwiss, 2006). By including aspects with transnational dimensions into the concept of security, security providers push themselves beyond their national borders and address the threats abroad (see the case of cross-border crime - for a critical perspective see, for instance, Sheptycki, 2006). As domestic security is increasingly linked to international security, nation states, but also international security providers as the United Nations [UN] and the European Union [EU] are increasingly deploying police officers, civilians and soldiers in order to address security issues abroad (Lyon, 2003, p. 122; Sands, 2005).

As Loader & Walker (2007, p. 9) note, these developments have a fundamental impact on both symbolic and territorial borders as they break down traditional boundaries between external and...
internal security, policing and soldiering and war and crime (see also, for example, Bigo, 2000). This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of blurring boundaries between actors involved in the provision of public security during peace operations. However, it is not my intention to describe the nature of those blurred boundaries, but rather to examine why the traditional boundaries between security actors are becoming blurred during peace operations.

In this contribution I will argue that those blurring boundaries are largely a result of policy decisions, based on certain assumptions and ideological dogmas. How the concept of security is defined will influence the way the provision of security is approached. The phenomenon of blurring boundaries is perhaps most visible during peace operations where different state (police and military) and non-state (private security companies, NGOs) actors are involved in the provision of public security. Bearing in mind why the police and the military are there in the first place (Part I), it is easy to understand why the boundaries between the different actors become increasingly blurred (Part II).

5.1 Why are the police and the military involved in nation-building?

The focus and scope of international peace operations have changed drastically during the last two decades. Whereas during the Cold War peace operations were launched to monitor cease-fires and the implementation of peace treaties, from the 1990s onward peacekeepers have become responsible for, amongst other things, demobilisation of belligerent parties, monitoring human rights violations and the reform and training of local police (Kaldor, 2006, p. 12; Serafino, 2006, p. 3; US Army, 2008, pp. 3-13 - 13-19). The scope of those peace operations broadened even more during the peace operations in Kosovo and Timor Leste, where the international community established territorial administrations run by the UN. The broadened scope of contemporary peace operations is essentially based on two evolutions that are closely intertwined: the re-conceptualisation of security and the end of the ideological conflict between East and West.

5.1.1 The re-conceptualisation of security

It has become commonplace to state that the contemporary understanding of the concept of security has changed significantly during the past two decades. And it influences the way international organisations and nation states deal with security threats and issues of international stability. To a large extent, this changed understanding took shape in two different mindsets of security: of national security and within the larger framework of development assistance.

National security

At the end of the Cold War, territorial security became less important to the security agenda of developed countries as the threat of a foreign invasion and occupation was no longer impending. Due to, amongst other things, globalisation and ongoing economic integration (Sheptycki, 2006, p. 42; Zedner, 2007, p. 39), the understanding of the concept of security went beyond the study of threats from other states and quasi-states and shifted towards threats stemming from different actors and sources of insecurity such as terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, street gangs, but also, for example, from the struggle for natural resources (Dammer, Reichel, & He, 2005, p. 20; Felsen & Kalaitzidis, 2005, p. 3; Passas, 2001, p. 28; Woodiwiss, 2006, p. 14).
Whereas during the Cold War international relations were characterised by a bipolar world structure and conflicts were to be fought and settled between nation states (interstate conflicts), the number of internal (intrastate) conflicts increased dramatically during the 1990s. Indeed, the end of the Cold War had a devastating effect on numerous countries, often referred to as failed or failing states. Emphasising self-determination, the UN and most Western countries ignored issues of long-term economic and political viability of emerging states during the post-colonial period and when the Cold War came to an end, they became deprived of economic assistance that flowed from the West-East confrontation (Dorff, 1996). Although a considerable body of literature has been published on failed states, an unambiguous definition is not available. Some describe a failed state in terms of the incapacity to sustain itself as a member of the international community (Helman & Ratner, 1992, p. 3), while others point towards the incapability of delivering positive political goods to the majority of the population and the absence of internal law and order (Boas & Jennings, 2005, p. 386; Benoît Dupont, Grabosky, & Shearing, 2003, p. 332; Olson, 1993; Rotberg, 2004; Stromseth, Wippman, & Brooks, 2006). Most of those authors (Olson, 1993; Rotberg, 2004; Stromseth et al., 2006) agree that opportunistic elements in society are quick to take advantage of the situation: ‘warlords and political entrepreneurs flourish and may finance their private militias through criminal activity, including trafficking in arms and drugs’ (Stromseth et al., 2006, p. 138). Therefore, failed states are deemed to pose serious threats to the international order and security and even to the national security of particular Western countries (see for instance Dorff, 1996; Logan & Preble, 2006).

Connecting security with development

The ‘changed’ nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War period (see also, for example, Edmunds, 2006; Goodhand & Hulme, 1999; Karns & Mingst, 2001; Raitasalo & Sipila, 2004) instigated a security approach at the individual and community level, for it is believed that the foundations of intra-state conflicts (and terrorism), are rooted in deprivation, frustration and hopelessness (Zedner, 2009, pp. 39-40). Although nation states still remain the linchpin of security efforts, they are now monitored as regards their ability to provide the essential political goods to their citizens. According to Rotberg (2003, p. 1) and others (see, for example, Krause & Jütersonke, 2005; Milliken & Krause, 2002; Schwarz, 2005), security (understood as public security) is the most critical political good that has to be provided by the state. Without establishing a certain level of security, the provision of other political goods² will be seriously hindered and as a consequence, the government or even the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes of its citizens. What Rotberg refers to as political goods, is also known as Global Political Goods [GPG]. Having emerged in the context of the UN in the late 1990s, GPG refer to those public goods (which are - according to the standard economic definition - those whose consumption is ‘non-excludable’ and ‘non-rival’) that are universal and to which everyone is entitled (Biscop, 2006).³ The concept of the GPG builds on notions elaborated within the field of development and is compatible with the notion of ‘human security’ which seeks to decouple security from its politico-military interpretation and broaden it to threats such as famine, homelessness, disease and ecological degradation (Biscop, 2006, p. 90; Zedner, 2009, p. 40).

² Such as essential freedoms, medical and health care, schools and education, infrastructure, money and banking system, fiscal and institutional context fostering entrepreneurship, etc. (Rotberg, 2003, p. 1).
³ GPG are based on Kofi Annan’s three fundamental freedoms: the right to live free from want, free from fear and the right to live in dignity (Annan, 2005).
Adopted by the UN Development Programme [UNDP] (United Nations Development Programme, 1994), the ‘human security’ concept puts the spotlight on the individual and his community instead of focusing upon the nation state (Biscop, 2005, p. 5). The basic assumption behind the concept of ‘human security’ is that besides violence, economic, societal, environmental and health problems are also important threats to security (see, for example, Edward, 2001; King & Murray, 2001, p. 590; McRae, 2001, pp. 16-17; Owen, 2004, p. 383; Roland, 2001, pp. 90-91). There is, however, a definition *lato sensu* and a definition *stricto sensu* of the human security concept. The proponents of the broad definition assert that security can only be achieved if ‘people have a basic income, access to food, clean water, health care, as well as the protection from physical violence’ (Zedner, 2009, p. 41) and this is largely based on the UNDP definition which lists seven dimensions of security (economic, health, food, environmental, personal, community and political) (Biscop, 2005, p. 5). Others, however, focus on the prevention of violent threats to individuals (King & Murray, 2001, p. 590).

The importance of safeguarding public security is therefore twofold. An integral and important foundation of human security, the enforcement of law and order not only provides people with a secure environment, it may protect them from major human rights abuses (although often the police themselves are the source of such abuses). Secondly, the provision of public security, answers to the fundamental requirements of democracy and good governance (McDougal, 1991). Without a minimum level of security institutions cannot function properly (as demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq).

### 5.1.2 Neoliberal dogmas and assumptions

The re-conceptualisation of security as outlined above, is not only based on experiences in the field, but also on assumptions (transnational organised crime is a direct threat to national security) and certain policy decisions (directing the military towards crime phenomena). Above anything else, however, contemporary policies towards failed and failing states are imbued with neoliberal ideas and dogmas (Pugh, 2005, pp. 23-24). The concept of state-building is based on the assumption that underdevelopment is the root cause of conflict. Underdevelopment is often understood in terms of economic development (see, for example, World Bank policies), and is mirrored in the economic emphasis in nation assistance (Pugh, 2005; Tucker, 1993). However, as Boas and Hatloy (2008) demonstrate, underdevelopment (understood in economic terms) is not always a decisive element in the outbreak of conflicts. Other factors, such as political, cultural and social issues should be taken into account as well. Nevertheless, the idea that underdevelopment is a root cause for conflict is mirrored in, amongst others, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* (United Nations, 1992) and the *European Security Strategy* (Council of the European Union, 2003). In the former document, the peace building doctrine expressed the UN’s will to carry out political, institutional and economic reforms in post-conflict societies and was repeated in subsequent documents such as the Brahimi Report (United Nations, 2000) and the 2004 Report of the Secretary-General on *The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies* (United Nations, 2004). In practice, and in line with this view, democratic reform and the creation of governmental order have been deemed necessary to prevent violent conflicts and safeguard international stability and security. A common feature of the *good governance* doctrine is the
emphasis on the rule of law and the establishment of *law and order* as key contributors of regime stability (Bergling, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 2004).

David Tucker (1993) traces these ideas back to the Kennedy Administration in the early 1960s. Then Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Rostow argued that modernisation (understood in terms of economic growth and technological development) changes the way in which society is organised drastically and leaves opportunities to increase freedom and individual autonomy. However, at the same time ‘old resentments and new hopes’ may be exploited by communists resulting in guerrilla warfare (Tucker, 1993, p. 35). In Rostow’s opinion ‘communism is best understood as a disease of the transition to modernisation’ and should be tackled by building modern, prosperous, democratic nations (Ibid., p. 36). The nation-building concept, as it reappeared shortly after the end of the Cold War in *An Agenda for Peace*, is clearly rooted in this ideological discourse.

### 5.1.3 Security Sector Reform [SSR]

As a central part of development policy, Security Sector Reform [SSR] is the concept that brings the two mindsets together (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2006, p. 2). It is generally agreed that development and security mutually reinforce each other (Annan, 2005, p. 5). SSR, however, has only recently been incorporated into the development arena. It was first introduced by the United Kingdom in the late 1990s (Celador, 2008, p. 153) and later adopted by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005). Although there is no common definition of the concept, it is generally agreed upon that SSR aims at establishing effective and efficient security provisions or improve the security sector within the framework of democratic governance (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p. 24). Besides its clear normative dimension, the SSR concept has its merits for it fosters a comprehensive approach towards the provision of security by addressing state and non-state security actors and oversight and management bodies (see, for example, the generally accepted and applied OECD definition of SSR, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007, p. 5). Very often, however, SSR efforts only address state security actors, thereby adhering a narrow notion to the concept (see, for example, Abrahamsen & Williams, 2006; Baker, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Bryden & Hänggi, 2005) and bypassing non-state actors, armed groups and civil society organisations who could or might provide security as well as undermine it (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p. 26). As SSR efforts often take place within the framework of nation or state building, the state-centric security approach might not come as a surprise.

The incorporation of SSR into development instruments, however, has also some drawbacks. Robinson (2006, p. 11) detects a trend ‘among politicians, to link security and development in ways that make it hard to distinguish the logics and activities of the two sectors’. The risk of linking security and development is the potential securitisation of development, and development issues being perceived as security risks, which would lead to an over-emphasis of security-oriented means to cope with these issues (Zedner, 2009, p. 45). This is for example evidenced by the securitisation of migration. Having its roots in development issues such as poverty, there is a tendency to address migration in terms of combating migration and hardening borders (Huysmans, 2000).
As societies differ in the level of development, in the nature of their political systems and the state of their security forces (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p. 29), a common feature of SSR efforts is that each situation requires a different approach. SSR activities can range from supporting educational facilities to directly reforming security actors and are highly political undertakings for they touch upon states’ sovereignty (Hansen, 2005, p. 304). Therefore, the activities conducted during SSR will largely depend on the political will of both international donors to follow through their commitment and local politicians or elites to support the implementation of security sector reforms (Goodhand, 2006). Without local support, SSR efforts are likely to fail or will at least be slowed down and seriously hindered. This holds true for developed, developing, post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies. In Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH], for example, police reform has been and still is a painstaking venture. Attempts by the international community, in particular the EU, to reform the police and to organise the police on a more central level (see, for example, Celador, 2009) are perceived by the local politicians as attempts to undermine the authority of the entities (Hansen, 2008, p. 356; Hvidemose, 2009, p. 4) and has therefore become increasingly linked to the issue of constitutional reform.

As the political structures, the continuously changing security environment and socio-economic development within a society greatly influence police and security sector missions and have a direct impact on their success, the organisation and management of the missions also plays a role. As the security concept has broadened, the responsibilities and activities of international actors involved in peace and related stability operations have broadened as well.

In this regard, the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) may serve as an example. In 2004, at the outset of the EU operation, the EU Secretary General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP] was resolute in his demand that the military operation ’should be ‘new and distinct’ and should “make a difference”’ (Leakey, 2006, p. 59). The new and distinct part of the mission was mirrored in the fact that EUFOR Althea had two key military tasks: support the High Representative’s Mission Implementation Plan (dealing with the economy, the rule of law, the police and defence reform) and support the fight against organised crime. EUFOR was, however, not mandated to enforce laws and make arrests (although it was seriously considered (Gross, 2008, p. 319)) but needed to act in support of the police forces. This raised several questions about the role the military had to play in the fight against organised crime. David Leaky, former force commander of EUFOR Althea, notes: ‘it was ... important to make a distinction between what was an appropriate military activity for EUFOR soldiers and what was a police task. ... EUFOR would help discover a crime or illegality (e.g. fuel smuggling or illegal timber cutting), but would ‘freeze the scene’ and hand it over to the BiH authorities to deal with the legal and law enforcement technicalities ‘ (Leakey, 2006, pp. 63-64).

The broadened scope of peace and related stability operations requires the deployment of an adequate number of qualified personnel, something international organisations are still struggling with. The broadened responsibilities and the lack of a sufficient number of highly qualified personnel are two of the reasons why the boundaries between the different actors began to blur. The process is described in the second part below.

5.2 Why are traditional boundaries between different security actors becoming increasingly blurred?
5.2.1 The evolution of police functions in peace operations

Police reform and assistance have a long history and go back to colonial annexation and administration (Anderson & Killingray, 1992) and to inter-country technical assistance based on narrowly focused security concerns (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007). While international police forces were already used, for example, in Crete in 1896–97 and the Saarland in 1935 (Sismanidis, 1997), military units took on police-like functions and transformed into some sort of constabulary forces during British counterinsurgency operations and colonial interventions (Bell, 1974). In fact little distinction was made between internal and external security during colonial military interventions (Killingray, 1999, p. 10) as demonstrated, for example, by McAllister Linn’s analysis of US security policies in the Philippines and Hawaii (McAllister Linn, 1999, p. 131).

Deflem (1994) analysed British approaches to law enforcement in three former British colonies and concluded that British colonial policies to external and internal security show some similarities. In a first consolidating phase, the military had to protect the borders and address political and violent uprising. After consolidation, internal security was left to paramilitary police forces (see also, for example, Arnold, 1977; Hills, 2000, p. 29). Because of the military nature of their duties (collect taxes, protect western citizens and their property, control insurgencies and riots), colonial police forces did not engage in more civilian activities such as crime prevention and detection (Deflem, 1994, p. 49). Colonial police forces, moreover, were often used as auxiliaries in border and other conflicts (Ibid., p. 56). Although processes of de-militarisation were followed by processes of re-militarisation and vice versa, colonial police forces were gradually de-militarised, especially following nationalist uprisings after World War II. Military techniques were replaced by more civilian policing styles because the latter proved to be more suited for politically sensitive protests. Eventually the police had to deal with internal security, while the military had to safeguard the external security and be used as a last resort (Hills, 2000, p. 30).

Because colonial counter-insurgency and constabulary operations, contrary to full-scale military operations, were aimed at maintaining or re-establishing a secure and stable environment, they were often called police operations. Even during the first years of UN peacekeeping activities, military operations such as the UN intervention in Korea during the Korean War (1950-1953) were called police operations (Schmidl, 1998, p. 21). The police philosophy behind those missions was limited to order maintenance rather than the prevention and detection of crime (Das & Verma, 1998). In line with British colonial interventions, military engagement in the establishment of law and order was quite common and proved to be successful in Germany and Japan in the aftermath of the second World War, and in more recent interventions such as in Panama (see Collins, 1992).

In the second half of the 20th century, police reform started to be coupled with donor-funded technical assistance provided to newly independent states (Bayley, 2006; Nadelmann, 1993) and further evolved within UN peace operations. During the Cold War the UN launched four peacekeeping operations encompassing civilian police officers. When riots broke out in the Congo in 1960, the United Nations decided to send not only military forces, but also civilian experts (such as police officers) to assist and train the local police in maintaining law and order. The term CIVPOL (civilian police) was created four years later with the establishment of the UN peace force in Cyprus.
in 1964 [UNFICYP]. The emphasis on ‘civilian’ is because police operations could also be military operations that do not require special expertise with regard to criminal investigation, for example. The mission to Cyprus also marked a change in the organisation of peacekeeping operations. Whereas in the Congo the civilian police were merely seen as a supplement, during UNFICYP they were fully integrated into the mission (Schmidl, 1998). However, civilian police officers were only deployed sporadically during the 1960s and 1980s. They primarily had to monitor, accompany and advise the indigenous police (Broer & Emery, 1998).

It was not until the redefinition of the security concept at the beginning of the 1990s that police forces were once again given a prominent role in supporting internal security efforts in foreign territories. With its focus on upholding the rule of law, maintaining law and order and specific crime phenomena such as organised crime, trafficking and terrorism, the changed security concept thus rejoined internal and external security aspects.

The resurrection of UN police missions started in Namibia in 1989. This was the first post-cold war mission that contained a substantial CIVPOL contingent (Chappel & Evans, 1999). Since then, UN civilian police officers have been deployed in Mozambique, El Salvador, Haiti, Cambodia, Somalia, East-Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, etc. Whereas early missions had to monitor and assess police officers’ performances, it soon became clear that the achievements of police officers would not improve if the performance of police organisations as a whole was not addressed. In accordance with the changed definition of security and the ensuing ‘new’ approach to peace operations, the international community now monitored how governments from Bosnia or Haiti, for example, exerted their powers and enforced basic human rights (Hansen, 2002, p. 20).

Civilian police officers thus gradually took on more specific assignments and started to play a larger role in UN peace operations. This evolution even resulted in them taking on the responsibility of maintaining law and order in post-conflict societies. Since the former rulers had withdrawn their troops and security personnel in both Kosovo and Timor Leste and therefore were no longer able to exert their authority, the UN Security Council gave the UN missions full legislative and executive powers. Although informal security providers such as the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA] were quick to step in and fill the security gap, they were soon accused of being involved in murders, kidnapping and torture (Bisset, 2001). Therefore, during the initial phase of the intervention, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s [NATO] Kosovo Force [KFOR] was practically the only law enforcement force on the ground (Wilson, 2006, p. 155). The UN was asked to restore the rule of law, maintain and enforce law and order, build a new criminal justice system (encompassing a new police force (in which quite a number of former KLA combatants eventually were enlisted), judicial apparatus, prisons etc.) and develop a criminal code (Eide & Holm, 2000). Although both missions had executive powers, they also needed to monitor, reform and train the new indigenous police. Such missions are not merely expensive, but are also extremely demanding on contributing countries’ personnel capabilities. In Kosovo, for example, the maximum number of deployed police personnel was roughly 4,500.

5.2.2 Policing in different contexts

Over the past two decades, civilian police officers have been deployed in a variety of contexts. Post-conflict societies often need different security arrangements to those of societies in transition. Even
then, post-conflict societies differ widely from each other in terms of violence, the effectiveness and efficiency of the police forces (if any are present), and their political acceptability (in terms of human rights violations, involvement in the conflict, etc.).

In post-conflict situations, in which most security reform efforts take place, the state’s monopoly on coercive force, including its institutions, often need to be rebuilt (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p. 31). In Kosovo and Timor Leste, for example, no state police force was present, which prompted the international community to provide for law enforcement themselves. If police are available, the international community often starts a vetting procedure in which individual police officer’s attitudes towards reform and their past are assessed. This happened for example in Iraq, where Baath members were discharged from duty (the only problem was that if you wanted to make a career in the police under Saddam Hussein’s regime, membership of the Baath party was often required), which eventually weakened the Iraqi police when they were most needed (Deflem & Sutphin, 2006).

In transitional societies, the principal aim of security reform missions is to support the transition from one political system to another. The political institutions and security forces have not been destroyed or dismissed by a long-term conflict and need to be supported in their reorganisation or rebuilding (for example in South-Africa and Georgia) (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005, p. 30). These different circumstances have a great influence on the scope and impact of police missions.

In this context, the EU makes a distinction between two types of missions (Council of the European Union, 2009, p. 7). The first are the so-called strengthening missions which aim to educate, train, monitor and advise the local police with a view to increasing their capabilities and conduct and making them more effective (which would be suitable for missions in transitional societies). The second are the substitution missions where the international police is tasked to restore public security. Those are the most complex missions and occur in those states where local security structures fail. Of course, it does not suffice to just replace the local police, a new police force has to be recruited and trained. Therefore a substitution mission will often be followed by a strengthening mission.

5.2.3 Lessons learned: limitations and draw-backs

Despite improvements, the deployment of civilian police has several drawbacks. A first problem is providing an adequate number of well-trained policemen for individual operations and to deploy them rapidly. With the exception of some gendarmerie units such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police which is regularly prepared to go on foreign policing missions when requested, the international community relies on individual volunteers (Marten, 2007). This has proven not to be only a problem for the United Nations, but also for other international organisations as the European Union and ad hoc coalitions. The first large-scale police operation was set-up by the United Nations in Namibia (UNTAG, 1989) and constituted 1,500 civilian police officers from 25 different countries (Call & Barnett, 2000). Whereas the United Nations could count on 35 well-trained civilian police officers in Cyprus (UNFICYP), in Namibia they had to make an appeal to member states with no experience in international police operations to fill the personnel gap (Broer & Emery, 1998). A first reason is that, contrary to the military, the deployment of police officers abroad has consequences for the sending state since police officers are crucial to the provision of their domestic security. This
makes it hard for substitution missions to find a sufficient number of personnel to contribute to the establishment of public security. Moreover, as strengthening missions call for specialists (due to the increased complexity of peace operations) and well-trained police officers, contributing countries are very reluctant to send their well-trained (and therefore expensive) specialists abroad. By definition, specialists are limited in number and equally needed in contributing state’s efforts to secure public security. A second reason is that there are few incentives for (Western) individual police officers to volunteer for international police missions (Ashraf, 2007). The experience gained in police missions abroad was – and very often still is – not official recognised (with regards to the UK, see, for example, Ashraf, 2007; with regards to Canada, see Benoit Dupont & Tanner, 2009). The United Nations, however, provide reimbursements for individual police officers which is attractive for police officers coming from underdeveloped countries.

This brings us to a second problem: training. One of the biggest challenges the first CIVPOL missions were confronted with, was the lack of sufficiently qualified personnel. In essence, monitoring and advising the local police implies that the international civilian police would lead by example and demonstrate their professionalism. This implies, however, the deployment of well-trained and educated police personnel (Hansen, 2002, p. 19). Considering the fact that CIVPOL missions became more complex and grew larger over time, it became increasingly difficult to find qualified personnel. It took the UN approximately eight months to deploy roughly 3,300 police officers to Cambodia (Broer & Emery, 1998, p. 378). Many international police officers did not speak the mission language (English or French), could not properly drive a vehicle and did not have the required six years of experience (Chappel & Evans, 1999, p. 197). Due to the lack of sufficient planning, inconsistent support of contributing countries, and the pressure of rapid deployment, the minimum requirements set forth by the UN were not always met.

A third problem is that civilian police cannot function efficiently in societies that have not attained a degree of pacification (Azimi, 1996; Deflem & Sutphin, 2006, p. 278). As the Iraqi example indicates, civilian police officers are not as heavily equipped and armed as military units to perform their duties and keeping them safe at the same time. Of course, when has a society reached an acceptable level of pacification? Moreover, even in highly violent societies, some sort of police arrangements are needed to provide public security and support the transition to a stable, secure and prosperous society. This dilemma has fostered the idea to engage the military in policing in the early stages of the conflict when security is too low (US Department of Defense, 2005).

These deficiencies lead to a security gap that impede the establishment of law and order and can be subdivided in three types (Dziedzic, 1998b). The first is the deployment gap, when the international police’s deployment takes too long (due to recruiting problems). Very often, the military is the only source of order in the early phase of a peace operation. The problem according to Dziedzic (Dziedzic, 1998a, p. 9) is that ‘if a single soldier errs by using excessive force, the entire mission can be placed in jeopardy because local consent may be squandered. Inaction, on the other hand, risks the loss of credibility and can give the impression the mission is failing’. The enforcement gap relates to the lack of skills of those deployed. Serafino (2004, p. 7) refers to, amongst others, investigative and

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4 The EU launched its EUPOL Afghanistan mission in June 2007 with an authorised strength of 400 police officers and managed to get merely 245 officers on the ground by July 2009 (EU Council Secretariat, 2009).
intelligence gathering skills which are needed to enforce law and order. According to Dziedzic (1998a, p. 14) the enforcement gap also pertains to the relation between the police and the military because in cases of serious disturbances, the police is not sufficiently trained, equipped and armed to respond adequately and have to rely on the military. The only problem is that, according to him, the military lack the training and resources to deal with citizens. The third is the institution gap, where the necessary follow-up services to the police, such as judicial and prosecution services, are not present, have been destroyed or are incapable of doing their jobs (Serafino, 2004, p. 35). The success of police reforms largely depends on the effective functioning of these services that are largely neglected during security sector reforms. In Haiti, for example, the police reform was considered to be a success, but their effectiveness was seriously hindered by the weakness of the local judiciary and penitentiary service (Mani, 2003). It goes without saying that this seriously undermines the motivation of the local police to implement the reform process.

5.2.4 Rapid deployment and the quality of the personnel: possible solutions

Looking for cops

As a result of these deficiencies, initiatives were taken to increase the capabilities for rapid deployment and the level of training of police officers volunteering for a mission. Depending on the type of mission, the emphasis on the quality of personnel varies. The need for rapid deployment is, however, constant. A ‘strengthening’ mission does not require a lot of personnel. In order to assist the indigenous police in achieving better results, specialists and highly trained and motivated police officers are needed. A ‘substitution’ mission, on the other hand, needs a lot more personnel because it needs to maintain law and order in post-conflict societies.

In 2004, the Police Division within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO], introduced a new internal section (Strategic Policy and Development Section) mandated to keep and update a database of qualified police officers in order to recruit more personnel for new peace operations. Most contributing states use pools of volunteers: police officers in active duty who can apply for a job in a peace operation. But this has a serious drawback since the volunteers are equally needed in their own police organisation. In other words, the use of pools of volunteers does not guarantee the actual availability of these volunteers.

Another line of thinking was to recruit retired police officers to fill the personnel gap. This idea has several advantages: first of all, retired police officers probably no longer want to make a career and can therefore be convinced to be deployed for a longer period of time, resulting in a better terrain knowledge (Call & Barnett, 2000). Although the US did deploy retired police officers, it seems this idea is not an overwhelming success. It appeared that not all retired police officers are eager to serve in a peace operation, and those who are, are difficult to motivate once deployed in a mission. In the 1990s, the US sent a contingent of retired police officers to Bosnia. Twenty percent eventually quit before their tour of duty was up (Lathem, 2001).

Another option is to urge the contributing nations to develop a police unit consisting of officers especially recruited for peace operations (Ibid.). Those officers would be recruited, trained and be paid by the contributing state. The feasibility of this idea is seriously questioned. Not only would it be
difficult to support such a unit financially, but also institutionally. However, in 2007, the UN established the Standing Police Capacity [SPC], a rapidly deployable unit of 25 police experts whose objective is to support the UN in the start-up of new missions and provide guidelines on ongoing operations (Smith, Holt, & Durch, 2007).

Finally, the idea has been suggested to recruit people without any police experience, such as graduates or lawyers and judges to fill the vacancies (Lathem, 2001). This argument is based on the premise that civilian police functions in peace operations do not resemble standard police functions. In other words, police training is not a condition *sine qua non* to be able to do a monitoring mission. Special monitoring training would be sufficient.

*The need for better trained personnel*

Although there is a need to get as many boots on the ground as possible, the quality of the personnel is equally important. Evaluations of past police missions has identified serious shortcomings in the training and quality of the personnel. Minimum standards, such as knowledge of the mission language, the ability to drive a vehicle, to handle a weapon, ICT knowledge, the level of training, even as regards the maximum age were often not met (see, for example, Azimi, 1996, p. 6; Chappel & Evans, 1999, pp. 261-262; Serafino, 2004, p. 10). The level of preparatory training differs greatly from country to country. The Police Division within DPKO played a significant role in the selection and training of civilian police officers. After the mission in Cambodia, three minimum requirements were stipulated: at least five years of active duty police experience, ability to drive all terrain vehicles and ability to express oneself in the mission language both orally and in writing (Chappel & Evans, 1999, p. 205). Additional requirements may be required depending on mission specifications.

Developed within DPKO, the Selection Assistance Teams [SATs] can assist contributing countries in the selection process by, for example, organising driving and language tests (Chappel & Evans, 1999, p. 209; Smith et al., 2007, p. 41). By assisting in the selection process, the problems can be solved before personnel are actually deployed in the mission area. The deployment of unqualified personnel is limited which saves not only costs for repatriation but helps the image of contributing countries. The use of SATs has not only improved the image of civilian police officers, but has lead to less accidents and saved the UN about $3.5 billion (Broer & Emery, 1998). The use of SATs is, however, politically controversial (because SATs do not visit western countries). Moreover, it has not prevented contributing countries from sending unqualified personnel.

At the same time the Police Division developed a curriculum (for example the *United Nations Civilian Police Course*, *the English Language Course for United Nations Civilian Police* and the *UN Civilian Police Handbook*). In order to prepare civilian police officers, a training in four stages was prepared: generic training (history of the UN, of peacekeeping operations, human rights, etc.), mission specific training (monitoring, the mandate, languages, culture), in–theatre training (after deployment: ICT lessons, standard procedures), and finally a debriefing (lessons learned). The Training Assistance Teams (TATs) were tasked to pre-screen the police officers in their home country (Hansen, 2002, p. 52). This would encourage contributing states to organise pre-trainings of their police officers. In 2005, the Integrated Training Service was created within DPKO in order to develop, amongst other
things, training standards and policy guidelines on pre-deployment training, deliver training and oversee peacekeeping training activities (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2009, p. 3).

In sum, a lot of efforts were made to improve rapid deployment and the quality of the personnel. Nonetheless, the ghost of unqualified personnel still haunts UN CIVPOL operations for they are still confronted with recruitment problems. As recruitment is generally seen as being the biggest problem for contemporary police missions, there is still one option left to address both the deployment and enforcement gap: pass on certain functions or tasks to other actors or organisations in the field. Human rights monitoring could be done by human rights monitors, for example, instead of civilian police officers (Hansen, 2002, p. 45). Other partners in the field include the army and also private security companies.

5.2.4 Potential partners in policing

The Military

After the Cold War, the world was confronted with a new global constellation and the military had to ‘reinvent’ itself. In order to adapt to the new international environment, the Western armies were transformed into flexible, modular organisations and trained for humanitarian and conflict management operations. It was acknowledged that the military would take on civilian duties such as the accompanying of refugees, help to organise elections and even to maintain law and order (Flint, 2001, p. 231). After the Gulf War in 1991, military operations gradually resembled police operations in which law and order had to be enforced (Neuteboom & Ducheine, 2007, p. 1139). As mentioned above, such operations resemble the 19th century colonial interventions and border operations since aspects of governance and policing were also involved in those operations (Schmidl, 1998, p. 19).

In trying to fill the security gap, the military was and is considered a feasible candidate. The military is perfectly able to fill the deployment gap since they are rapidly deployed and are the first ones to be deployed in conflict situations. Because of the absence of police contingents in the first phase of peace operations, multinational military forces are increasingly given the responsibility for maintaining law and order and ensuring public security (Neuteboom & Ducheine, 2007).

Most military organisations, however, are not designed to take on public order and law enforcement activities. Over the decades, the military has been reluctant to perform police activities (Marten, 2007, p. 242; Schmidl, 1998, p. 20). Military forces are not trained to deal effectively with police situations. They are trained to work together in large groups, to destroy the enemy and win wars. Policing, however, requires another approach including patrolling in small groups, being flexible on the individual level, working closely with the population to prevent and control crime (Marten, 2007, p. 242; McFarlane & Maley, 2002; Schmidl, 1998, p. 19). Some military forces, such as those from Spain and Germany, are even constitutionally prohibited from performing police duties both at home and in foreign countries (Marten, 2007). Others, such as the Canadian and United States armed forces, are increasingly engaged in police activities at home. Besides engagement in serious disturbances, they support domestic police forces in the ‘battle’ against drug and human trafficking (see, for example, Brown, 1991). The most striking military involvement on the European continent in police affairs was the Italian Vespri Siciliani operation from 1992 until 1998, launched after the
‘mafia’ assassinated two judges in the summer of 1992: 9,000 soldiers were deployed as auxiliary police officers in 1992 (Serino, 2003). Their main objective was to control the territory and to secure specific buildings and infrastructure in order to allow the police to fully engage the ‘mafia’. As a result of the operation, some important members of the Cosa Nostra were arrested (but, as some observers note, other organised crime groups such as the ‘Ndragheta took over Cosa Nostra’s business) and a decrease by 50% of petty crime was noted during the operation (Tsoukala, 2004).

The reality is that when there are no effective police arrangements available in the area of operations, as witnessed in, for example, Iraq, the military has no choice but to step in and fill the gap (Bayley, 2001; Bronson, 2002). As Agordzo (2009, p. 288) notes, if the military should fail to fill the security gap, local vigilantes will take their place. In 2005 the Pentagon issued a new directive stating that ‘US military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.’ (US Department of Defense, 2005, point 4.3). However, because the military is a blunt instrument (Dziedzic, 1998b), and therefore not fit to take over law enforcement duties, they should be replaced as soon as possible by civilian police. This is also recognised in the joint US Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) which states that ‘military forces might have to perform police duties at the start of an insurgency’ but that it ‘is best to establish police forces to assume these duties as soon as possible’ (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2006, p. 153).

**Gendarmerie forces**

In practice the transition between military and police enforcement, however, is not that distinct. It remains very difficult to judge when the civilian police can take over. As witnessed in many post-conflict societies (Kosovo for example), a period of stabilisation could easily be followed by a period of serious violence and aggression. In such circumstances, the police are often not up to the task and very often have to rely on the military to restore law and order. Therefore the question is also raised whether or not the police are capable of policing societies in which the level of violence is high (i.e. the security gap).

Because of that gap, military police and gendarmerie forces are another alternative. The law enforcement training of the military police, however, is limited for they are merely trained to enforce law and order within the military and are not sufficient in number to police post-conflict societies (Agordzo, 2009, p. 288; McFarlane & Maley, 2002, p. 202). Gendarmerie units, on the other hand are more promising because they are not only trained for policing activities, but have also enjoyed a military training, have a military structure and can be deployed as units (Call & Barnett, 2000; de Weger, 2009, p. 7). According to Dziedzic (1998b, p. 145) and others (Smith et al., 2007), in violent circumstances only the military, the military police and gendarmerie forces have the necessary fire power and training to take on law enforcement responsibilities. Other authors, however, point out the danger of the militarisation of police functions in post-conflict societies (Agordzo, 2009, p. 288;

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5 After Albanian media reported that three children drowned in the River Ibri after being chased by Serbs in the divided city of Mitrovica, violent riots erupted on 17 March 2004 which resulted in the displacement of 4,500 people, 8 Serb and 11 Albanian dead, more than 900 (of which 700 Serbs) wounded, 120 KFOR and UNMIK police officers and 58 Kosovar police officers wounded (Human Rights Watch, 2004; International Crisis Group, 2004).
Moreover, civilian police are generally not supposed to uphold law and order by force in democratic societies, but through consensus.

The necessity to safeguard internal security in post-conflict societies, however, resulted in the deployment of gendarmerie forces believing that those forces are the best of two worlds. The underlying thought is that gendarmerie units would be able to take action far more efficiently during disturbances than their military counterpart without running the same risks as civilian police officers (Call & Barnett, 2000). The United Nations recognises the potential advantage of gendarmerie forces (called Formed Police Units, FPUs). Apart from their organisation and training, the deployment of gendarmerie forces has another advantage: they are more cost effective than individual police officers (Smith et al., 2007, p. 4). At the same time, countries such as Afghanistan and Jordan are interested in re-establishing gendarmerie forces. The use of gendarmerie forces would increase their ability to project their force beyond urban areas. Moreover, similar to the Vesperi Siciliani operation, the use of gendarmerie forces in Afghanistan, for example, would allow the Afghan police to engage in community policing, while the gendarmerie forces would be able to deal with the Taliban, other insurgents and the opium industry.6

The first deployments of such units was during the UN peace operations in Haiti and El Salvador from 1992 till 1995 (Hansen, 2002, p. 71). They were deployed as Specialized Police Units in Kosovo in 1999 and Liberia in 2003. By 2007, 35 FPUs (about 4,000 police officers) were deployed in Liberia, Kosovo, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti and Timor Leste (Smith et al., 2007, p. 3). Although the gendarmerie units filled the gap between the civilian police and the military and scored some successes, in practice some new problems emerged. Similar to civilian police, gendarmerie units play a role in the internal security of the sending state. As is the case with the recruitment of civilian police officers, the recruitment of gendarmerie officers did not proceed as smoothly as first thought (with the exception of the Italian Carabinieri, which has a staff of 111,000) (Call & Barnett, 2000; de Weger, 2009, p. 78). The co-operation with the civilian police does not always proceed smoothly either, since gendarmerie units tend to bring along their own chain of command, rules of engagement and methods (Hansen, 2002, p. 72). Moreover, reportedly in order to justify their raison d’être, some gendarmerie units in Kosovo withheld vital information from the civilian police and acted completely on their own, without informing the other partners within the mission.7

Worth mentioning is the initiative of five European Union Member States - France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain which created a European Gendarmerie Force [EGF]. Units would be able to execute all police tasks in every phase of the conflict with a rapid deployment of 800 to 900 men within 30 days. The use of the EGF is not limited to the EU and could be used by the UN to fill the security gap. The EGF has so far conducted only one mission, whose aim was to show the flag rather than be useful to the peace operation itself. In 2007, the EGF was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as part of the EU military operation Althea. There was a great deal of discussion among the EGF Member States because they did not agree with the nature of the missions nor about the area in which the missions should be deployed. Some suggested Iraq and Afghanistan, others Kosovo, but all agreed to send the EGF to BiH because it seemed the most straightforward mission

6 Interview with an officer of the Dutch Royal Marechaussee, February 2010.
7 Interview with a UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) police officer, 2005.
(knowing that the EGF would be monitored closely by the international community) (de Weger, 2009, p. 19). It remains to be seen whether or not the EGF can live up to the expectations it created.

**Private Security Companies**

In order to address staff shortages, international organisations could outsource some civilian police functions to private contractors. Although until recently most attention has gone to the military services offered by private corporations, there are some contractors who were involved in civilian police missions such as DynCorp International or AGS. Those contractors were hired by the US State Department to recruit and train civilian police officers for police missions abroad (Perito, 2003, p. 15). DynCorp International is contracted by the US State Department to hire law enforcement personnel to fill civilian police posts abroad. For example, as part of a US State Department funded pilot project called ‘Focused District Development’ [FDD], DynCorp recruited and trained police officers are contracted to reform and train the Afghan police (Chatterjee, 2009).

There are indeed some advantages to contracting private security companies to recruit and train police officers. First of all, private contractors can deploy their personnel more rapidly than international organisations because they do not have to wait for personnel contributions from different countries and are able to by-pass the cumbersome bureaucratic machinery which is often related to personnel contributions. Moreover, some companies are more specialised in specific areas – especially technologically – than conventional armies (Singer, 2003, p. 61). Furthermore, contractors can offer their customers a package of balanced and customised services and believe they are more cost-effective than international organisations (Ibid., p. 183). Because of the competitive environment in which private security companies work, they need to be innovative and deliver their services as efficiently and effectively as possible. In theory, this enables the customer to shop around and terminate a contract.

Outsourcing the recruitment and training of civilian police personnel is, however, not without risks. In Bosnia Herzegovina, for example, 24 of the 10,000 civilian police officers serving with the ITPF were repatriated because of misconduct. To a large extent, DynCorp International was blamed for this misconduct (Hansen, 2002, p. 51). DynCorp-deployed police were discovered to have been involved in arms trading and the sexual exploitation of women and children (Perito, 2004, p. 283). Moreover, when an employee informed his superiors of the misconduct of his fellow colleagues and later, when they did not respond, he informed the US military police that some of his colleagues literary bought children as sex slaves, he got fired (O’Meara, 2005). Since the Spring of 2006, DynCorp has been under investigation by US officials following reports of criminal fraud by DynCorp employees in Iraq, including the illegal selling of fuel and ammunition intended for the Iraqi police (Deflem & Sutphin, 2006, p. 278). Employees from these companies have also reportedly been involved in several shootings of Iraqi civilians (Finer, 2005). Although they may fill a void, the deployment of private security employees should be scrutinised. Prior to the September 16 incident in 2007 (in which Blackwater employees killed 17 civilians), private company employees contracted by the US State Department (those contracted by the Defense Department are subject to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act) were immune from prosecution in Iraq and the worst form of punishment they could be given was getting fired (Gollust, 2007). Triggered by the incident, the US House of representatives passed a bill on October 4, 2007 to subject State Department contracted
personnel to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. On 17 November 2008 a new Status of Forces Agreement was signed between the US and Iraq in which it is stipulated that Iraq will have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over US contractors and their personnel (Article 12, "Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the organization of their activities during their temporary presence in Iraq," 2008). However, it remains to be seen whether oversight and accountability indeed has improved.

Of course, cases of fraud, corruption, criminal behaviour, misconduct and criminal exploitation are not the problem of private contractors alone as civilian police officers, international civilian staff and soldiers are often involved in such cases as well. British, French, Romanian, Russian, US and Pakistani peacekeepers and UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) police have been accused of exploiting trafficked women (LeBor, 2004). KFOR and UNMIK personnel are immune from prosecution in Kosovo, but this immunity can be suspended by a special order. Thus has happened in only two cases since 2002 (Ibid.). According to Amnesty International, between 2002 and 2003 20 to 30 KFOR soldiers were suspected of trafficking offences (Amnesty International, 2004, p. 52).

There are, however, other issues at stake when contracting private security companies. As Rasor and Bauman (2008, pp. 1-2) demonstrate, companies can decide to end the contract. In their book, they describe the case of KBR, a subsidiary of Halliburton, which threatened to stop supplying food, water and other supplies if the army did not pay KBR’s bills. Another contractual issue is that while companies meet the contract, when situation demands additional efforts, they can refuse to provide those extra services (Singer, 2003, pp. 159-160). Moreover, since contractors are profit-driven, there is a risk they may cut back on equipment and qualified personnel. In contrast with most government personnel, private security sector employees do not swear allegiance and may be less thoroughly vetted (Ibid., p. 221).

5.2.5 Blurring boundaries

Due to the difficulties of deploying sufficient numbers of qualified police personnel to post-conflict societies, the civilian police often have to rely on other security providers to support public security efforts in peace operations. When an effective security system is in place (and is accepted as such by the international community), international civilian police officers can work together with their local counterparts, which is often the case in strengthening missions. When, on the other hand, security is low and the local security system is fragile, police missions will have to rely on other security actors or outsource some of the policing activities, to the military for example.

The military is the most obvious partner as it is very often the first security provider on the ground. However, the question arises whether or not the civilian police will remain the obvious actor in police missions. Gendarmerie units are more robust, rapidly deployed and – as some argue – equally capable of performing police functions. This is mirrored, for example, in the development of FPUs at the UN level and the establishment of the European Gendarmerie Force at the EU level. It is therefore likely that gendarmerie forces will be deployed more often in post-conflict societies in the near future. Perhaps these forces could eventually replace the army in its function as watchdog or in the words of Smith et al., ‘this approach could mark the beginning of a new trend (‘less green, more
blue’) in UN missions’ (2007, p. 3). Moreover, the role of private security companies in guarding public security in post-conflict societies is not yet fully examined. The media and even scholarly literature tend to focus on the misconduct of private security personnel, but their worth in terms of contribution to security sector reform and cost-effectiveness still remains an open question. In general, the 2003 Iraqi conflict heralded the *en masse* use of private security contractors (although they were involved in previous conflicts such as the Gulf War in 1991 but in smaller numbers). Much has to be learned about the monitoring these companies in terms of accountability and transparency and this is increasingly recognised by governments (with regards to the U.S. government, see, for example, Labott, 2007).

Indeed, as discussed above, each security provider has its pros and cons. As it stands now, during those missions where no effective local security systems are in place, the different actors will have to support each other because none of them are able to independently execute police functions in every phase of the conflict. An inclusive approach towards police reform, police assistance and the provision of public security is needed and is mirrored in, for example, the EU’s comprehensive security approach.

The blurring of the boundaries between the different security actors is, as argued above, not a new phenomenon. Colonial security approaches were primarily based on the army’s flexibility providing for internal and external security. Other actors such as private security companies were equally involved in the provision of internal security (although they primarily protected European property; see, for example, Deflem, 1994). Colonial police forces were often used as auxiliaries during colonial wars, just as the army was often used as an auxiliary during periods of local unrest. The constant blurring of the boundaries demanded that security actors be flexible and adapt to local circumstances. Once again, this flexibility and adaptability are important features of contemporary peace operations (as demonstrated by EUFOR Althea). The question then and now, is how this blurring of boundaries affects the accountability and oversight over these actors. An analysis of colonial intervention reveals, amongst others things, the difficult relation between military and civilian administrators with regard to oversight over the military and police (Bell, 1974; Deflem, 1994; McAllister Linn, 1999). Today, the same issues are at stake. Several scholars have highlighted the difficulties in coordinating the international community’s efforts in the field of security (Celador, 2005; Mounier, 2007; Nowak, 2003; Peake, 2004). These coordination problems, together with the blurring of boundaries between the various security actors, could undermine the international community’s efforts to promote democracy and good governance because accountability and oversight are key ingredients.

**Conclusion**

This contribution’s objective was to shed light on the reason why boundaries blur between security actors in contemporary peace and related stability operations. Its point of departure was to look at the delivery side, the provision of staff for such missions. During contemporary interventions, the deployment of an adequate number of qualified personnel is a painstaking process. In my opinion, this is one of the reasons why the boundaries between security actors have begun to fall away. Of course, peace and related stability operations face other - and perhaps even bigger - problems such as creating local ownership and a favourable environment for political and socio-economical
transitions. However, being able to deploy the necessary personnel remains a precondition for international interventions.

The decision to send the military and police officers abroad with a view to securing public security and contributing to the stabilisation of failed and failing states, is the result of political decisions that are based on experiences, assumptions and ideological dogmas. Contemporary policies regarding failed or failing states are based on a neoliberal view of the state, and have consequences for the security actors deployed in those states. Creating a secure environment to foster economic development is far more demanding than monitoring human rights. The question is whether the international community, international organisations or ad hoc coalitions can ‘deliver the goods’. Do they have the necessary instruments and means to build and stabilise nations? Is the current approach successful? Is there empirical evidence to support current policies?

The answer to these questions will not be straightforward. As the system has its limits, it is time to re-evaluate current policies towards peace operations. As discussed above, international organisations and individual states do not have the necessary means to secure the provision of public security. Police missions are characterised by slow deployment and personnel shortages, and the deployment of civilian police officers is limited. The military, gendarmerie units, civilian police or non-state actors can be used. There are a lot of options, but none of them seem to be ideal. So, in order to achieve the goals as outlined by policy makers, security providers have to cooperate. Close cooperation between the military and the police maximizes each actor’s efforts.

Here is where the boundaries begin to blur. It is a logical result of the current policies towards failed and failing states, societies in conflict and post-conflict societies. Considering the broadened scope of contemporary operations and personnel shortages, the provision of public security needs to be guaranteed. However, in a constitutional state, the security actors abide by the rule of law. The engagement of the military in the domestic affairs of a country is subject to strict regulation in most constitutional states. This idea goes back to the New Model Army of Cromwell and is meant to prevent the army from becoming a state within a state and thus becoming a risk to the constitutional state. Therefore, in the 19th century most western countries regulated the use and deployment of the army and established police forces. Although the military was often used to crush insurrections, they gradually turned to the provision of external security, while the police focused on the provision of internal security (Lutterbeck, 2005). The actions of both security providers became regulated in order to safeguard citizens’ rights. The danger of those blurring boundaries in peace operations is that rights can be lost in translation. While acting to provide public security, the army, gendarmerie units, the civilian police and private security companies can become a danger to that public security by failing to guarantee the individual’s procedural rights.

The blurred boundaries may create a grey zone in which several actors are engaged in the procurement of public security while a clear division of powers and executive functions, and therefore, accountability may vanish. This grey area could clearly undermine the foundations of democracy and the rule of law in post-conflict societies. These are the key concepts that the international community is seeking to promote through the deployment of those actors.

References


6. Striving for Symmetry

(Constabularisation, Security and Security Complexes)

Michiel De Weger

Introduction

Constabularisation of the military is a fundamental change that is taking place in Western defence forces. It is a topic on which much has been written, as well as on its synonym ‘policisation’ (and German and French equivalents), and it uses terms such as ‘convergence’ or ‘de-differentiation’ of police and military organisations, and ‘blurring’ of the boundaries between these organisations. Constabularisation is often presented as being part of a wider debate on changing security conditions, including the ‘blurring’ of internal and external security. In fact, it is hard to find conceptual clarity in all these publications. Different definitions of constabularisation are provided, while few authors spend much time on systematically describing how constabularisation relates to changes in domestic and international security, as well as the transformation of national security complexes, of which the police and the military are the largest constituents.

It is the goal of this chapter to move the debate on constabularisation somewhat further. More specifically, the objectives here are to help academics better understand constabularisation and to inspire more focused research on the relations between specific threats and specialist branches of the police and the military. It is also an attempt to help policy makers and leadership to take these relations into consideration more when assigning tasks, budgets, personnel and material.

To achieve these goals this chapter will try to answer the main question: How do security and security organisations relate? To do so, the following section focuses on definitions of constabularisation of the military and on the question of whether this process has indeed taken place. The emphasis here lies on Western armed forces as they have developed since the end of

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1 The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their comments. A version of this article was presented and discussed during a panel at the October 2009 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society in Chicago. The author would also like to thank the panellists and other participants, especially professor Tom Vander Beken, for their comments.
the Cold War. The third section tries to answer the question of why constabularisation has taken place and whether it will continue to do so. In the fourth section the scope is broadened to include the rest of the world, longer-term historical developments and changes in police organisations. These need to be taken into account in a universal, timeless view, encompassing the entire national security complex. Section five proposes the introduction of a model consisting of six categories of specialist security branches and the specific security threats they are best suited to counter. In the final section, using the model we seek to clarify some important issues in the debates on ‘blurring’ and ‘convergence’.

6.1 Constabularisation of the Military

To answer the first question on whether constabularisation has taken place, the phenomenon has to be defined first. What is constabularisation? The literature provides six definitions.

The first centres on the role of the military in international relations. As Janowitz (1960) originally worded it: ‘the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory’ (p. 418). The military would be able to act using a range of arms, including weapons of mass destruction, and using flexible and specialised units. Other authors use similar definitions of constabularisation (Greener-Barcham, 2007; Kernic, Klein & Haltiner, 2005; Zimmermann, 2005). A second group of authors defines the constabularisation process (also) as the changes in the armed forces necessary to be able to perform these new tasks. This includes changes in military education and organisation (Zimmermann, 2005; Haltiner, 2003, 2001), *modus operandi* and rules of engagement (Lutterbeck, 2005). What is also required is ‘an institutionalization and internalization of characteristics and competencies of the police in the military organization’ (Neuteboom, 2004, p. 50). The third definition relates to an increase in military involvement in internal security and domestic law enforcement (Beede, 2008; Lutterbeck, 2005; Lutterbeck, 2004; Dunlap, 1999; Kraska, 1996; Kernic et al., 2005). The fourth definition refers to the military (over the past decades) having become more engaged in policing activities in operations abroad (Beede, 2008; Kraska, 1996). According to the fifth definition, other authors state that constabularisation is the creation or growth of parts of the military most resembling police forces (Kernic et al., 2005;
Military counter-terrorist units and gendarmerie forces are mentioned explicitly, but this can reasonably be thought to include military police, special forces and intelligence branches of the armed forces (Lutterbeck, 2005; Andreas & Price, 2001; Neuteboom, 1999; Kraska, 1996). Finally, the term constabularisation, in French *policiarisation*, is used to describe the gendarmerie forces increasingly resembling civilian police (Dieu, 1993).

These six definitions are linked logically to a degree. ‘Janowitzan’ expansion of tasks will invariably lead to changes in the military. Larger involvement in either domestic or foreign law enforcement requires growth of police-like branches within the military, while the latter might in the longer term take on more characteristics of regular police forces to be even more successful (or acceptable). What conflicts, however, is that Janowitz’ (1960) original definition excluded permanent domestic law enforcement involvement and providing security abroad at levels of violence lower than those used in paramilitary and counter guerrilla operations (pp. 418 and 420). The second group of authors does not go as far as that either. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that the third, fourth and fifth definitions stem from later stages in the academic discourse. Put differently, the definition of constabularisation seems to have been expanded over time. This can easily be explained by a further, ‘post-Janowitz’, expansion of tasks for the military and its consequences. As the use of final definition coincided more or less with the emergence of the use of the military for constabulary tasks abroad, this constabularisation probably only refers to Gendarmerie adjustments to domestic requirements.

The literature indicates that constabularisation of the military in all six senses has indeed happened. The picture that emerges, however, is far from complete.

It has often been pointed out, and still is, that the military since the end of the Cold War have been far more frequently used for non-war tasks, also in the West. As Janowitz (1971) himself writes, ‘the actual pattern of military operations of the United Nations has in effect conformed to a constabulary pattern’ (p. 47). Others also report this type of constabularisation taking place (Neuteboom & Ducheine, 2007; Kernic et al., 2005; Winter, 2003).

Other authors also indicate changes in the military as a consequence of their expanding scope of operations. This includes the introduction of crisis reaction forces (Winter, 2003),

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2 Easton (2001) describes the policisation of the Belgian gendarmerie (*Rijkswacht*), using the term ‘demilitarisation’ however. They are not synonyms, as the latter is also used in the literature for downsising the military in general and the process of DDR: disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of combatants.
changes in structure (Neuteboom & Ducheine, 2007), changes in education and equipment (Winter, 2003), changes in planning capabilities and decentralisation of decision making (Winter, 2003), setting limitations on the use of force and granting police-type powers to military units (Lutterbeck, 2005).

Has constabularisation, in the sense of increased domestic tasks, also occurred? While a large group of authors provides examples of cases of (sometimes large-scale) military assistance to civilian authorities, others point at specific domestic tasks recently given to the military in specific countries (Neuteboom & Ducheine, 2007; Kernic et al., 2005; Lutterbeck, 2005; Haltiner, 2003; Haltiner, 2001). They mention tasks in air defence against hijacked (renegade) planes, site security, and other counter-terrorism tasks, counter-drugs, border control, controlling maritime traffic, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear [CBRN] protection in Austria, Canada, Italy and the US (Andreas & Price, 2001; Cabigiosu, 2005; Dunlap, 1999; Dunn, 1996; Frank, 2005; LaCrosse, 2005; Lutterbeck, 2005; Takacs, 2005).

The literature abounds with illustrations of the regular military performing activities abroad over the past two decades that most Westerners would call policing if they were to take place on their own territory. They include public order, counter-crime, counter-narcotics, border control and site protection, by Belgian, Canadian, Danish, French, German, Italian, US and UK military forces, on missions in Bosnia, Colombia, Iraq, Kosovo and Panama (Andreas & Price, 2001; Armitage & Moizan, 2005; Haltiner, 2003; Hills, 2000; Höllander, 2003; Perito, 2004).

Regarding the fifth definition, the growth of police-like military formations has also been remarked upon in the literature. Several authors point at the growth in size or importance of gendarmerie (or paramilitary) forces in Argentina, Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and the US, especially in the fields of border control and peacekeeping operations (Haltiner, 2003; Lutterbeck, 2005; Lutterbeck, 2004). A significant growth of MP forces is reported in the US: from 70,000 to 114,000 (Johnson & Krueger, 2008). Special forces have been expanded in the Netherlands and the US (Fitzsimmons, 2003; Van den As, 2007). No literature indicating or describing the growth of military intelligence agencies has been found – which could be explained by the high level of secrecy surrounding these organisations.

Finally, Easton (2001) describes how the Belgian Gendarmerie (Rijkswacht) between 1940 and 1998 slowly became more similar to civilian police into which it was incorporated in
2001. No other literature was found describing a growing resemblance of military police forces to their civilian counterparts, but at least in Luxembourg (2002) and Austria (2005) gendarmerie forces met the same fate as the *Rijkswacht*. It seems fair to conclude that in this sense, too, constabularisation has indeed happened after the Cold War in the West.

Over the last couple of years, Western navies have started operations, or significantly expanded operations, against piracy, in particular off the coast of Somalia, and against terrorism in the Mediterranean, which falls under law enforcement. This phenomenon may well develop into a significant new field of constabularisation of the military for operations abroad, including specialised branches within navies or the involvement of traditionally domestic security-oriented coast guards, which in many countries are military or fall under military control for this purpose (Woudstra, 2009; Hammick, 2007).

### 6.2 Drivers of Constabularisation

Answering the question of why constabularisation happened is instrumental to predicting whether it will continue. In the literature, five groups of explanations can be found.

A first group only links constabularisation to changing security conditions, which basically makes them explanations founded on structuralism. As a response to the emergence or rise of transnational terrorism and crime in general the military has increasingly been tasked to perform police activities at home and abroad (De Wijk & Toxopeus, 2005). There has been an increased demand for tasks more closely resembling those of the police than those of the military (Neuteboom, 1999).

A second group of explanation presents constabularisation as a voluntary process. After the Cold War, in an attempt to become more ‘socially useful’ or as part of a survival strategy, the military took on policing tasks (Bigo, 2000; Kraska, 1996; Lutterbeck, 2005; Neuteboom, 1999). It also created a greater willingness within the military to embrace new policing missions (Andreas & Price, 2001). When survival and security are at risk, i.e. when governments have to protect themselves or the public demands rapid and effective action, the police will be bypassed and tasks taken over by the military (Beede, 2008; Hills, 1997). From these authors it can be concluded that a drastic decrease in the likelihood of having to perform a particular main task can
draw the military into other fields, which explains constabularisation after the Cold War. Moreover, the military can be forced into policing when domestic and international crises overwhelm police capacity.

A third group of explanations emphasises characteristics of the military and the state of civilian alternatives at a given moment - also a structuralist view. The military becomes involved in counter-drugs efforts, cognisant of the international dimensions, when local police forces are overwhelmed, because of the popularity of the military and its image of being efficient (Dunlap, 1999). In fields such as counter-terrorism, border enforcement and peace support operations, effective action requires an ‘in between status’ between the police and the military, and a combination of police-type skills and equipment and the ability to engage in more ‘robust’ (military style) operations (Lutterbeck, 2004; Lutterbeck, 2005). The military is tasked with additional domestic policing tasks because it has available capacity and because it is an instrument of central government (De Weger, 2006).

Fourth, Den Boer (2008, p. 72) provides a rather different, but again structuralist, explanation: global discourses about drugs, organised crime, illegal immigration and terrorism cause defence personnel to be increasingly deployed for policing tasks.

Finally, Moskos (1975) establishes that performing peacekeeping missions causes the emergence of a constabulary ethic among the soldiers involved. Constabularisation in this sense is thus a self-sustaining, self-stimulating and structuralist process.

Some other factors, not found in the literature, could also explain constabularisation. The reluctance of police organisations to contribute to security operations abroad or the lack of a common vision among police organisations on the issue has left governments with only the military option. The increase of judicial constraints on military activities abroad may also have caused the armed forces to incorporate policing methods – as the police are used to working within far more restrictive domestic legal systems.

As far as the literature indicates, constabularisation is thus driven by a number of forces. Assuming these are indeed the drivers of constabularisation, can this trend be expected to continue? Unfortunately, the literature does not suggest in which fields constabularisation is likely to ‘breed’ and where the police is in such a bad state that the military provides an attractive alternative.
What the literature does offer is predictions of world security in the decades ahead. Drastic changes, forcing the military to abandon constabulary tasks and return to fighting in war as its main task, are deemed unlikely. On the contrary, except for conflicts caused by competition for resources (Ministère de la Défense, 2007; United States Joint Forces Command [USJFC], 2007; Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre [DCDC], 2006), the chance of real wars diminishes even further because of the decreasing probability of super power conflict, increasing multi-polarity, regionalism and a further rise in the number of democratic countries in the world (Ministère de la Défense, 2007; USJFC, 2007; DCDC, 2006; National Intelligence Council [NIC], 2004). From these predictions it would follow that it is likely that those parts of the military meant for fighting wars will continue to be downsized by politicians trying to cut costs. This in turn would mean that other parts of the military continue to grow in relative size and significance at least. To remain or become more ‘socially useful’ and ‘trying to survive’, military leadership and politicians sympathising with the military would push the military towards further constabularisation.

On the other hand, the security issues military constabulary forces are used for –terrorism both national and international, crime, drugs, protecting governments, leading to increasing police capacity and border enforcement, as described above - are predicted to continue and become even more of a challenge to Western states. There will be more socio-economic inequality and tensions, crime, illegal immigration, terrorism and ungoverned areas (Ministère de la Défense, 2007; USJFC, 2007; DCDC, 2006). As the ‘arc of instability’ spanning the Middle East, Asia and Africa is predicted to remain, there will be more disorder and insurgency, internal conflicts, failed states and the internationalisation of domestic conflicts (Ministère de la Défense, 2007; USJFC, 2007; DCDC, 2006; NIC, 2004). The military can therefore be deployed for even more ‘Janowitzan’ constabulary interventions, but whether this will happen is also dependent on politics, the will of Western leaders to intervene in foreign conflicts, and whether the now dominant discourse of blurring and merging of police and military tasks will continue.

6.3 Broadening the Scope

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3 Note that the sources used for this compilation predate the Georgia-Russia conflict and world financial-economic crisis of 2008.
Thus, since the end of the Cold War constabularisation of the military has indeed happened in the West. But what is the value of such a broad concept? The six definitions span just about the whole of the military and all the work armed forces are doing nowadays – except for remaining prepared for large-scale, real military conflict: war. Moreover, the concept points out a direction or six directions in which the military is developing, but not how far this transformation will or should go. The research for the sections above was also limited to the West after about 1990. To really understand the relation between security and security complexes, non-Western and less recent history should be included. This will not be described here in much detail, but it is clear that military involvement in domestic security of all Western nations was more extensive during the protests in the 1960/70s, in the class-struggle period of 1880-1930 and even more so before that (Cooper, 1980; Engdahl, 1971). The role of the military was, generally speaking, bigger in colonies than in the mother countries (Das & Verma, 1998; Enloe & Semin-Panzer, 1976).

Outside the West, there are countries where security complexes for domestic employment are highly military even today (with authoritarian regimes and prolonged domestic conflicts). Even when including – and studying more thoroughly – all this, it would still be impossible to gain a full understanding of how security and security complexes relate, as this would be limited to the military. Another real limitation of the constabularisation concept, as analysed above, is that it more or less excludes the police, their development and relations with the military. In police literature the phenomenon of ‘militarisation of the police’ receives considerable attention (Kraska, 2007; Lemieux & Dupont, 2005). Closer examination would probably reveal that it is a concept that is just as broad and complex as constabularisation of the military.

To reach full understanding of changes in both police and military organisations, a concept or model is needed that is universal, timeless and that incorporates all security threats and all security organisations to counter them. It should also relate threats to organisations, as these, at least from a structuralist viewpoint, explain why the surge or decline of specific threats causes growth or downsizing of specific branches of police and military. Insofar as changes in security complexes are the results of choices, at least from an efficiency point of view it is desirable that the relation between these specific threats and specialists be kept in mind as much as possible, striving for symmetry, as this would result in the most suitable security complex for the security situation of the country involved. Adhering to this symmetrical approach will deliver the best
results, as using the ‘wrong’ security instrument, as a result of applying disproportional means and violence, whether too little or too much, will decrease effectiveness, legitimacy and public support (Hedges & Al-Arian, 2008; Mockaitis, 2007).

Despite the momentous changes to the military profession that have taken place in the West over the past two decades, the literature seems to provide no models to help explain what has happened to Western security complexes, both the domestic and international. Oddly enough, there also seems to be little literature on the question of which part of the military is best suited for certain tasks. On the contrary, in official military doctrines discussion of ‘irregular’ adversaries and ‘asymmetrical’ threats has become mainstream, which serves as a perfect illustration of armed forces not having transformed enough to effectively handle these opponents: they have not constabularised enough. Moreover, the military should conceptually come to terms with these new tasks (Blank, 2004; Kilcullen, 2007). As Bigo describes in his 1998 work and several ensuing publications, organisations try to define and redefine security to their own advantage. ‘New’ threats are exaggerated, definitions stretched to the maximum, all linked to the present activities of the organisations, in an attempt to get more money and manpower. Experts and scientists, often directly or indirectly paid for by police, military, customs, intelligence agencies etc., contribute to this. It causes the confused discourse Den Boer has remarked upon. To give one example: in the military literature there is frequent discussion on whether war has changed, while in fact it has more or less disappeared. What are called wars are not wars, but civil wars, insurgencies, general lawlessness etc. Using all-encompassing phrasing like ‘conflict’ does not create conceptual clarity either. This confusion - or intentionally misleading language - is also illustrated by the idea of ‘the three-block war’, a concept that is often used in the military literature to describe that soldiers nowadays have to be able to counter military adversaries, keep the peace and handle humanitarian crises within the space of only three housing blocks (Krulak, 1999), while only the first should be called ‘war’. Likewise, only a part of the so-called ‘hybrid wars’ (Mattis & Hoffman, 2005) against adversaries with military and non-military capacities are in fact wars.

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4 Following Bigo’s (1998) reasoning, clearly and exclusively defining this would threaten the interests of the branches involved and can therefore not be expected to happen that often.
6.4 An Encompassing Model

In the figure below such an all-encompassing model is presented. It is based on a security continuum ranging from real war to a state of only minimal infringements on ideal law and order. War in which weapons of mass destruction are used is not included here as a separate, highest category. In fact, CBRN capabilities can be used in far more situations, from war down to (in theory at least) basic law and order. The same goes for virtual warfare/terrorism/crime, use of explosives and information warfare/psychological operations/propaganda, etc. Intelligence and investigation agencies also work on all levels. The model does not distinguish between domestic activities and operations abroad, but implies that any kind of security activity, i.e. an air battle or riot management, is in its essence the same wherever it is executed. The different law and judicial systems covering security threats and activities to counter these are also not mentioned because at all levels it is forbidden or not tolerated (for social or economic reasons) to use disproportionate violence and means. All military and civilian support functions, such as logistics, facilities and administration are left out to keep the model simple. The same goes for such activities as humanitarian relief, reconstruction, governance and development. Finally, the intentions of actors are left out, i.e. whether protestors or terrorists want to overthrow the government or not.

The continuum is divided into six different security conditions, each with quite specific security threats. Over time security in a specific area can escalate or de-escalate along the continuum – taking from months to decades. In this model it is assumed that each of these kinds of threat can best be countered by specialists from military, paramilitary/intermediate forces, police or even private security companies. While there is no doubt that only organisations called military have the means to wage war and stop civil war, in practice all other activities are catered for both by military and police organisations, either domestically or abroad, by Western organisations or non-Western, today and in the past. For this reason the labels of ‘police’ or ‘military’ are avoided in the model.

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5 I found inspiration for this model in Last’s (2000) five-categories spectre in particular, which was only meant for peacekeeping, and also in Blank (2004), with his appeal to put more effort into distinguishing precise threats and capabilities to counter these: symmetry.
Identifying more categories of threats and branches is possible. Bartlett, Holman & Somes (2000) identify seventeen levels for the military alone. More clarity is reached, however, when the most important branches of the police and the armed forces can be linked *exclusively* to certain threat categories. By adding more specific threats or branches this exclusive link will be lost. To fully understand the model, it must be emphasised that in reality a specific country at a specific moment in time can experience more than one threat. To give a simple example: in times of war, crime and crowds also need to be handled occasionally. In reality, security conditions might differ from one part of a country to another, even within a city. Moreover, even in conditions where law and order prevail, most countries retain the means to defend themselves in war, just to be sure. As a consequence, the development of national security complexes is more a matter of re-sizing the various specialist branches as security conditions change, discourses come and go, and the political will to intervene in other countries increases or diminishes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels, frequency, size of organisation and geographical scope of violence</th>
<th>Security threat</th>
<th>Opponent</th>
<th>Security specialists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High/largest</td>
<td>(Interstate) war</td>
<td>Very large and mass violence organisation</td>
<td>Tanks, fighter planes, warships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>Large and highly violent, overt and widespread acting organisations</td>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency</td>
<td>Widespread activity of small groups, operating lethally</td>
<td>Special forces, protection units (Kilcullen, 2007; Mockaitis, 2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 This model focuses on the actual use of forces, not their availability. Having forces around or positioned deters adversaries/deviant behaviour.
How does this model relate to the process of constabularisation? Most definitions provided above can easily be incorporated into the model. After the Cold War the military was also tasked with intervening abroad in or after civil war and in cases of insurgencies. During the operations it was faced with the even smaller ‘opponents’ of the three lowest categories. Domestically it was assigned extra, lower level tasks. And as armed forces became more involved in these tasks they changed and started to expand their branches most suited for these tasks. Gendarmerie forces becoming more like civilian police is not so easily linked to the model mostly because these military police organisations did not have significant changes in the domestic tasks that they share to a very high degree with civilian police (De Weger, 2009).

The model can also accommodate the explanations for the occurrence of constabularisation. As the chances of war diminished, the numbers of Western tanks etc. were greatly reduced. As Western military forces were tasked with operations abroad, they were faced with a high demand for capabilities to counter lower insecurity level threats all the way down to providing law and order in the areas they were deployed to. Armed forces started to transform themselves, as they wanted to survive at least in a reduced size and be socially useful. The discourse on blurring and merging roles legitimised the fact that they (too) were assigned new tasks and means. Domestically – including on the borders - Western nations were faced with a

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7 Mueller (2004) demonstrates that the numbers of wars and civil wars have declined over the past decades.
growing threat of extremism (terrorism)\textsuperscript{8} and large-scale crime that police alone could not handle. The military were well suited for this because of the international orientation they inherited from the Cold War period and interventions abroad following in its wake. ‘Irregular parts’ of the military benefited most, as they could provide central government with counter-insurgency and robust security capacity. As the military became familiar with its new tasks, it increased the pace of internal transformation.

The model not only helps to place constabularisation and its definition into a larger context, it also allows for more detailed discussions on the most desirable composition of the armed forces and the police, the sizing of various branches and focusing these on specific opponent types. Undesirable competition among branches is limited and resources are used more efficiently. Scientists can contribute to this by focusing research on specific security phenomena and specific security organisations. Moreover, in many cases academic quality will increase if the dichotomy between police and armed forces, and bias towards either of them, are overcome.

**The Model and Reality**

The model proposed above can be used to clarify some important issues in the debates about ‘blurring’ of security threats and ‘convergence’ of security organisations, and this further demonstrates its usefulness. While there are more issues that could be discussed, three issues stand out in particular in the confused discourse on security and national security complexes.

First, the regular military (infantry) seems to be providing far broader security tasks abroad than it should be according to the symmetrical line-up model. Several factors can explain this. First, there still is a shortage of MP, Gendarmerie and special forces (Bronson, 2002; Gompert & Gordon, 2008; Höllander, 2003; Neuteboom, 1999). Moreover, in many operations there is a real threat of security conditions escalating, in anticipation of which this infantry is deployed (Geser, 1994). While this brings with it the risk of regular military using too much force, many countries lack constabulary forces and civilian police, so the only option remaining is a deployment of infantry. Some countries train their infantry for lower level security tasks,\textsuperscript{9} but it is questionable

\textsuperscript{8} For the difference between terrorism – here included in ‘civil protest’ - and insurgency: see Mockaitis (2007).
\textsuperscript{9} In a discussion with the author, the Israeli academic Ben-Ari Eyal pointed out another trend: ‘special force-ification’ of the infantry, implying the infantry is being reshaped according to the special forces model. In fact, the
whether they are suitably trained or can ever learn to combine combat skills with lower-level force. The model assumes that infantry soldiers can not become special forces, protection units or constabulary, unless they lose their ability to act as infantry.

Second, many countries deploy gendarmerie forces, i.e. police with military status, separate or alongside their regular military forces, to take care of the three lowest levels of threats. According to the model, this should not be regarded as ‘blurring’ of police or military roles because Gendarmerie forces perform community policing and civil protest tasks domestically. Geographically large-scale and lasting general lawlessness, however, is not a phenomenon that Western countries have experienced much over the past century or two, domestically, apart from cases in some neighbourhoods of Western cities. The role of countering general lawlessness abroad is not a case of blurring, either, as neither police nor the military of the West have been tasked with it until relatively recently. In continental Europe in the early 19th century, gendarmerie forces were created to get a grip on and pacify remote and rural areas of the mother country (Emsley, 1999). While gendarmerie forces are thus reclaiming their historical function, infantry are being sent to lawless or ungoverned territories, i.e. up to April 2003 in most of Iraq (Mockaitis, 2007) and until 2006 in Southern Afghanistan (Browne, 2006), and they are still trying to find out how to optimise their operation in this area.

Third, it is the middle categories of the model that much of the debate about constabularisation, blurring, merging and probably also on militarisation of the police is focuses on. Handling these situations abroad came back into the portfolio of Western security complexes in the 1990s after it had disappeared at the end of the colonial period. Domestically, civil protest was largely unknown in the West until the 1960/1970s. Police and Gendarmerie forces formed SWAT teams and riot (crowd) control units to handle them, labelled by many authors, i.e. Waddington (1999) and Kraska (1996), the paramilitarisation and militarisation of the police. In addition, in many countries military special forces were (also) tasked with domestic counter-terrorism. The 1960/1970’s gave rise to as many calls of blurring and merger, and as much confusion as the constabularisation of the military in the present post-Cold War period. Again, blurring and similar terms seem to be incorrect qualifications, as these specialist units did not exist before: security complexes have merely been adjusted to changing security conditions.

Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (infantry) has recently published its vision for 2015 in which it sees four tactical roles for itself: fighting, assistance including humanitarian, training/education of other security forces and public order management.
Conclusion

In the preceding sections it was concluded that constabularisation of the military has indeed materialised. This trend is also likely to continue, both as a consequence of catching up with security changes up to the present moment and of changes in the decades ahead. Unless dramatic political events alter this course, it may very well be that in a few decades time the more police-like parts of the military will have become as large and important as those intended for waging war. Needless to say, this would also change the way the public, politicians and even academics see the military. Within the armed forces such a transformation will probably not happen without both growing pains and increasing competition and jealousy.

Nevertheless, generally speaking, for policy makers, leadership and academics in the field of constabularisation of the military the future seems bright. As was also concluded here, they should, however, sharpen their analysis and research. A broader historical view, non-Western bias and inclusion of developments within the police are needed. To this end, a model relating security to security complexes has been proposed in this chapter.

In the mean time, there seems to be no lack of topics for further research. They could include quantifying constabularisation of the military, military-police comparisons, militarising of the police, international comparisons, the pre-1990 period and police-military relations in the non-Western world. Archives and interviews might provide more insight into and detail about why, when and how precisely changes in security complexes occur. What also deserves attention is the way in which constabularisation of the military affects relations with civilian cooperation partners. Finally, proposing and validating concepts and models that can help understand, predict and prescribe in this rather complicated field of ‘meta security’ could also be useful.

References


PART II IMPLICATIONS, CHALLENGES AND CASES.

An Analysis of Different Models

Peter Neuteboom

Introduction

Since the 1990s military organisations have faced many different challenges, varying from fighting counterinsurgency, conducting peace support and stability operations to delivering humanitarian support. These operations are not exclusively military. They increasingly demand capabilities that can deal effectively with post-conflict public order and security issues. During these operations, the international community assumes the responsibility for the implementation of both military and civilian aspects of a peace settlement and is therefore the owner of the so-called security gap. A security gap is the result of a quantitative or qualitative deficit of indigenous or international police available during or directly after a military conflict that can restore and maintain order and security. This deficit often places the international military in a position where it has to act as a temporary police force (Dziedzic, 1998). The question is whether the armed forces are trained, organised, and equipped for the execution of police duties. This question has fuelled a discussion on the so-called constabularisation of the military (Armitage & Moisan, 2005; Brouse, 2006; Dziedzic, 1998; Haltiner, 2003b; Jones, Wilson, Rathmell & K.J. Riley, 2005; Neuteboom, 2004; Perito, 2004). Historically this development refers to the American constabulary forces that served as interim police forces in countries where the US had intervened militarily. These constabulary forces had been military organisations that took on tasks that fell in a grey area between police and military tasks.

Among military experts there is no consensus on what constitutes a constabulary force and how is should be defined. A study of relevant military literature reveals three different interpretations of what constitutes a constabulary force: (1) the expeditionary model; (2) the hybrid military model; and (3) the gendarmerie-based model. This chapter defines and discusses these three concepts and seeks to explore their resourcefulness or feasibility in post-conflict operations.

7.1 Expeditionary model

7.1.1 Concept
In the early 1960s Morris Janowitz presented a comprehensive sociological study on the organisational setting of the US military services and their leadership. He assumed that in the nuclear era the use of force in international relations would change fundamentally and would create new challenges and missions for the military. These missions would be rather of a constabulary nature than that of regular war operations. He hypothesised that these missions
would ultimately redefine the professional requirements and roles of the military (Reed & Segal, 2000: 58; see also Box 1). Janowitz (1960, p. 435) based his ideas on the British model of ‘imperial policing’, which the British forces applied in the post-1945 era to deal with politically motivated insurgency in the colonies and other countries of the British Commonwealth. He claimed that ‘the British forces demonstrated considerable resourcefulness in developing a constabulary concept to deal with their policing missions.’ As a result, he noted, the military had to transform into a constabulary force that is ‘continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory’ (Janowitz, 1960, p. 418).

Box 1: Constabulary Roles

Janowitz’ initial constabulary model is not about creating a new military organisation. Nor does it refer to any kind of peace or stability operation. His concept is rather about a need for new military roles in the nuclear era. He recognised that the main problem in transforming the military into a constabulary force was in fact its skills structure (Janowitz, 1960, p.424). He pointed at the change affecting the military institution since the beginning of the Cold War. During the Second World War the heroic leader had been the dominant military role model. He realised that the introduction of the nuclear weapon would transform the function of military professionals into ‘controllers of a machine designed to remain inactive’ (Nuciari, 2003, p. 67). Janowitz (1960, p. 424-425) envisioned a challenge in finding a balance between the traditional heroic leader and the military technologist through the introduction of military managers with skills and orientations common to civilian managers: ‘Military managers will have to prevent the constabulary from being dominated or defined by either the military technologist or the heroic leader. The military technologists tend to thwart the constabulary force because of their essential preoccupation with the upper end of the destructive continuum and their pressure to perfect weapons without regard to issues of international politics. Heroic leaders, in turn, tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their desire to maintain conventional military doctrine and their resistance to assessing the political consequences of limited military actions which do not produce victory.’ Without this balance, the transformation of the armed forces into a constabulary force would be problematic, Janowitz argued.

Janowitz emphasised that military professional roles should correlate with the current security environment. Extrapolated to contemporary peace support or stability operations this assumption implies that an effective execution of these missions require new professional military roles. To Burk and Moskos (1994) these roles should include that of soldier-diplomat, the soldier-scholar and the soldier-communicator. Kümmel (2003, p. 432-433) elaborates on these ideas and underlines that in contemporary peace support operations traditional and non-traditional roles are indivisible. Alongside Burk and Moskos, he distinguishes the soldier-street-worker, soldier-police officer, and soldier-diplomat. In this sense, the constabulary force is a starting point for new concepts and theories to accommodate new tasks into the military profession (Nuciari, 2003, p. 73).

Janowitz’ definition reflects the key values of the constabulary concept: its operational and organisational readiness, and the minimum use-of-force principle. Janowitz stipulated that the constabulary force should be able and prepared to act at all times. To illustrate this quality he referred to the police organisation. He did not include the integration of police tasks into the military mission or to transform the military into an international police organisation, however. Nor did he want to draft a template for a new type of military organisation (Haltiner, 2003a, p. 163). On the contrary, Janowitz (1960, p. 420) presumed that an ‘extensive involvement of the military as an internal police force – except as the reserve instrument of ultimate legitimate force – would hinder the development of the constabulary concept in international relations’. He based the constabulary force on the police

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3 The model of imperial policing was based upon four principles laid down by Charles Gwynn (1934, p. 10-33). These four principles were (1) the primacy of the civil power; (2) the use of minimum force; (3) the need for firm and timely action; and (4) the need for cooperation between civil and military authorities.
concept only to emphasise the need for a responsive, standing organisation which eliminates the traditional distinction between a peacetime and a wartime establishment and thus integrates preparation and operational activities (Janowitz, 1960, p. 419).

The principle of minimum use-of-force implied a rather atypical use of the military instrument which – at the time – was primarily designed to fight all-out or nuclear wars. Janowitz stipulated that the use or threat of force would be carefully adjusted to the political objectives pursued. He did not relate this principle to peacekeeping operations, however. This relationship was first made by Moskos in 1975 when he studied the impact of peacekeeping missions on professional military attitudes. Moskos (1975, p. 389) regarded peacekeeping as ‘an extreme accentuation of the constabulary model’ because it puts less emphasis on ‘the application of violence in order to serve goals of attaining viable political compromises’. He considered the principle of minimum use-of-force to be a fundamental part of the so-called ‘constabulary ethic’ which implied that a peace soldier serves a wider body than the nation-state, subscribes the principles of absolute minimal force, relies on compromise and negotiation, and recognises the elusiveness of permanent political solutions (Moskos, 1975, p. 399).

Expeditory Force

Janowitz’ constabulary model represents a functional, idealistic approach to how a military unit will have to work in the future. His approach is not based on empirical data but on the presence of nuclear weapons, which would entail that there has to be limits to the management of violence. Janowitz developed his ideas in an international security environment quite different from that of the early twenty-first century. In today’s military environment Janowitz’ constabulary concept is best compared to the expeditory model implemented by many Western governments after the end of the Cold War. His constabulary force concept has thus not lost its significance.

Expeditory forces are designed and tasked to cover a broad spectrum of military missions. Some authors (Sheptycki, 2007, p. 32; Greener-Barcham, 2007, p. 96; Manigart, 2003, p. 329). Manigart (2003, p. 329) consider these operations as constabulary missions that range ‘from conventional war-fighting to maintaining and enforcing peace in unstable regions of the world to fighting international terrorism and other threats to carrying out humanitarian missions’. This wider notion of the constabulary force concept is in fact quite close to the original model which emphasised its role in the entire spectrum of military power and organisation, including military aid programs, paramilitary operations, guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare (Janowitz, 1960, p. 418-419). In addition, to act as an expeditory force the military needs an organisational concept that enables them to respond at any time and to intervene in crisis situations on short notice and in various international scenarios.

7.1.2 Feasibility

Public order and security tasks may be part of the curriculum of the expeditory force but it is not self-evident. The expeditory model does not exclusively imply the execution of public order and security tasks though. As such, the model does not fill the gap in the grey area between military and police operations. Experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq have resulted in a change of view within military circles about the necessity of the military filling the security gap. The US military has recognised policing as an indispensable element of expeditory forces (Shin, 2009, p. 25). However, most Western militaries have not yet changed their doctrines, structure, and training to perform police duties of any kind. When regular military forces do have to perform policing duties this may collide with the classical hierarchical, top-down military command and control structure. Because policing requires
some sort of empowerment and decentralisation, the military would need to adopt principles that could be anomalous to the military organisation.

7.2 Hybrid Model

7.2.1 Concept

Where the expeditionary force seeks to cover the whole range of military power the question arises whether soldiers can be trained and equipped to deal with public order and security issues. This question has been discussed among many military experts for a long time. Those who reject the notion that the military could play a role in public order and security management argue that the military organisation is not designed to cover the full spectrum of force, including police force (Bronson, 2002; Call & Barnett, 1999; Clark, 2001; Hillen, 2001; Interchurch Peace Council, 1998; Smith, 2005). Haltiner (2001, 2003a, 2003b) and Geser (1996a, 1996b), point at the shortcomings of today’s armed forces in relationship to their mission in terms of structure, leadership, command and control, training, and functioning. They refer to the difference between classic warfare and contemporary conflict resolution. In their opinion it is unlikely that a military organisation can deal with macro and micro violence at the same time and in the same organisational fashion. They conclude that the military will fail to adapt the present demands and therefore suggest a transformation of the military organisation into a hybrid: an organisation that combines the qualities of both the military and the police. They have an organisational approach to the establishment of a constabulary force. Geser and Haltiner have different views on what such body should look like. Geser focuses on the establishment of a new security organisation, such as a global third force, while Haltiner suggests a transformation of the present military organisation as a whole.

Cosmopolitan Third Force

According to Geser (1996a, p. 48), the institutional solution to the current international security problems should be found in the establishment of a cosmopolitan ‘third force’. He considers the existing security challenges too complex and too dynamic to be assigned effectively either to police forces or to military forces. Therefore this ‘third force’ should be an organisation that combines high-standing police capabilities – like flexibility and community responsiveness – with full-range conventional, goal-oriented military characteristics rather than being an organisational structure somewhat midway between conventional armies and civilian police forces. Foremost, it should add some third force capacities not present within the traditional police and military organisations.

The concept of a cosmopolitan police organisation as described by Geser is not unique. Other authors have presented similar ideas. Däniker (1995, p. 93) suggests that military forces are ‘no longer solely an instrument of countering enemy power, but increasingly an instrument for building and cementing a new era of inter-state relations’. He builds his views on the establishment of new – rather cosmopolitan – military roles such as the ‘police soldier’ or ‘miles protector’ (guardian soldier). These roles include ‘classic defence missions against the attempt of an aggressor to seize a country and its population, [and] the establishment of a war-preventing effect like deterrence ... or “dissuasion”’. But this also entails ‘all the law enforcement functions against the use of force of strategic scope below the threshold of war, such as large-scale terrorism or gang warfare with which the

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4 The concepts presented by Geser, Däniker and Kaldor bear the characteristics of the constabulary force, however without an explicit reference to it.
police is unable to cope ... [and] the battle against organised crime’ (Däniker, 1995, p. 104). Such changes in functions, capabilities and skills require that existing military roles and structures are expanded and provide for much greater flexibility and multi-functionality than previously. This cannot, in Däniker’s opinion, be improvised but must be included in the military’s force structure calculations and its training and equipment schedules.

While Geser and Däniker both focus on a wide range of cosmopolitan security tasks, Kaldor concentrates her focus on the protection of human rights which in her opinion also requires an activity ‘somewhere between soldiering and policing ... focussed on the minimum use of force’. This concept, labelled by Kaldor (2003, p. 156) as ‘cosmopolitan law enforcement’, must lead to ‘a professional service which would include both civilian and military personnel, ranging from robust peacekeeping troops, through police and gendarmerie, administrators, accountants, human rights monitors and aid workers’. Such force must then be built on ‘a new kind of soldier-cum-policeman’ tasked ‘to protect civilians, before, during and after conflicts’. The establishment of a cosmopolitan law enforcement force cannot be based on current organisational structures and concepts, she adds, but will require ‘considerable rethinking about tactics, equipment and command and, … training’.

The question is, however, how and when this new ‘cosmopolitan third force’ should be established. Geser and Kaldor remain ambiguous on this subject. Däniker (1995), on the other hand, is clear about the fact that the establishment of such a force will not be achieved in short term. He suggests that the ‘search for new structural forms and procedures … compatible with [its] hybrid tasks’ should be accomplished within the framework of contemporary peace support operations through a process of organisational evolution and trial and error.

**Transformed Military**

The establishment of a global security force may be less feasible in the short term. The option Haltiner (2003b, p. 162-164) presents to a transformation of the military into a hybrid organisation may be another solution to the problem of security gaps. He puts forward the hypothesis that efforts to solve new military tasks of a policing nature by traditional military structures creates dilemmas and tensions that endanger, if not rule out, the fulfilment of the organisation’s goals. Haltiner observes that a ‘constabularisation’ of most Western armed forces is taking place, since the execution of police-like peace operations has become their main mission and the use of national armed forces as international and national constables has gained importance both in terms of frequency and intensity. He questions, however, whether these organisations are suited for these missions. He considers the constabulary force concept being an anomaly to the classic military organisation: ‘Some of the most important reasons for potential failure … may well lie in the unfitness of traditional military organisational structures for any tasks that are not of a combative nature’. He argues that the organisational structure, the management system, profile, qualifications and the identity of the organisation have to meet the complexity of the new tasks. To comply with these demands, Haltiner (2003b, p. 178) suggests that the classic military organisation should transform itself and mutate into a military-police ‘hermaphrodite’ with a minimal loss of its traditional military skills and identity. This hybrid should have a flat hierarchy and a flexible, modular, and decentralised structure. It should incorporate its experiences from missions of policing nature into the organisational structure and concepts (Haltiner, 2001, p. 298). To meet demands of the second strategy, the rigid military organisation must become more flexible, the education

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5 According to Kaldor (2006, p. 133), ‘cosmopolitan law enforcement’ comprises traditional military tasks such as separating belligerents, maintaining cease-fires, and controlling airspace; essentially new tasks such as the protection of safe zones or relief corridors; and tasks close to policing such as ensuring freedom of movement, guaranteeing safety of individual, and the capture of war-criminals.
of officers and soldiers must be broadened and become polyvalent and the professional identity must meet the new expectations (Haltiner, 2003b, p. 178-179).

7.2.2 Feasibility

A hybrid military can be created through the establishment of a cosmopolitan third force or the transformation of the military. Both options are based upon the same principle. They all envision a force that is able to combine traditional military capabilities with new demands such as law enforcement, public security, nation-building and humanitarian support. The two differ in terms of institutional structure. The cosmopolitan force seems to be a structure assigned to a supranational body on a permanent basis. Attempts to establish a global standing military force under UN command have failed so far because many governments are reluctant to transfer authority over their troops to a supranational body on a structural basis. Governments rather allocate units to NATO-led missions on a temporary basis than creating something new under a supranational body.

The transformation of the armed forces into hybrid security organisations builds on existing national military structures. As Haltiner noted, it combines traditional military capabilities and competences with those that characterise the police organisation. In fact, Haltiner argues for implementation of more a flexible structure, the empowerment of authority, and the implementation of policing skills in the military curriculum. As such, this version of the hybrid military is more about creating an adaptive military capable of dealing effectively with a wide variety of security challenges on the ground than creating a completely new military institution.

The question remains whether these concepts are realistic. Considering the history, constitution, and organisational make-up of contemporary military organisations, a fundamental change will neither happen overnight nor succeed through anything less than deep-seated reforms and will have a deep impact on the military’s function, structure, and organisation.

7.3 Gendarmerie-based Model

7.3.1 Concept

A third model for constructing a constabulary force is the use of gendarmerie forces. This model does not seek to close the security gap through a transformation of regular armed forces, but through the expansion of the role and capacity of existing gendarmerie forces. Gendarmerie forces are police organisations with a military status assigned with both military and civilian tasks (for a brief description of the gendarmerie force, see Box 1).

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6 This model comes close to kind of constabulary force that emerged after the establishment of the British professional police organisation in second half of 1800s. Unlike their police model of unarmed ‘citizen in uniform’ the British government designed paramilitary, centralised, and armed to police their colonies (Enloe, 1978, p. 248). These constabulary forces were basically organised like the European gendarmerie forces. As such they were often stationed in barracks in close proximity to the military and separate from the civilian population (Brogden, 2005, p. 77-78).
Historically, the gendarmerie can be characterised as a hybrid; being a mixture of a police and military force. The gendarmerie model originates from the French police tradition. During the Napoleonic era in the late 1700s and early 1800s the gendarmerie model spread over large parts of Europe. After Napoleon’s definite defeat in 1815 in many European countries the gendarmerie remained and became part of the national police system. Although gendarmerie forces are a typical feature of continental European states, they can be found in all parts of the world (Bayley 1985, p. 46), for example in France (Gendarmerie Nationale), Italy (Carabinieri), Spain (Guardia Civil), Portugal (Guarda Nacional Republicana), the Netherlands (Koninklijke Marechaussee), Jandarmeria Română (Romania), Zhandarmeriya (Bulgaria), Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı (Turkey), Carabineros (Chile) and Gendarmería Nacional (Argentina).7 Historically, the gendarmerie is part of the military establishment and is tasked with maintaining law and order in the interior, chiefly in rural areas and along major thoroughfares (Bayley, 1985, p. 41). Over time, some of these gendarmerie forces have been demilitarised, for example in Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg. However, their military characteristics have been attenuated or their links to the armed forces have been severed. Nevertheless, in most cases their military origins are still visible. Even though there are considerable differences between the gendarmerie forces of individual European countries, nowadays most of them display roughly the following features: they have a double affiliation, with the ministry of defence and the ministry of interior, they are recognised along military lines and they are equipped with heavier equipment than civilian police forces, such as armoured cars, helicopters and light infantry weapons (Lutterbeck, 2004, p. 47).

In their home-countries, gendarmerie forces are tasked with regular police duties or a limited number of specialised police functions, such as counter-terrorism, (mobile) border control or crowd and riot management. Gendarmerie personnel are trained and equipped for both police and military assignments. This makes them suitable for challenges and situations which are characterised by a higher degree of danger or hostility than that normally faced by the ordinary police. These are situations which often call for a more robust response than the one ordinary (i.e. civilian style) police forces are able to provide, but for which the use of the regular armed forces is not considered appropriate (Lutterbeck, 2004, p. 50). Given their double affiliation and their interoperability and familiarity with the military command and control, logistic and culture, gendarmeries can be deployed under both civilian and military command. They are also seen as providing an ideal interface between police and military forces involved in peace support operations (Lutterbeck, 2004, p. 62).

Conceptual support for an enhanced role of the gendarmerie in peace support or stability operations comes largely from European initiatives and from American military experts who have a deeply rooted reluctance towards the use of US combat forces for public order and security tasks. They argue that this kind of operations will basically lead to a loss of military professionalism and combat readiness (Call & Barnett, 1999, p. 49; Clark, 2001, p. 458; Hillen, 2001; Last, 2000, p. 48; Zisk Marten, 2004, p. 110). However, experiences in the Balkans and in Iraq made many of these experts realise that the provision of basic law and order is essential to achieve overall success after a military intervention. In an ideal world, the police would be tasked to achieve this. As explained above, these capabilities are often not available in the required qualities and quantities. To overcome this deficit and to prevent ‘inappropriate’ use of US troops in police-like operations, the Americans have emphasised either an elaborate use of gendarmerie-like forces, or the establishment of a US constabulary force or a civilian-based US Stability Police Force (Kelly, Jones, Barnett, Crane, Davis & Jensen, 2009).

A representative of this ‘American school’ is Perito. He considers Gendarmerie forces to be ‘an ideal solution to close a post-conflict security gap since such forces have both military

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capabilities and police powers’ [and] ‘can serve in either a military or civilian capacity and operate independently or in cooperation with other military or civilian police forces’ (Perito, 2004, p. 46). According to Perito (2004, p. 5) the Gendarmerie forces ‘straddle the line between military and police and have characteristics and capabilities of both types of forces.’ As such they ‘can serve as a bridge between the military and civil police and can handle tasks that do not clearly fall within either camp’. Oakley and Dziedzic (1998, p. 519-520), and Armitage and Moisan (2005, p. 2) mention another advantage of the gendarmerie as a constabulary force, namely their ability to fill the gap between waging war on the high end and local law enforcement on the low end of the spectrum of violence by executing light infantry-like operations. They consider the gendarmerie an ideal mix between the military and the police and therefore an viable solution to a security gap: ‘They are trained in military skills, but their focus and equipment is on minimal/non-lethal use-of-force and tasks normally associated with police functions’ (Armitage & Moisan, 2005, p. 2).

The gendarmerie-based model can be achieved through a number of different options. This section discusses these options and their feasibility. If the gendarmerie is called upon to act as a constabulary force in an international peace support operation, there are three options. The first option is to create an international gendarmerie-based constabulary force on an ad-hoc basis. The second option is the deployment of regular Military Police [MP] units in a constabulary role. The third alternative is the establishment of a permanent Gendarmerie Stand-by Force.

Ad-hoc Gendarmerie-Based Constabulary Forces
The international peace operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo clearly revealed the existence of security gaps. 8 The absence of an adequate public order and security capability worked as a catalyst to find adequate solutions to the security gap between the international civilian police and multinational military. In both missions the solution was to establish an ad-hoc gendarmerie force within the structure of the multinational military force. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the first Multinational Specialised Unit [MSU] was deployed within SFOR in July 1998. The unit was composed of Italian Carabinieri, augmented with Argentinean gendarmes, and Romanian and Slovenian military police. Its main task was to conduct patrols to ensure public order and security and crisis management, including riot and crowd control. In the course of the operation, counterterrorism and law enforcement tasks were added to the MSU mandate (Hills, 2001; Perito, 2004).

Based on the lessons learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the MSU model also served to fill the gap between KFOR and UNMIK in Kosovo. Like it did in Bosnia, the MSU reported directly to the KFOR force commander. The Kosovo MSU consisted of Italian Carabinieri, augmented with French gendarmes and Estonian military police. Its primary function was to provide a security presence by conducting patrols, maintaining public order, crowd control, and gathering intelligence on organised crime. In addition to the MSU, UNMIK also deployed 10 Special Police Units [SPUs] which were responsible for crowd control and other special

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8 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the international police force UNIPTF was tasked to execute a traditional monitoring mandate. Its police officers were unarmed and lacked executive powers to provide law enforcement or public order services. The Bosnian police had retained full authority over their policing mandate. However, they were ethnically divided and often unwilling to provide protection or police services to minorities. In addition, the support from IFOR/SFOR troops to IPTF or the Bosnian police in case of serious law and order problems was also often problematic because the military feared some sort of mission creep and considered its troops not suited to law and order assistance. In Kosovo the international police UNMIK had full executive powers while at the time there were no local police available to enforce the law or maintain public order. The security gap in Kosovo involved both KFOR’s and UNMIK’s inability to cover the high end of the police spectrum, for example in managing public unrest or the arrest of armed law offenders or war criminals.
police functions related to maintaining public order. In concept and organisation the SPU
were also based upon the gendarmerie model (Perito, 2004).

**Military Police**

The second alternative is the use of regular MP units in a constabulary role. Several US authors
consider the MP to be a suitable American alternative to the European Gendarmerie (Oakley &
Dziedzic, 1998; Field & Perito, 2003; Foley, 1998; Perito, 2004). Although the MP and the
gendarmerie can be considered military police forces, their character and mission differ in
essential respects. First, the gendarmerie is a police organisation with a military background
while the MP is a military organisation with police tasks. In other words: the gendarmerie
force generally performs as MP while the MP is by definition not a gendarmerie force. Second,
the gendarmerie serves primarily as a national police force that is responsible for policing
rural areas or performing specialised police duties. They operate in the same manner as
civilian police forces. They are thus familiar with policing civilian communities and serving
under civilian control. The policing role of the MP is strictly limited to military personnel and
military property. They have no police powers over civilians, except while on military
property or when explicitly regulated in a peace mandate.

While the Gendarmerie and the MP have differences, they also have some
characteristics in common. They receive military training and they are able to perform public
order and law enforcement functions in peace support operations, ranging from civil disorder
management to detaining law-breakers and war criminals. This is what makes the military
police suitable for constabulary duties (Perito, 2004, p. 80). Besides basic training as light
infantry, they are trained to interact with civilians, to make individual decisions in ambiguous
situations, to use mediation and other conflict resolution techniques, and to use only the
minimum amount of force necessary to control a situation (Perito, 2004, p. 81). These views
are shared by Bronson (2002, p. 129), who adds that US MPs have the kind of skills that are
often needed to keep the peace in conflict areas: ‘These talents include knowing how to
respond to civil disturbances in populated areas, how to interact with civilian leaders, and
what force options exists when trying to restore law and order.’ Armitage and Moisan (2005,
p. 2) perceive this differently. They argue that ‘the training that military police receive in
some of the skills required for stabilisation is not focused on creating competency in the full
range of constabulary skills. Rather, police training emphasises a general familiarity with
tasks, relying heavily on in-the-field operational training. In addition, both special operations
and military police units generally lack the full gamut of specialised equipment (lethal and
non-lethal) to deal with lower levels of stabilisation and nation-building.’

**European Gendarmerie Force**

The third alternative is the establishment of an international permanent gendarmerie force.
The first step towards such a force was made in 2006. France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the
Netherlands took the initiative to develop multinational constabulary capacities within an
institutional framework: the European Gendarmerie Force [EGF]. The EGF is a police force
with a military status capable of carrying out a wide range of police tasks, and can fall under
military command (Coppola, 2006, p. 54). According to its mission statement the EGF must be
able to operate in every phase of a conflict on thirty days’ notice. The EGF is, first and

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9 The EGF must be capable of covering every aspect of crisis response operations. During the initial phase of a
conflict the EGF could go along with military forces to perform police tasks. During the transitional phase the
EGF could operate alone or together with a military force, facilitating coordination and cooperating with local or
international police units. During the military disengagement phase the force could facilitate the handover from
military to civilian authorities, whether local or international (http://www.eurogendfor.org/egfpages/missiontasks.aspx; downloaded on June 1, 2009).
foremost, at the disposal of the EU, but could also be assigned to the UN, NATO, OSCE\textsuperscript{10} and other international organisations, or on an ad hoc basis to carry out several police tasks in crisis management operations, the so-called Petersberg missions.\textsuperscript{11} Depending on the kind of operation or mandate, the EGF's main purpose is the execution of substitution and strengthening missions. ‘Substitution’ refers to missions where the local police either do not exist or are incapable of maintaining public order. ‘Strengthening’ missions involve advising and training local police to perform public order duties, such as urban operations, crowd control, patrimonial site protection, and combating terrorism and organised crime. The EGF consists of approximately 800 gendarmes and can be deployed either simultaneously with or immediately after a military operation to maintain or establish public order and safety. The advantage of the EGF is that it can be placed under military command.\textsuperscript{12} In other words, EGF forces have the training, equipment, and background to work in a military command environment. The authority under which the EGF will be deployed could vary depending on the mandate or type of operation. During operations in the upper part of the spectrum of force, it will operate under military command and in the lower end under civilian authority.

### 7.3.2 Feasibility

Gendarmerie-type forces can be of great value to international peace support or stability operations. They are considered suitable to discharge the military from public order and security duties in every phase of an internal military conflict and thereby contributing to the closure or prevention of a security gap (Hovens, 2008). Nevertheless, a gendarmerie-based constabulary force may not be feasible at all times. Although gendarmes have been employed successfully in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and elsewhere, they do not provide a universal or long-term solution to security gaps.

First, the global supply of gendarmes is limited since only a small number of democratic countries have forces historically rooted in the gendarmerie tradition.\textsuperscript{13} In these countries, gendarmerie forces are commonly an integrated and indispensable part of the national police system. They are deployed in their domestic capacity at all times, for example to police rural areas, the national borders and airports, and to fulfil some specialised police functions such as anti-terrorism or public order management (Lutterbeck, 2003). Their engagement in national policing puts limits on the availability of their personnel for international peace support operations. In that sense they share the same resource problems as the police. Gendarmerie resources that are available are often assigned to multiple alternatives. For example, gendarmes normally comprise the core of their national CIVPOL contingent. And in case of the EGF, most of the contributing countries have committed their gendarmerie capabilities not only to the EGF, but also to the UN, NATO and OSCE (Armitage & Moisan, 2005, p. 4; Earle, 2004, p. 12). This means that gendarmerie capacities are not earmarked for specific tasks and that they are all drawn from the same pool. The possibility to participate in Gendarmerie based international constabulary forces on a more structural basis is therefore constrained (Call & Barnett, 1999, p. 53; Hansen 2002, p. 72 & 74; Jakobsen, 2000, p. 49). An option to expand the pool of military law enforcement personnel would be to include (US) MP to a Gendarmerie based constabulary force. According to some commentators

\textsuperscript{10} Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
\textsuperscript{11} http://www.eurogendfor.org/egfpages/strategiclevel.aspx; downloaded on June 1, 2009.
\textsuperscript{12} Source: http://www.eurogendfor.eu (downloaded on June 1, 2009).
\textsuperscript{13} For example: within the European Union there are only seven traditional gendarmerie forces: the Gendarmerie Nationale in France, Carabinieri in Italy, Guardia Civil in Spain, Guarda Nacional Republicana in Portugal, Koninklijke Marechaussee in the Netherlands, the Jandarmeria Română in Romania and the Zhandarmeriya in Bulgaria.
this will not solve the capacity problem since the number of international well-trained MPs is also limited (Bronson, 2002, p. 130; Cline, 2003, p. 174; Mobekk, 2005, p.4; Perito, 2004, p. 330). The creation of a Gendarmerie based constabulary force seems only feasible if donor countries are willing to deploy or fund sufficient numbers of gendarmes or military police. Considering the limited resources available this is not likely to be the case (Smith, Holt & Durch, 2006, p. 45).

Second, in a security gap a gendarmerie force in a constabulary role can only be considered supplementary to the existing international security capability. They cannot replace military forces or civilian police; they can only support them. Nor can they eliminate the need for military involvement in law and order tasks. While gendarmerie forces are well suited for operations varying from normal police work to the level of light infantry operations; they are not suited for combat operations. A gendarmerie force will always require reinforcement by international military troops who could respond to outbreaks of conflict or violence between demobilising armies. No matter how robust, an international gendarmerie force will never completely become a substitute for military capabilities where there are security threats (Bildt, 2005, p. Call & Barnett, 1999, p. 53; Hansen, 2002, p. 82; Jakobsen, 2000, p. 49). Therefore, a gendarmerie based constabulary force will always be part of a triad of international security forces: high end military forces at the macro-level of force that are ‘capable of compelling the warring factions to cease fire and abide by the terms of the peace accord’; constabulary forces at the meso-level of force to handle crowd control and lower levels of organised violence; and local or international civilian police at the micro-level for providing public order and security (Perito, 2004, p. 4; Armitage & Moisan, 2005, p. 2).

Third, the presence of a third force between the police and the international military might lead to operational problems. If, for example, the level of force exceeds the competence of the gendarmerie, an operation may well be transferred to the military. Such a transfer could lead to immediate operational problems during the actual hand-over of operational command and control from the Gendarmerie to the military and may cause confusion and coordination problems on the ground. In the longer term this could undermine the trust of the international and local communities in the effectiveness of the Gendarmerie. The presence of a third force, between the military and the police, may thus worsen institutional coordination problems. This problem has plagued some recent peace operations and could lead to a costly duplication of effort (Jakobsen, 2000, p. 49).

Fourth, military and police commanders that are unfamiliar with gendarmerie-like forces may underestimate its utility, resulting in a misunderstanding of its role and mission. This became clear during peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo where UNMIK commanders failed to appreciate the broad range of functions the gendarmerie based MSU could perform. As result, the MSU was deployed only occasionally for the purpose for which it was intended (Perito, 2004, p. 326).

Fifth and last, the use of gendarmerie forces in post-conflict police operations is controversial. For some international experts the gendarmerie is aligned too much to military culture and militarisation of police work. They argue that the involvement of gendarme forces in post-conflict police operations may send the wrong signal to the local population during a process of reconciliation, demilitarisation and democratisation, especially in operations where authoritarian paramilitary forces used to repress them (Jakobsen, 2000, p. 49; Hills, 1998, p. 37; Mobekk, 2004, p. 84; Penrose, 2002, p. 133; Smith et al., 2006, p. 44-45). For example on the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea (Penrose, 2002, p. 133), and in East Timor (Mobekk, 2004, p. 84) the use of gendarmerie forces to restore law and order resulted in confusion, mistrust of the police and government and a further destabilisation of the situation. For those reasons, Hills (1998, p. 37) considers a Gendarmerie-force only suitable in the
short-term, to bridge the early and more violent stages of a security gap. But as a replacement for regular CIVPOL in the long-term she considers them less suitable.

Also within the UN system such a role is disputed. Paramilitary involvement in UN police operations is considered incompatible with the leading principles on SSR. The UN Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations explains for example that the purpose of SSR is ‘to emphasise the strict separation of military and paramilitary entities from civilian police in developing national law enforcement structures’ (United Nations, 2003, p. 88). The perceived incompatibility of paramilitary involvement in post-conflict policing is a more fundamental argument, and likely has its roots in the history of national police systems. For example, Great Britain would be less inclined to support paramilitary involvement in policing than France and Italy with their gendarmerie tradition.

Conclusion

The constabulary force cannot be described univocally. The three models presented in this chapter have a different focus and specific organisational, operational or functional features (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constabulary Force</th>
<th>Classical Constabulary</th>
<th>Hybrid Military</th>
<th>Gendarmerie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach</strong></td>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Organisational</td>
<td>Organisational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Focus</strong></td>
<td>Adaptation of military professional roles to the new challenges of the Cold War political and international environment</td>
<td>Adaptation of the military organisation to the challenges of peace support operations</td>
<td>Extended use of Gendarmerie or formed police units to discharge regular forces from public order and security duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisation</strong></td>
<td>Regular military</td>
<td>Transformed military</td>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Field of Operations</strong></td>
<td>Full spectrum of military operations</td>
<td>Full spectrum of peace support operations</td>
<td>Public order and security within peace support operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Application of Force</strong></td>
<td>Minimum use-of-force</td>
<td>Minimum use-of-force</td>
<td>Minimum use-of-force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police Capabilities</strong></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Trained police officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analogy with Police Model</strong></td>
<td>Responsiveness of front-line organisation</td>
<td>Decentralisation, empowerment, reduction of hierarchy</td>
<td>Police organisation with military status</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 1: Comparison of Constabulary Concepts |

The expeditionary model comes close to the constabulary force Janowitz conceptualised in the early 1960s. It encompasses a military force able to cover the broad spectre of military power. Janowitz did not refer to peace operations or public order and security activities of any kind, however. Nor did he intend to transfer the military into a police-like organisation. Due to its commitment to the principle of minimum use-of-force and to the settlement of conflicts through political solutions rather than military victories, this model appears suited to contemporary peace support or stability operations. The question of whether the expeditionary force is the ideal solution to close security gap cannot be fully answered. In principle, an expeditionary force is trained and equipped to operate at the lower ends of the spectrum of violence; is familiar with the principle of restrained use-of-force; and has the volume and equipment to patrol large areas. However, the expeditionary force model has a general
mission and is specifically focused on the execution of public order and security tasks. Its members are not specially trained and equipped for these tasks. This makes the expeditionary force less suited to fill the security gap other than as an option of last resort.

The hybrid model as conceptualised by Geser and Haltiner describes a force primarily tasked with executing peace support operations, including public order and security activities. This concept is theoretically a good alternative to deal with security gaps. It has the volume, equipment and competences to serve as international police instrument in post-conflict areas. It is also the most challenging option in its organisational and functional consequences. It demands a reform of military competences and organisational features. This is an inherent weakness. Although most Western forces have increased their operational and organisational flexibility through the implementation of features such as modularity, ambidexterity and mission command, the establishment of a hybrid has far reaching political and institutional consequences. It requires a total redefinition and transformation of existing military structures leading to specialisation in missions in the lower end of the spectrum of military violence. Ultimately, it abstracts from the existential function of the military organisation, namely waging war. It also implies a division of tasks within international military establishments like NATO where some countries focus on the classical military tasks and others on the constabulary function. This principle choice makes it less likely for individual governments to transform their militaries into hybrids. Full transformation of the military into hybrids will therefore remain an idealistic option.

Finally, the constabulary concept as presented by Perito focuses on an extended use of gendarmerie forces or formed police units in order to maintain public order and security during a security gap in a peace support operation. This concept is from a policing point of view the best option, because the Gendarmerie is able to perform both police and military functions and is therefore capable of covering the whole range of operations, from police power to light infantry missions. A disadvantage is the limited number of global resources, which makes the model less feasible as a structural solution to the question of security gaps, unless governments want to invest in the expansion of their existing gendarmerie forces or MP establishments.

Whatever the case may be, the international community – when responsible for the closure of a security gap – will have to deploy capacities and capabilities to deal with public order and security problems in post-conflict areas. These problems are often urgent and require immediate responses to create a basic level of public security is necessary for all peace building activities. The deployment of international civilian police to close the security gap is often problematic. As discussed above, they are often not available in the numbers required or the security situation on the ground is too volatile for governments to deploy them. The only solution is to then task the international military with policing duties. Under these

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14 Modularity refers flexible, modular-built forces. Dandeker (2003, p. 414) defines these forces as ‘a series of coherent, self-contained, mix-and-match sets of units borrowed from various organic commands for a given mission. Such modules can be assembled at short notice to form a mix of force appropriate for the specific demands of an unforeseen crisis demanding the use of armed forces.’ It thus creates enormous and flexible military capacity on the basis of which specific configurations of resources can be composed and recomposed.

15 Ambidexterity means that soldiers can no longer rely on one specific competence. In peace support operations they are facing several contradicting demands. Soldiers need to be adaptive to these situations and equally skilful and trained in applying violence, winning the hearts and minds of the local population, and in cooperating with civilian organisations (Soeters, 2008, p. 109-124; De Waard & Soeters, 2007, p. 190-192).

16 Mission command is a system of decentralized command that enables initiative and decision-making at the subordinate levels of the military organisation thus increasing its flexibility. The essence of mission command is based on autonomy of action, clarity of objectives, adequacy of means, and trust between commanders. The aim of mission command is ‘to ensure a robust system of command and control throughout the entire organisation in order to guarantee unity of effort at all operational levels’ (Koninklijke Landmacht, 1996, p. 108; Ministerie van Defensie, 2005, p. 93).
circumstances a constabulary force can be of help. The structure and nature of this force remains unclear. If the existing expeditionary forces or gendarmeries are not the optimum solution, for qualitative or quantitative reasons, and the hybrid remains a utopian option, the final solution can be found in a combination of the three.

This ‘layered’ constabulary force could consist of a core element suited for operations in the lower end of the military spectre of violence, including police-like operations in a security gap. Around the core element there could be different organisational shells that are suited to increasingly higher levels of military violence. Depending on the security setting of the operations, additional military capabilities can be added to the various shells.

The core of the constabulary force model consists of gendarmerie and/or MP units and – if required – capacities and capabilities for SSR activities. The gendarmerie or MP units would deal with all basic policing activities, varying from community policing, crowd and riot control to the arrest of suspects of war crimes and terrorism. These units are equipped with all arms and equipment necessary to deal effectively and efficiently with every police contingency, such as protective equipment, automatic fire arms, armed personnel carriers, and helicopters.

The second shell of the constabulary force consists of combat units for dynamic response to insurgency and massive violence. Infantry units provide military presence and backup, such as military patrol, control and protection of urban or sensitive areas, security of international sites and buildings. Special Forces can deal with counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations and manoeuvre elements, such as tanks and combat helicopters provide robust backup when appropriate during military operations. Engineers provide support in reconstruction projects and in the detection and clearance of improvised explosive devises [IEDs].

The third and last shell consists of offensive support capabilities such as air support and artillery. Air support capabilities are responsible for the air superiority in the mission area and can provide close air support to ground operations. Artillery can be used for general fire support to ground forces.

This constabulary option still leads to a transformation of the military but can be achieved with existing capabilities. This option leads to an optimisation within the present military structure. This constabulary force can deal with almost every contingency within contemporary stability operations. Its formalisation will require a strategic reorientation on the use of the military instrument. Ultimately it is a matter of political ambition and is a political choice.
References


8. Cultures Converging upon Constabularisation

René Moelker

Introduction: converging cultures and policing the barbarian temperament

Following the guiding hypothesis in this volume, the police and armed forces organisations could be converging upon each other. This suggests that their organisational cultures may also grow to be more alike. Culture does not necessarily follow organisation, but it is clear that organisation and culture are connected and without adequate symbiosis neither of them can be successful in operational conditions. From the armed forces point of view, the difficulties in acquiring an operational culture (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008) that amalgamates policing and army ways of thinking, feeling and doing will not be easily overcome.

In spite of the many anticipated difficulties, culture change is inevitable if police work and soldiering are indeed moving towards one another. The reason for the trend towards a convergence in cultures is connected to global changes in risks and security. For fragile states and for post-conflict situations Dziedzic (1998) is right in stressing the importance of policing skills for military servicemen when they have to close different sorts of security gaps during the transformation that comes with state building, i.e. the lack of policemen during a ‘deployment gap’, the need for muscles when security situations get out of hand during the ‘enforcement gap’ and the assistance of soldiers in training local armed forces and policemen during an ‘institutional gap’. But it is not only in post-conflict regions with a focus on transitional security where one needs ‘to provide physical security to allow the rebuilding of the country’s institutions and the resumption of regular daily life’ (Voorhoeve, 2007, p. 54).

Security gaps (Dziedzic, 1998) do not only occur in fragile states. While Dziedzic, Voorhoeve and others focus on reconstruction, they neglect the fact that insecurity comes home to the western world by way of the reflexivity that is part of globalising processes (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994). Manuell Castells (1997) illustrates this idea with his concept of the ‘Fourth World’, a term which denotes all people that are excluded from the post-industrial information society. It is not only people in Africa or other underdeveloped countries who are excluded from work, wealth, care, the Internet etc.etc that belong to the Fourth World, but also people in the western world who do not have a job, who live in the ‘banlieu’ or similar places, and are lacking the opportunities to make a living or have a career. The strength of the concept Fourth World is that it involves people anywhere in the world where they are excluded.
Moreover, refugees from conflict areas seek asylum in other countries and because of all this reason, the security issue boomerangs home to the western world. Security issues anywhere in the world also affect people in Europe and the United States of America. This reflexive character of globalisation stresses the need for a communal security culture, hence the blurring of internal and external security. Two perspectives are connected with this tendency, one is comforting, the other is disquieting.

A comforting thought is derived from Kaldor (2003) who in *Global Civil Society* remarks that in international relations theory the stranger, or barbarian, is pushed further away time after time, meaning that the image of our enemies is changing. One hundred years ago we might have felt threatened by the barbaric nation on our border who posed a real threat to us that required an armed response. The military were our guardians. In the Cold War, the Soviets were the enemy. Nowadays the boundary between the civilised world and the barbaric world has been pushed even further, if we still can speak of a boundary. The image of the barbaric enemy is blurred. There is no clear or consistent image any longer, and military operations are performed in far away places. Soldiers are fighting ‘opposing forces’, but no longer is the other side demonised, and fighting goes alongside reconstruction and humanitarian aid. Winning the population is the objective, not its destruction; therefore the image of the other is no longer ‘barbaric’. This thought is comforting as it demonstrates a belief in progressing civilisation in the same sense as we can find in the work of Norbert Elias (1982).

A disquieting thought, however, is that *The Barbarian Temperament* (Meštrovic, 1993) is within us. It is within Castells’ Fourth World and therefore we can encounter it in our own neighbourhoods, and some, like Meštrovic, would claim that it is inside each and every person. Meštrovic (1993) claims that the ‘heart’ (egoism) is always stronger than the ‘mind’ (society) and following Durkheim he writes ‘… that society has a dual role; as a kind of policeman that controls as well as a magnet that draws out benign, moral desires in society’s members …’ (Meštrovic, 1993, p. 263). An earlier book by Mary Kaldor, *New Wars* (1999), is closer to this gloomy perception of men (so she evolved towards a more optimistic perspective in only four years!) that depicts the world around us as a kind of Hobbesian playground in which we need the state and the international community to police the wolves that surround us and also to control the wolf that is inside each of us. Kaldor (2003) does not only want the state and the international community to provide human security, but also points at the important role to be played by global civil society (for example NGOs). As a British citizen, she would probably prefer international policing to adopt the style of
community policing and maybe this style will increasingly become a requisite for soldiers too, as they are the executioners: the instrument of the international community. Again we return to the blurring of internal and external security.

Globalisation not only lays the security issue on our doorstep, it also provokes local responses. Global changes are connected to local uprisings, to revolt and protest and to organised crime that adapt warlord politics. A security community should therefore in response to global changes react locally, it should react ‘glocally’ (Robertson, 1995). A communal security culture should comprise partly military culture and police culture. But most importantly the military should learn how to operate amongst the people better (Smith, 2005). In this respect, the police, whether they stem from the tradition of Anglo-Saxon community policing or the French policing traditions, are ahead of the armed forces and it is not certain that the military will adequately acquire the culture that is required to perform well at the new tasks.

In this chapter the main focus is on the complex matter of the armed forces incorporating parts of a culture that is ‘policing’ in character. I discuss the problems encountered in this respect. First, in the second section, the cultural differences between armed forces and police are described. In the third section, the central issue is the differences in national cultural styles of occupation during peacekeeping operations that resemble policing operations. The then next section is devoted to the present day operations of the armed forces. Decisive for the manner of operating is the proximity of soldiering work to the local population. How the armed forces try to acquire cultural competences for dealing with the problems of proximity is discussed in fore last section. The last section offers conclusions and topics for discussion. We argue that acquiring cultural competence and intelligence is only one part of the story. The other part is proximity. And in this respect, we think the armed forces can learn a lot from the police.

8.1 Cultural differences

Talking about cultural differences between armed forces and police organisations can only ever be based on sketchy and rough assumptions. It can only depart from crude ideal typical approaches, conceptualisations that are intentionally designed to distort reality, but at the same time grasp the meaning of the culture under study. Comparing police and armed forces cultures is not always easy because of the many differences between nations, and even the subcultures that exist within the organisations, or police corps from different cities. Street
cops are different from management cops, and the navy is really distinct from the air force. Even though the author is cautious not to fall into the trap of ‘essentialist’ description, it is widely accepted that there are some universal characteristics of both the police and the armed forces organisation. Soeters, Winslow & Weibull, (2003) claim that there is a common military culture that supersedes the cultural differences at the national level. Yes, there are differences in national military cultures, but there are also common denominators, such as the value that armed forces traditionally place on discipline and pragmatism. Notwithstanding the prominent differences between Anglo-Saxon and French policing cultures, there is also a communal, or even universal, police culture (Reiner, 2000).

Both the police and the armed forces organisations exercise the state’s monopoly of violence and are considered male dominated professions. In both organisations women are underrepresented, but in most countries the percentage of women is about twice as high in the police,\(^1\) which not only makes a quantitative but also a qualitative difference (Moss Kanter, 1977). Masculinity is part of the job and part of the organisational humour, which is sometimes a bit rough, cynical, sometimes at the expense of colleagues, etc. Language is often sexually tainted. Typically, a gun is associated with the male sexual organ and a beam used for exercises is referred to as manly.

The difference between the two organisations lies in the way violence is used. When confronted with violence the police send men and women whose strength is the de-escalation of violence, people who are verbally strong and who know how to talk their way out of trouble, how to mediate and how to perform to resolve conflict. When confronted with violence, the armed forces will utilise people who are capable of functioning at the high end of the spectre of violence. They must be sufficiently fit to fight but also be able to go out on a social mission, patrol the neighbourhood and to talk to the local residents. The distinguishing parameter here is proximity. When soldiers use violence, it is mostly from shooting range, not talking range. Policemen are more often at talking range, making it safer for them to negotiate or mediate than to use weaponry. But policemen are not only the friendly constables who walk the neighbourhood and talk with the residents and they can adapt many different cultural styles. Reiner (2000, p. 131) distinguishes:

\(^1\) I have not given percentages for all European countries because this chapter is not about gender differences. But just to give an idea we selected three examples: the UK had roughly 18% female police personnel (2002) and 9% service women (2007), Belgium slightly above 25% policewomen (2007) and 8% female military (2007), the Netherlands 20% female police (2007) and 9% female soldiers (2007/2009). The increase in the percentage of women in the organisation is steeper in the police than in the armed forces.
- The ‘bobby’ - the professional street police officer.
- The ‘new centurion’ - crime fighting, action seeking law enforcer (Dirty Harry).
- The ‘uniform carrier’ - burnt out, cynical street cop who will not advance in promotion. Avoids real policing trouble but talks about it.
- The ‘professional’ - upwardly mobile officer who is very idealistic, rarely stays long in the same job and can present himself/herself in the most desirable manner to superiors.

The ‘new centurion’ type would not be the type to utilise when de-escalation of violence is the objective. Perhaps it is the type that you would not want working in neither armed forces nor in the police. Even when robust action is necessary, this is the type you do not want to recruit. Neither does one need the burnt out ‘uniform carrier’ or the ‘professional’ who is overly concerned over his or her own career.

Cohesion also appears to be characteristic of both organisations, yet there are differences. Policemen do stand by their colleagues (Van der Torre, 2007, p. 500) and sometimes cover for each other, and in this respect they demonstrate solidarity that also is reflected in a strong feeling of ‘us policemen’ against ‘those civilians’ or ‘those politicians’. But basically it comes down to individualism (Punch, Tieleman & Van den Berg, 2000). Mostly, policemen are individually responsible for their actions and have to be streetwise. When something goes amiss, they can ask for assistance, but the first actions will be solitary operations by individuals (perhaps assisted by a buddy, as policemen often work in pairs). Servicemen seldom operate individually, and cultivate a strong collectivist feeling, sometime called ‘esprit de corps’ when regimental units are referred to, and ‘cohesion’ in case of smaller units (Boer, 2001). Similar is the strong ‘we’ versus ‘the civilian’ divide that sometimes also leads to misplaced loyalties, cover ups, hushing murky events, etc. ‘In the infantry, they take care of their own’ is an opening quotation in an article by Winslow (1998) that points to this dark side of cohesion. Misplaced loyalties were a major factor in deviant behaviour of Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia. The same phenomenon is known to exist in police cultures.

Regarding the hierarchy and discipline, there are some iconic differences. Police organisations are renowned for being in principle egalitarian (Van der Torre, 2007, p. 497). In some countries there is a strong divide between police officers and the other ranks, whereas in other counties there are more possibilities to rise from the lowest to the highest level because each policemen must start at the bottom. But when policemen are out on the street, they all are in similar working conditions that equalise interpersonal relations (there certainly are
tensions between street and management cops, but these do not necessarily correlate with tensions in hierarchy). Discipline is an instrumental part of the profession but the police officer deals with it pragmatically and when on the street has a high degree of professional autonomy: ‘policy implementation in the end comes down to the people who actually implement it’ (Lipsky, 1980). Police officers are therefore street-level bureaucrats (and so are social workers and others who enjoy professional autonomy at the shop floor).

Hierarchy and discipline are regarded differently in the armed forces. Sometimes discipline becomes the objective instead of being instrumental to exercising one’s profession. Goal displacement can happen in the armed forces, making discipline and hierarchy almost divine characteristics of the organisation. From studies of values in military academies Soeters (1997) concluded that these characteristics are part of the socialisation processes of cadets in at least thirteen countries. In spite of the ‘iconic’ differences there is an underlying bureaucratic logic that both the police and the armed forces share. For uniformed personnel, and for bureaucrats in general, it is safe to abide by the rules and to hide behind the formal hierarchy. In cases of shooting incidents and this goes for both organisations, the shooters are scrutinised to see if they were following the right procedures. If inquiries prove that the rules did not apply, the blame is on the functionary who can be severely punished. This legalisation of the uniformed profession enhances risk-avoiding conduct.

Regarding leadership styles the above is also relevant. Often mentioned is the bottom-up style for the police in contrast to the armed forces’ top-down style (Haltiner, 2001, 2003; Easton, 2001). The armed forces do apply ‘leadership by objectives’ and ‘commanders intent’ (Vogelaar et al., 2001), but even so the chain of command is top-down. In practice, independent behaviour and decision-making is the norm in police organisations, while it is exceptional in the armed forces and only restricted to situations where superiors cannot be consulted. The structural component in this matter lies in the ministerial responsibility regarding the armed forces, in contrast to responsibility sharing in the triadic governance structure for the police (major, police commissioner, and public prosecutor share responsibilities). This structure allows police officers a few extra degrees of autonomy. And thus, armed forces incline towards direct leadership styles, whereas police organisations favour delegation and coaching (from a distance).

All-pervasive is the proximity parameter. The distance between police and society is smaller than the distance armed forces and society. Both organisations need a solid base of legitimacy, but the military can and do claim a certain distance in order to be able to perform their duties (Boëne, 1997). The greater distance from society is illustrated by the
characteristics of the total institution that despite the gradual opening up of the organisation still persist within the organisation.

Paradoxically - considering the smaller distance - the police are renowned for being cynical and distrustful towards the public (who are potential offenders, Punch et al., 2000, p. 265), whereas cynicism and distrust within the armed forces is directed internally (Van der Kloet, 2005). It is the predecessors in the armed forces that always make a mess of affairs and the new functionary has to sort things out all over again. The dominant cultural proverbial response is ‘trust is good, control is better’. During the Cold War externally directed trust was not an issue. The Russians simply were the enemy and close contact was unlikely. In present day operations close contact with civilians, ‘opposing forces’, international military partners, NGOs, etc, is daily practice, rendering the issue of trust just as important as it is among police officers.

8.2 Differences in national cultural styles of occupation

When the military engages in missions that require long-term presence, soldiering will almost equate to policing because it will take the form of an occupation with rule of law and public order management as its final operational goal. Mostly the desired end state is that intervening powers will retreat when local police and armed forces are reconstructed and able to maintain law and order themselves. But even when missions evolve into occupations, cultural diversity in occupational style will lead to differences in the way soldiers will try to achieve public order and rule of law. We should therefore look at the phenomena of reconstruction, assistance to governments and nation building from an historical point of view. Cor Lammers (2005) wrote an interesting book entitled ‘Vreemde Overheersing’ [Foreign Rule] on differences in national styles of occupation and even though this concerns a contribution to historical sociology, the relevance for today’s reconstruction missions is striking. The comparison is most interesting, particularly where it concerns the occupational style of the USA, (Lammers, 2010).

2 Remarkably, the concept of ‘opposing forces’ resembles J.K. Rowling’s fictional character Voldemort … ‘he whose name we must not mention’. This is a cultural and psychological shift in the image of the enemy. Not typecasting ‘The Taleban’ as our enemy, makes it easier to treat the Taleban as humans and easier to negotiate with former Taleban at a later moment in time. It also reflects that ‘the Taleban’ is a very imprecise category, maybe it comprises all Pasthun?

3 English speaking readers are referred to Lammers (2003).
Lammers’ theory in a nutshell is about the interplay of concepts such as ‘occupation’, ‘coercion’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘rewards’, and ‘indigenous versus loyal elites’. Occupations always involve the use of force or coercion, but force is to be used sparingly because it affects legitimacy negatively and consequently occupations will – depending on the degree of force used – always provoke resistance. Occupations cannot do without legitimacy and rewards. Sometimes the reward is simply the fact that an occupier can bring peace to a war torn society. It may even take centuries, but the foreign occupiers will eventually be driven out of the country. The success of occupations therefore depends on how the occupier wheels and deals with elites in the occupied society. This was true of colonial times, just as much as it is true of modern times. There are never enough troops, civil servants, traders and so on to occupy regions in another country as the British and the Dutch found out in countries as vast as India or Indonesia. Therefore local elites must be used, but there are different sorts of elites and they differ in willingness to co-operate as well as in legitimacy. Indigenous elites are legitimised from below; they enjoy the trust of the people. Loyal (groups favoured by the occupier, like the Dutch half-breed segment of the population) elites are legitimised from above, by the occupying power. Whichever elite is used, in the end they will lose legitimacy and they will have to choose sides between the forces that propagate independence and those who favour the occupier (who will eventually be the losing side).

The French have mostly resorted to a style of direct rule when occupying a foreign country. It is an imperial style of occupation that only worked when they succeeded in turning the occupied country into a province of the French Empire. With this direct style of rule comes a centralist style of governance. To exaggerate a bit: Most things are decided in Paris. A large bureaucratic apparatus is needed to govern territories in this manner, making human interaction rigid and hampering all change. Because of this cultural preference, French military style in occupations and gendarmerie styles of operating resemble each other to a certain degree.

The German style of occupation during World War II [WWII] in Western Europe depended significantly on creating loyal elites, like the Vichy Regime in France or the Dutch NSB party (National Socialist Movement: a Dutch party sympathetic to the Nazis) in the Netherlands. These collaborating elites enjoyed little popularity and ‘collaboration’ was seen as a ‘dirty word’, but Lammers has reappraised the situation. Yes, these elites may have collaborated, but in doing so they kept their own societies from greater harm, such as the one that befell the East European countries who suffered much more from the German occupation. The Germans even contributed substantially to the governance of the Netherlands by
introducing improvements in legislation and so on. The sociological point is that as these loyal elites are not legitimated from below, the population will be tempted not to play by the occupier’s rules. And when the population breaks the rules, the instrument of coercion will be used (Lammers, 2005, p. 322). The occupier feels they have no other choice. Legitimacy will spiral down as a consequence, making resistance an even more attractive option, the more so when the occupier cannot use reward to regain legitimacy. The military occupier will not be perceived as a friendly constable.

Although Lammers’ analysis of the German style of occupation is only applicable to times long past, it is interesting because of its resemblance with the present day American style of occupation (Lammers, 2010). The style ‘play along with our rules and we will treat you decently’ seems to apply to post-war Iraq and other examples of US occupation. The difference is that the USA does not really want to be an occupying power. It wants other nations to comply with its will, but it never wants to stay and become a territorial occupier. Even in the case of the Philippines the USA were reluctant occupiers. The USA never wanted colonies and it does not need colonies to be an economic and military superpower. When forced, the USA will invent Civil Affairs units like they did during WWII, but they never wholeheartedly embraced the instruments of occupation because it meant getting entangled in public order management and dealings with civilian authorities. To quote General Dwight Eisenhower ‘The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope the happier I will be!’ (in Brocades Zaalberg: 2005, p. 11)

The British and Dutch styles of occupation are very similar and stem from colonial times. India and the East Indies (Indonesia) could not be governed by direct rule in French occupational style. The territories were too large, the populations too diverse and the distance from the mother country too far. The British and the Dutch had to govern by indirect rule making use of loyal and indigenous elites. The British and Dutch also had to use coercion but they succeeded at the same time in offering rewards to the indigenous elites (who as a result became loyal) and to gain legitimacy. In the end resistance to the occupancy grew, indigenous elites lost their legitimacy from below the more they were legitimised from above, rewards were no longer sufficient to buy compliance and the battle for independence forced the old colonisers to retreat.

To summarise the lessons learned from Lammers that are relevant for present day nation building and reconstruction missions: Occupation regimes are inherently unstable; they are dependent on indigenous elites who allow for less use of force; collaboration with local indigenous elites, even if they are former Taleban, is a precondition for success; meaning that
governance must be supplied by the indigenous population itself (if possible). Benevolent occupations, that is, occupations for the greater good of the war ridden country, need to be temporary affairs otherwise they will lose legitimacy and occupiers will resort to force.

The ‘Dutch Approach’ is rooted in colonial history. Another piece of colonial history that the Dutch share with the British is the approach towards counter insurgency, an approach in which the Dutch to invite the Taleban round to tea!

8.3 Inviting the Taleban round to tea

For the armed forces, the blurring of internal and external security will impact the glocalised tasking of this organisation. The international community is deploying soldiers to do policing tasks in far away countries. The difference with regular policing is obviously the wider spectrum of violence and the counter insurgency philosophy that is mingled with state building and public order management. The local operations are legitimised by an ideology derived from the concept of globalisation. In August 2006 after an attack on Canadian peacekeepers, the former NATO Secretary General told the global audience ‘If NATO does not go to Afghanistan, the Afghans will come to us.’ In an earlier speech he said ‘We have begun tackling terrorism as a main mission, indeed, in Afghanistan we are engaging terrorism at the source’ (J. de Hoop Scheffer, Munich: 4 February 2006). NATO has become a value-community, enforcing western values as if it is ‘globo-cop’ (Osinga, 2008).

To ‘globo-cop’ the whole world, the armed forces have to adapt to a mixture of fighting and policing that will require the soldiers to shift flexibly between ‘Defence’, ‘Diplomacy’ and ‘Development’. Moreover the shift requires a cultural upmake that resembles policing. The culture will remain dominantly military, but it needs to incorporate some elements of police culture.

In order to reconstruct a working civil society in Afghanistan, all ethnic groups should be included in the process of state building. The Pashtun in particular, the ethnic group that harbours the Taleban movement and was in the past (and to some extent still is) affiliated with Al-Qaida, will have to be included in the state building process. To exclude certain ethnic groups, especially if they are large and political key players, would be disastrous. From many studies we know that exclusion is one of the main causes of conflict (Rearon & Laitin, 2003; Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009).

Operations therefore are fought not only with traditional weaponry, but with understanding and empathy as weapons. Like the police, the armed forces will have to engage
with society. According to the retired US general Robert Scales (2006),

future conflicts will cause a shift in classic centres of gravity from the will of governments and armies to the perceptions of populations. Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground. Understanding and empathy will be important weapons of war. Soldier conduct will be as important as skill at arms. Culture awareness and the ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops more effectively than body armour.

Also, senior Dutch officers Vermeij and Soldaat (2007, p. 65) defined the Centre of Gravity of the operations in Afghanistan as ‘acquiring the trust of the Afghan population’. By using the term ‘centre of gravity’ the colonel and lieutenant colonel, who returned from their Afghan mission in October 2006, declared the hearts and minds operation as the key success factor in reaching the military, political and societal objectives. The assignment ‘assisting the Government of Afghanistan in building its capacity, authority and influence by prioritizing and synchronizing reconstruction and development programmes with security operations, with full engagement of ANSF, in order to set the conditions for a secure and stable Afghanistan’ (Vermeij & Soldaat, 2007, p. 63) can only be realised by winning the support of the local population.

The Netherlands’ philosophy of winning the hearts and minds of the local population and thus contributing to security is termed the ‘Dutch Approach’. In contrast to the instrument of forceful coercion, this approach refrains from using an excess of violence; it is meant to display full professional military capacities whilst only using force as a last resort. It is meant to win over hearts and minds by reconstructing the society, by the method of ‘smile and wave’, and by enabling local authorities to take over public order issues themselves. Using a minimum of force in order to gain trust is risky to the Dutch soldiers themselves for they are often more exposed to danger than they would be otherwise. They do not wear mirror sun glasses in order not to remind the Afghan population of the Russians, they prefer to patrol on foot if possible, wear the minimum of protective clothing and when driving the soldiers use open roofed vehicles or lightly armoured cars that allow the soldiers to show themselves. The Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail stated:

The Canadians and Americans establish forward operating bases [FOBs] in unstable areas, often building them into fortresses of giant sandbags and razor wire, and using
them as a launching point for operations. The Dutch prefer to build mud-walled compounds they call ‘multi-functional qalas’, using the Pashto name for house, designed with a traditional-style guest room for visitors (Smith, G. 2006).

The British newspaper *The Times* wrote that the Dutch ‘aim to beat Taleban by inviting them round to tea’ (Page, 2007). In fact, ‘inviting the Taleban round to tea’ closely resembles the community policing approach.

The Dutch Approach is in line with what the Dutch were training for. In preparation for deployment, the troops switched to an experimental and relatively extensive cultural awareness training programme (Gooren, 2006; Ooink, 2006). The method that was already used in training in 2002 is called ‘Smile and Wave’ (Jongbloed, 2003). Soldiers posted in Kabul are supposed to be friendly, polite and show as little aggression as possible. The method is incorporated in a pre-deployment training with role players. However, in 2003 the soldiers were not yet trained to be culturally sensitive which was demonstrated in the documentary by Jongbloed showing footage of a soldier giving porn movies to one of the interpreters. The interpreter’s embarrassment was evident from his facial expression. Nowadays in pre-deployment training, the emphasis from the beginning is on respect for the culture and religion. Knowledge on local habits and training on how to behave respectfully, for example at road block, is part and parcel of the training (Gooren, 2006; Ooink, 2006; McFarland, 2005).

Robert Gooren (2006) managed to obtain the attention of the American military establishment by publishing his views on the *Dutch Approach* in Military Review. The point Gooren refers to pre-deployment training in cultural awareness. This kind of training indeed is fundamental to training for reconstruction missions because it is all about respecting and understanding the cultures of the people that soldiers will encounter. The US military is well informed about this topic. Diana Simpson (2007) gives a thorough overview of predominantly American sources on cultural awareness. The US army has already changed their training methods accordingly. But strangely, Gooren promoted cultural awareness training as something different, something special, a typical ‘Dutch Approach’. It is as if the Dutch are inventing a new tradition in reconstruction approaches (Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983). In contradistinction to this Dutch-centred perspective, the next section will discuss the efforts of scholars and soldiers in many other countries to arrive at a culture that is more in line with the policing nature of so-called ‘glocal’ tasks.
8.4 Trying to acquire cultural competences and intelligence

For armed forces acquiring a mindset that is closer to the policing nature of the new tasks and missions, it is not easy. The most difficult aspect remains establishing social contact with civilians. Many units show resistance regarding the necessity to bridge the gap between soldiers and foreign societies, especially when those societies are based on Islamic cultures. The anthropologist Brown (2008, p. 443) cites an author stating ‘the only thing people in the Middle East understand is force’ as being one of 100 myths about the Arab mind. He turns this essentialist myth on the Arab mind around, and projects it onto American soldiers, in particular onto the army: ‘One senior officer of the Fourth Infantry Division told journalists “the only thing these sand niggers understand is force and I’m about to introduce them to it”’ (Brown, 2008, p. 445).

Air force and army – Big Army - seem predisposed to kinetic contact and try to secure their own safety by keeping the local population at a distance using weaponry. When driving through a village they speed out of fear of being attacked. When in contact with the locals they depart from a sense of distrust. Celebration fire during a marriage is misinterpreted and answered to by disproportionate firing from the air or from the ground. According to Brown, the Marine Corps and Special Forces operate in a different manner because they are in much closer contact to the local population. The Marine Corps in Vietnam patrolled, trained, and lived among the locals, and by doing so, built security. The core competency of Special Forces was:

… training US allies in foreign countries, adopting local dress and weaponry where necessary … . The clash between Special Forces and the regular US Army boiled down to different views on achieving progress: Special Forces regarded the creation of distance as undermining the mission, whereas army commanders insisted that the distance served the needs of force protection (Brown, 2008, p. 449).

Thus, military units that expect and experience that their operational success depends on close contact with local populations share a more positive attitude towards the acquisition of cultural competences. By now, most militaries in the world have assumed training models and training centres for cultural competences. Many have built villages for simulation and role-playing that enable the troops who prepare for mission to train as close to reality as possible. Role players are, where possible, recruited from the refugee community or from Nepalese
Ghurkhas, so that the enacted scenarios gain credibility. Footage from a training facility in the UK (available at the internet⁴) shows a mock up Afghan village where villagers populate a market place. The soldier patrols the streets and interacts with the locals who of course play their part and cause difficulties the soldier has to find a solution to. Soldiers are greeting villagers, participate at a shura [council], and afterwards Afghan trainers and cultural advisors tell the soldiers what they did wrong or right. In similar places all over the world soldiers prepare for all kinds of missions.

The US Marine Corps was the first to publish a course book on Operational Culture for the Warfighter. This book was written by Barak Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber (2008), two anthropologists working for the Marine Corps University. The book is written for soldiers and addresses them in a language they understand without simplifying the complexities of conflicts in far away societies. The book provides tools for adequate behaviour and serves as a useful introduction. So, in many places armed forces are trying to bridge the gap between soldiers and foreign societies through training and education. But nonetheless, what the soldiers train for, and what level of cultural proficiency they hope to acquire, is not exactly clear. Neither is the effectiveness of the courses and training efforts. But more and more studies are being published and the military are learning quickly through trial and error, from scientific works (including an Austro-German publication by Krysl, 2007) and from conferences organised at Shrivenham (Defence Academy of the UK, 2008, 2009).

Most countries preapring for missions that started in 2006 or earlier used cultural awareness training programmes, which comprised role-play, information and visits to a mosque. But these programmes are not sufficient for acquiring cultural literacy. The approach, despite good intentions, remains too much cognitive, is based too much on rules, and offers few opportunities for transfer, meaning that things learned and understood, and skills acquired are not necessarily transferable from one conflict area to the other: ‘locking culture learning into a systematized straitjacket will force learning targets into sterile abstractions of the lowest common denominator’ (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 266). Cultural Awareness Training did not fit into military culture well, as it was too closely associated with the aim for cultural sensitivity, a ‘term bearing connotations of softness and effeminacy’ (Brown, 2008, p. 444). But even high up the kinetic spectrum (i.e. war fighting) culture, traditions, values and norms and societal structures, are important as they influence the way war is fought (Salmoni & Holmes-Eber, 2008, p. 264).

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Scholars in the fields of anthropology and psychology have strongly advocated more thorough approaches that surpass awareness and cultural literacy training. One such method is the cultural competency approach that is defined as ‘the ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively engage individuals from distinct cultural backgrounds to achieve the desired effect’ (Selmeski, 2006, p. 12). Soldiers using this approach react adequately to cultural encounters of a diverse nature, be it African, Middle Eastern or Asian. It presupposes knowledge, understanding, awareness, and a willingness to ‘reflect upon one’s own position in relation to the other’ (Kamorski, 2006, p. 4). Culturally intelligent individuals have the ‘capability to adapt effectively to new cultural contexts’ (Selmeski, 2006, p. 2). Salmoni & Holmes-Eber (2008, p. 246) bring all of the above back to military operations ‘cross cultural competency focuses on the adaptability of a person to a culture, while Operational Culture focuses on the ways to understand, plan for, and operate in those cultures to which Marines may have to adapt’. In short: the soldier is expected to understand the significance and meaning of cultural behaviour and to respond in an appropriate manner. He is expected to study cultures in the way in which Geertz views culture. Therefore he should know ‘that man is an animal suspended in a web of significance, he himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be … an interpretive one in search of meaning’ (Geertz, 1973, p. 7). Apart from being a great anthropologist, he also should be able to act upon those meanings. Perhaps the objective of these courses aim too high. Considering that most educational and training settings are short in duration, these ambitions are admirable but unrealistic. Sometimes no more than two days are available during a pre-deployment preparation course for training personnel in cross-cultural competences.

It is impossible to reach these kinds of training goals in short courses that also have to compete with training in ‘mine awareness’, ‘survival’, ‘physical fitness’ and ‘combat’. There is no time, and even if there were time, to reach goals such as these would take a lifetime. Therefore training should address not only different levels, i.e. cognitive, affective and behavioural (knowing, feeling, acting), it should also include reflection on one’s own culture and it should be spread over time. In his book *The Cultural Backpack*, Ooink (2009, p. 79-85) advocates a model of cross-cultural training based on four phases. During the initial phase, the individual soldier, young recruits upon entry in the military organisation, should learn about culture, acquire cultural literacy, cultural competences and cultural intelligence. During the preparation for deployment, group training and role-play should enhance cultural awareness and competences. Moreover, during pre-deployment training, the course organisers can delve
into the specifics of the host nation’s culture, whereas training during the initial phase is more
generic in character. In the deployment phase a cultural advisor can coach the troops on
awareness and cultural intelligence. In the re-deployment phase the lessons learned should be
apprehended. Soldiers can reflect on their experiences and adjust attitudes, feeling and
behaviour for future deployment. Experiences and lessons learned also serve to train the next
rotation and therefore induce a cycle of organisational learning.

Discussion: Effectiveness and ideas for improvement!

Despite all good intentions, despite recent changes in US doctrine and theatre command in
Afghanistan, and despite all the effort that goes into culture training, it is too little too late and
sometimes effects of training can even do damage. When soldiers undergo training during
pre-deployment preparatory courses their expectations about intercultural contacts are raised,
and they demonstrate positive attitudes, but sometimes reality is disappointing to the soldiers
who, after a deployment, end up with less favourable attitudes. That is what Ooink found in
his studies (2006, 2008) into the effectiveness of the Cultural Awareness Training. There are
three explanations for this.

Firstly, as suggested by Ooink (2008), preparation should be spread in time, as noted
above, it should start at the initial military education, then intense and mission relevant
training should prepare the soldiers for deployment, during deployment coaching should be
administered, and afterwards lessons learned should become an integral part of a new learning
cycle.

Secondly, the less favourable attitudes are part of a very normal pattern known as
Hofstede’s acculturation curve (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 324) or Wunderle’s ‘cultural
awareness and expectation management’ (Wunderle, 2006). In any relationship (for example
a relation between two lovers) one begins with the euphoric ‘honeymoon phase’ where
expectations are high. After a while – when the butterflies have left – reality comes as a
shock that can lead to disappointment and frustration. The relationship can be at a low during
this phase. Later, one re-appreciates these experiences, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aspects of the
relationship are re-evaluated and the relationship finally stabilises at some level of
‘satisfaction’ even if this level can never be as high as during the exalted honeymoon phases.

Thirdly, attitudes depend very much on the type of work the soldiers are doing during
their mission. The more the work resembles community policing, the closer in touch the
soldiers are with the local population, the more soldiers profit from culture training and the
more positive their attitude is towards the local population. In a high-risk mission such as Afghanistan, the largest group of soldiers is tasked with force protection. Either they remain in the compound and provide security, or they get embroiled in fighting with an enemy who does not play by the rules of regular war fighting. Only a small percentage of the soldiers is really involved in reconstruction, in civil-military co-operation, in Provincial Reconstruction Teams or in training local police men or local militaries. Van den Berg and De Ridder found significant differences between these two groups in their attitudes toward the local population. Using a longitudinal design, measuring attitudes before and after the mission into Afghanistan, Berg and De Ridder (2010) noted that 65% of the soldiers in the Provincial Reconstruction Team had daily contact with the population, while 30 percent of soldiers in the Battle group had daily contact with the villagers. The PRT soldiers evaluated the effects of these contacts on security, reconstruction, cooperation and trust in a much more favourable way than did the soldiers from the battle group (in all items there was about 30% difference). Before deployment both groups scored five on a nine-point scale measuring the attitude of the image of the population (nine was the most positive response). After the deployment, the assessment of the image of the population significantly increased to 5.6 in the PRT group, whilst it decreased to 4.3 (also significant) in the battle group.

Reflection on the findings above steers the discussion into two different directions. The first direction is the conclusion that culture education and culture training are worth the effort and that investing in both research and educational innovations will result in a satisfactory return for value. More knowledge on effective cultural learning is necessary so that the soldiers can become proficient in cultural competences and acquire cultural intelligence.

The other direction is that acquiring cultural competence and intelligence is only one part of the story. The other part is proximity. Comparing police and military cultures points to several distinctive characteristics that differ, among which the style of leadership, the difference between top-down and bottom-up organisations, and the hierarchical relations. But the proximity parameter proves to be the most important. Police officers are closer to society whilst the military maintains a distance that they claim to need in order function well. The police would not function well if their officers were a distance from the population. This characteristic explains why police officers prefer to interact in order to solve a conflict and use only a minimum of force in conflict resolution. In the military the ‘kinetic’ way suits fighting large-scale conflicts. Violence from a distance, preferably using technical violence (air force or artillery), is safer for troops even though in the end most conflicts still require
soldiers on the ground in order to win the war. Asymmetric conflicts of the counter-insurgency type require fighting and policing at the same time. Offering security to the population is the only way to win ‘hearts and minds’.

The military experiences difficulties in acquiring cultural proficiency, mainly because the cultural competences need to be acquired from the very start during initial training and has to be continued until pre-deployment training. An important lesson to be learned is how to go about this with the proximity parameter in mind. That is why joint training would be beneficial. Not only crowd and riot training, but also a period of internship with the police could be beneficial to the soldiers. Why not train soldiers and police officers together for relevant parts of their training? Why not have soldiers (in police uniforms) patrol the streets in our capital cities side-by-side with police officers by way of internship? Why not operate (more) jointly during large events, soccer games, festivals, and similar gatherings? Likewise, it could be beneficial for police officers to work temporarily as an intern in the armed forces, for example, like they do in Singapore. Here we have in mind large mobs becoming unruly or large-scale violence from hooligans or protesters. Joint training enhances knowledge of each other’s procedures and makes it easier for both police and armed forces to, when necessary, escalate or de-escalate their response. At officer level, military cadets and midshipmen can profit from a police course in public order management. Future police officers could gain knowledge on the use of force at the higher end of the spectrum of violence. Personnel from both organisations can benefit from learning from each other, specifically with regard to variation in the parameter of proximity. More research is required to investigate whether these joint lessons will prove just as valuable, or even more so, than culture training.

References


Kluwer, 495-522.
9. The Peacekeeping Warrior

A Theoretical Model

Wendy Broesder, Ad Vogelaar, Martin Euwema, and Tessa op den Buijs

WHO is the happy Warrior? Who is he
What every man in arms should wish to be?
.....
Whose high endeavours are an inward light
That makes the path before him always bright
William Wordsworth (1770-1850)

Introduction

The warriors still exist but one can hardly say that their path is still as bright as Wordsworth described it. The military role has changed over time as well as through situations. Recent history shows that after both World Wars and the end of the Cold War the military role shifted from warrior to peacekeeper. During the Cold War there were about 13,000 uniformed peacekeepers, in 1993 this number had already mounted to 78,500 peacekeepers. Now, in 2009 there are 117 countries and 93,481 uniformed peacekeepers deployed (United Nations, 2009). In an early description of peacekeeping, the United Nation’s basic assumptions underline the differences between the warrior and the peacekeeper by ordering peacekeeping soldiers to remain impartial towards all parties involved and to use force only as self-defence or to defend the mission progress (Findlay, 1996).

Peacekeeping involves tasks such as assisting and helping the local population, reconstruction, restoring local government, policing and training army and police.

With the start of the American ‘Global War on Terror’, the American Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker stipulated that to face the new complex operational situation, every soldier should be a warrior first (Kirkton, 2005). He should be trained and proficient in his warrior tasks and drills, ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies (Soldiers Creed, 2007). Although the description of the two roles seems, at least partially, to exclude each other, contemporary missions show the need for both ‘warriors’ and ‘peacekeepers’ in order to achieve success. Of course military operations always entail various kinds of roles but what if some of the roles are contradictory or possibly even exclude each other? How does a soldier fight the enemy as a warrior and protect the local population as a peacekeeper, especially when some of the people who are to be helped and protected, turn without warning into enemy fighters? Can a soldier put down his modern ‘armour’, in both a factual and psychological sense?

Scientific literature shows that until the end of the Second World War the interest of scholars mainly concerned war and not the warrior. Combat motivation was nothing more than duty, patriotism, leadership and character; combat breakdown was, although a large-scale problem in both World Wars, simply a lack of them (Wessely, 2006). It was not until the aftermath of the Vietnam War, that researchers started paying attention to the warrior himself. Although at first their interest focussed on mental disorders caused by combat, researchers quickly broadened the scope of their research. Personality-related predispositions, required personality traits, psychological and sociological factors of warfare are now frequently researched. With the increase of peacekeeping

1 The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments. The final result remains the sole responsibility of the authors.

2 In this text ‘he’ can also be read as ‘she’.
operations, an explosion of research can be observed about the soldier as peacekeeper. Studies concern among others the willingness of soldiers to participate (Miller, 1997), the specific stressors they encounter (Bartone & Adler, 1996; Bartone, 2006), and the psychological demands of peacekeeping operations (Litz, 1996).

The ability of soldiers to execute the associated operational roles, or how different roles relate, has received hardly any scientific attention. Military practice, although recognizing the different warrior and peacekeeper roles, does not question the ability of soldiers to execute both roles successively or even simultaneously (Blackstone, 2005; Broesder, 2008; Jamison Yi, 2004). No literature was found to specify or explain soldier’s abilities to switch from one role to the other. Because of this lack of knowledge, it is our aim to develop a theoretical model that will situate the so-called ‘peacekeeping warrior’ in the context of military operations. A model that will demonstrate the consequences of executing tasks that are the opposite of the role a soldier identifies with. Although we label the roles ‘warrior’ and ‘peacekeeper’, this study will also enlighten the military performing policing tasks or police performing their tasks in operations abroad.

This chapter starts by describing the theoretical background, more specifically the role theory. Next, the components of the Warrior-Peacekeeper Model are elaborated. This model explains the interaction between a soldier’s role-identification and the tasks he executes during deployment, and the consequences of this interaction. Finally, it is discussed how the Warrior-Peacekeeper Model can be of importance to further investigate these two roles, their combination and effects on military performance.

9.1 Roles, Theory and Research

Role theory offers an important starting point for understanding the consequences of executing different roles. A role can be described as a set of expected behavioural patterns attributed to someone occupying a given position in a social unit (Robbins, 1991, p. 283). Roles specify what goals should be pursued, what tasks must be accomplished and which behaviour is required in a given situation (Biddle, 1979, p.8). A person who chooses to be a soldier has some conception of what is expected of him. A role does not only give direction to behaviour, it also requires certain attitudes. A policeman has to agree to carry and use weapons, he must be willing to help people in need, and not be afraid. Finally, a role influences an individual’s personality (Katz & Kahn, 1978). A soldier who is confronted with the hardship of others during missions, may become less sensitive to relatively small problems at home.

Role theory clarifies how role strain and role conflicts occur when roles change, are incompatible, or do not correspond to one’s expectations (Kleber & Winnubst, 1983). Although Wippler (1983) concludes that role theory hardly contributes as an explanatory theory, the role concept is one of the most compelling theories bridging individual behaviour and social structure. Role theorists argue that the role theory in particular makes it possible to demonstrate role-combination problems by focusing on the different ways roles can collide. As has been said, roles are the result of expectations that others have of the focal person who occupies the role. However, individuals have many roles at the same time or several ‘others’ may be expressing different opinions about the same job. These situations can create role conflicts. Katz and Kahn (1978) distinguish four kinds of role conflict.

Intrasender conflict refers to incompatible expectations held by a given person who is important for the execution of the role by the focal person. E.g. a policeman’s commander may expect him to be ‘on the street’, but also do administrative work. This may create a conflict about priorities. Intersender conflicts refer to different persons expecting different behaviours from the focal person. E.g. the battalion commander may expect the company commander to be loyal to the organisation and to leadership, whereas the subordinates expect their company commander to take care of their interests. Interrole conflict points to incompatible expectations from two or more
persons of whom the person is dependent. A soldier, for example, can be a father and a husband. These roles can be conflicting, for example when the job keeps the soldier away from home often. In addition, the soldier can be confronted with different expectations, to act as a peacekeeper, and as a warrior. Person-role conflict refers to incompatibilities between the requirements of a role and the needs, values and competencies of the person holding it. This means different people expect different types of behaviour at the same time.

Roles can also be ambiguous, meaning there is uncertainty about what is expected from the person fulfilling the role. According to Katz and Kahn (1978), both role conflict and role ambiguity create low job satisfaction and high tension. Finally, role strain is the result of expectations that do not correspond to someone’s role. The main causes for this mismatch can be found: (a) in the situation (or outside the individual); (b) in the interaction between the individual and his surroundings; (c) inside the individual (Dijkhuizen & Winnubst, 1983). Appearances of role strain are role conflicts, role ambiguity or role overload (id., 1983). A person experiencing role strain can feel fear, uncertainty and irritability, but also show physical reactions and stress related behaviour (smoking, absence from work). This is particularly the case when situational demands exceed a person’s abilities or desires. Depending on the way a person copes with these strains and its causes, health problems and unproductive behaviour can occur (Buijs, 2004; Kleber & Winnubst, 1983; Schok, Kleber, Elands & Weerts, 2008).

Contemporary research regarding role-combination problems is mainly related to the combination of work and care, and the consequences of this combination on an individual and at an organisational level (Bakker & Geurts, 2004; Greenhaus, Allen & Spector, 2006). Conflict between roles occurs when experiences in a role interfere with meeting the requirements and achieving effectiveness in the competing role. These role conflicts can indeed have negative implications on performance as well as wellbeing. Evidently, for a soldier, the role of peacekeeper can interfere with the role of the warrior. For example, when he has developed friendly relations with the local population as a peacekeeper, and subsequently has to perform a weapon search operation in the same village.

### 9.2 Warrior and Peacekeeper as Roles

A profound description of the warrior role is to be found on the US Army website stipulating an American soldier’s qualities:

‘American soldiers, possessed of a fierce warrior ethos and spirit, fight in close combat, dominate key assets and terrain, decisively end conflicts, control the movement of people, protect resource flows, and maintain post-conflict stability.’

Besides that, he is:

‘flexible, adaptive, and competent and infused with the Army’s Warrior Culture, fierce, disciplined, well trained, and well equipped and prepared for the stark realities of the battlefield.’

This characterisation is exactly the soldier general Schoomaker referred to in 2003 and, at the same time, can be seen as the opposite of the traditional peacekeeper.

Although peacekeeping missions started in 1948, there is still no unequivocal definition of peacekeeping. The UN recognises three basic principles: a peacekeeper is present with consent of all parties, should therefore be impartial and will only use a minimum of force (Findlay, 1996).

These descriptions indicate expectations of a soldier’s attitude during a mission. However, the descriptions are contradictory. Central in the definition of both roles is either the presence or lack of a focal enemy. This means that whereas the warrior has an enemy he has to fight with force, for the peacekeeper there are, at most, opponents. His tasks, necessary to accomplish mission goals, will be assisting and helping the local population, social patrols, negotiating, and mediating, among others (Siekman, 1984). The attitude that goes with these tasks is one that is friendly, open and sociable. The warrior’s attitude, on the other hand, is reserved, strict, and ready to destroy the enemy (Soldiers Creed).
9.3 The Warrior-Peacekeeper Model

The main idea of the Warrior-Peacekeeper Model (WPM) is to portray the role strain a soldier may experience in the context of contemporary military operations. The discussion whether peacekeeper tasks are appropriate for a ‘real’ soldier started almost fifty years ago and was clearly named by Hammarskjöld when he stated: ‘Peacekeeping is not a soldier’s job, but only a soldier can do it’ (Hammarskjold, Secretary-General UN, 1953-1961).

Also soldiers themselves can have mixed feelings about the peacekeeper role. It was in the sixties that the sociologist Janowitz warned that professional soldiers would resist peacekeeping, because they were likely to view these police-like activities as less prestigious and less honourable than traditional combat tasks (Franke, 2003). The topicality of this warning can be found in a ‘military’ reaction on police tasks that the military had to execute in Kosovo:

‘The infantry and other combat units, by contrast, tend to hate it. The manoeuvre guys find it very frustrating, they get trash thrown at them and they want to hit somebody.’ (Ricks, 2001, p. A21).

A British officer of the Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus supported this point of view:

‘One thing makes a soldier different and better than anybody else. The thing which gives dignity which nobody else can have is respect for the man he is fighting. No civilian can ever have that. No soldier who hasn’t fought can have it either. In peacekeeping the trouble is that you don’t have an enemy, and this means you don’t have any dignity as a soldier.’ (Franke, 2003, p. 41).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) stated that a task can exceed the mission of peacekeeping forces and the expectations of peacekeepers. He suggests that utilisation of more heavily armed and more extensively trained forces should be considered. In fact, he states that one cannot expect soldiers to shift from one role to the other naturally.

According to NATO’s current strategy, soldiers have to be both warriors and well-diggers and may have to be fighting and dying in a country half a world away (Ames, 2008). These soldiers will hardly ever work alone, they are members of a unit, executing tasks with comrades. The challenges and effects of this role combination are delineated in Figure 1.

![Figure 1. The Warrior-Peacekeeper Model](image_url)

The warrior and peacekeeper role are described in the previous section. We have used this description because we expect soldiers to recognise it and identify with one or both roles.

9.4 The Confrontation

Part 1 of the WPM refers to three types of possible confrontations. First, a soldier may or may not be
able to identify with both roles. Second, he may have to combine the two types of tasks - peacekeeping and warrior - and may or may not be able to perform in this combination. Finally, the first part refers to the confrontation between a soldier’s role identification and the actual tasks he has to execute during deployment. They may or may not match.

**Role identification** refers to the attitudes and behaviour consistent with the warrior and/or peacekeeper role (Robbins, 1991). Military socialisation and group membership can cause a preference for one specific role (Goffmann, 1975). Identification is influenced by the organisation that teaches young soldiers which roles are appropriate and what kind of behaviour is expected. An example of such influence can be found in the clear opinion of a British officer, stating: ‘I’ve been in the army a long time and I can’t see a British soldier saying ‘I’m proud to be a peacekeeper’, but they’re very proud to say ‘I’m a warrior’. But if you’re from a country that has focused on peacekeeping missions it has different connotations’ (Broesder, forthcoming).

As said, a soldier may or may not be able to identify with both roles. For example, if we are correct in assuming that the military role shifted away from the peacekeeper role at the start of the American ‘Global War on Terror’, the initial military training will now lead to a preference for the warrior role. If as a consequence the training before deployment mainly assumes worst-case scenarios, identification with the warrior role will be reinforced. A soldier who joined the army to help people will, as a result of emphasising the warrior role, experience role identification problems.

With regard to the identification with roles, not only individuals identify themselves with roles, teams develop a ‘team mental model’ in which they define the shared meaning of their tasks, and how to perform them. This shared mental model may be important for the match between role identification and tasks (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Eduardo & Cannon-Bowers, 2000).

After initial training, a soldier will be deployed and confronted with one or both kinds of tasks which he may or may not be able to perform in combination. The warrior and peacekeeper tasks, or parts of the tasks, can be contrary, compatible, or complementary to each other.

For example, the ‘no use of force’ principle of the first generation peacekeepers (Findlay, 1996) will irrevocably cause tension for a peacekeeper in a ‘warrior situation’ where maintaining order is only possible by using force. However, not all components of a task will relate in the same way. For instance, where the use of force other than for self-defence is contrary to the peacekeeper task, executing patrols may be compatible within the framework of both peacekeeper and warrior tasks.

The third confrontation refers to the confrontation between a soldier’s role identification and the actual tasks he has to execute during deployment. A mismatch means that a soldier’s identification does not correspond with the tasks. For instance, a soldier who believes that fighting tasks are the only ‘true’ tasks for soldiers but has to help local people by digging wells experiences a mismatch.

Evidently, some identification-task combinations resemble an obvious match or mismatch, with positive or negative consequences. Although the consequences of different combinations have not been researched yet, it is obvious that the stronger the preference for only one role, the stronger the confrontation can be when tasks are the opposite. However, both identification and tasks can be less ‘black or white’. A soldier who wants to be a warrior who has to fight for peace can also identify himself with a peacekeeper who helps to build schools. Related research does show that when a soldier, mainly trained as a warrior, has to execute both tasks, he will behave as a warrior when tensions increase (Franke, 2003).

### 9.5 Role Strain

Role strain can be defined as the felt difficulty in fulfilling role obligations (Thomas & Biddle, 1966) and it manifests in three different ways: role conflicts, role ambiguity, and role overload. We have already noted different types of possible role conflicts. Role ambiguity has been determined as a dominant stressor in Bliese and Castro’s (2003) Soldiers Adaptation Model. Parasuraman, Greenhaus & Skromme Granrose, (1992) show that the relationship between work and family role stressors and
overall life stress are often the result of role overload (Greenhaus, et al., 2006). On the other hand, roles can give meaning and guidance to behaviour and so prevent anxiety or depression (Bakker & Geurts, 2004; Schok et al., 2008; Thoits, 1983).

Part 2 of the WPM shows role strain as a result of a mismatch between the three types of possible confrontations. Obviously, a warrior fighting in a war will not suffer from role strain. On the other hand, a warrior will suffer role strain when the deployment situation requires mainly peacekeeping tasks. Role strain can also be the result of identification with the peacekeeper role in a more ‘warrior-like’ situation. This role strain is expressed in a statement of a US peacekeeper in Bosnia: ‘I’m a tanker, that’s what I do, been one for 14 years. But let me tell you, those skills are perishable. You got to use them, and all I’m doing here is checking people’s driver’s licenses’ (Franke, 1999b).

Role strain appears in a situation in which an individual is confronted by divergent role expectations (Kleber & Winnubst, 1983; Robbins, 1991). Expectations and anticipation (Thomas & Biddle, 1966) are closely related to role strain. Op den Buijs (2004) showed the relationship between role conception, expectations and wellbeing by confirming the moderating role of expectations on the health of Dutch soldiers during deployment operations in low-risk areas. Another US peacekeeper in Bosnia said the following about false expectations: ‘We were taught how to sneak around these tanks quietly, surprise the enemy and destroy him in combat. But here we are supposed to stay out of combat by being obvious. To me, it’s like teaching a dog to walk backwards’ (Franke, 1999b).

In the WPM, role strain is used as a mediator influencing the final outcomes. A mediator represents the mechanism through which the independent variables are able to influence the outcomes. This use of role strain fits our objective to describe the entire context of military operations.

9.6 The Outcomes

Role strain, i.e. role conflicts and false expectations, may have negative consequences for wellbeing and performance of individuals.

In their Job Characteristics Model, Hackman and Oldham (1976) distinguish several personal and work outcomes: internal motivation, quality of work performance, satisfaction with the work, and absenteeism and turnover. Bliese and Castro (2003) state in their Soldiers Adaptation Model [SAM], where role ambiguity is one of the stressors, that job satisfaction and commitment are typical attitudinal outcomes that may reveal more about a group than health or wellbeing. Job satisfaction and commitment are deemed highly relevant for military performance during deployment.

These outcomes can be applied to the WPM because they reflect what may happen when role strain is high. Internal motivation can be equated to commitment to the mission that soldiers are taking part in. It can be expected that high role strain may effect a deterioration of commitment to the mission. Soldiers may feel that the mission is not what they signed up for. Role conflicts will also reduce their motivation to do the task and thereby the quality of work performance. Soldiers may put less effort into the tasks they have to do, which will be reflected in the products and services they deliver. A soldier who, for instance, does not feel committed to the task of reconstructing schools may put less effort into delivering high quality constructions. Also job satisfaction may be influenced. Job satisfaction can be described as the global, affective evaluation of the work and work conditions (Vogelaar, 1990). Soldiers who are experiencing role strain may feel less satisfied with the work they are doing and the situation they are in. Finally, these soldiers will have a propensity to be absent from their duties and leave the organisation as soon as the opportunity arises.

9.7 Unit Characteristics as Moderators

The relationship between role strain and outcomes can be ameliorated or attenuated by several kinds of moderators. One might think of moderators at an individual and an organisational level. The
importance of individual coping strategies is clearly recognised; however, in the context of the WPM we will only address the unit characteristics cohesion and morale.

Positive unit characteristics may function as a buffer against possible role strain. This moderation effect implies that high role strain has large effects on the outcomes under the condition that unit characteristics do not stimulate mutual support and cooperation, whereas the negative effects of role strain are only small or non-existent when the unit characteristics are positive.

Military work is foremost team based work and soldiers are highly dependent on each other. As Manning (1991) stated: ‘the importance of group solidarity for effective military performance has been a staple of military doctrine for 2,500 years.’

The importance of the unit is well-expressed by a British officer: ‘If you ask British soldiers why they do what they do, they will first of all tell you it’s because of their mates. I do what I do because I don’t want to let my friends down, my mates down. I don’t want to let my platoon, my company, my regiment down. It has very little to do with the rights or wrongs of the conflict, it has very little to do with serving the country, and that rationale doesn’t change from mission to mission. It is always the same rationale’ (Broesder, forthcoming).

Group cohesion is one of the most studied variables. Several military interests are served by building cohesive units. Besides the relation with unit integrity, the effect of cohesion on both psychological wellbeing and military performance has been broadly confirmed (Manning, 1991; Griffith & Vaitkus, 1999; Shils & Janowitz, 1948; Siebold, 2005). Moreover, units with a highly shared mental model may develop ways to reconcile the differences between personal identities and bring them in line with the tasks that have to be performed. Having a shared mental model implies that team members have a good understanding of the goals, roles and responsibilities, time sequencing of events, tasks to be performed, how individual efforts will be coordinated, and progress towards goals (e.g. Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). In other words, highly shared mental models contribute to prevent role strain. Team cohesion contributes strongly to a shared mental model.

Another variable that has been researched thoroughly is morale. Morale has been defined as ‘the enthusiasm and persistence with which a member of a group engages in the prescribed activities of that group’ (Manning, 1991). Morale is closely related to unit cohesion and together they are necessary for effective performance of soldiers in combat (Britt & Dickinson, 2005; Manning, 1991). For this reason it is expected, and confirmed by research, that effects of role strain can in particular be reduced by unit characteristics like cohesion and morale (Harrison, Price & Bell, 1998; Michaels & Dixons, 1994).

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The role of the military has shifted significantly and certainly differs from the traditional ‘warrior role’ of old. Due to the new security reality, roles and tasks to restore and maintain peace and internal security are broadly reconsidered. A possible blurring between military and police, warrior and peacekeeper roles becomes apparent from General Krulak’s description of the so-called three-block war’ (Cocksedge, 2005):

‘In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees – providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three-block war.’

Obviously, the warrior and peacekeeper roles are needed and have to be combined, but are also, at least partly, contradictory. Can the warrior successively or even simultaneously be a peacekeeper and vice versa?

Scholars demonstrate tension between the warrior and peacekeeper roles (e.g. Franke, 1999a, 2003; Winslow, 1997). The military does not question the abilities of soldiers to execute both
roles. We, however, began this chapter by arguing that there is a lack of knowledge concerning a soldier’s abilities to switch from one role to the other and executing warrior as well as peacekeeper tasks.

By using the role theory as a starting point, we have developed a model that shows a soldier, as a member of his unit, situated in the challenging context of conflicting roles and tasks and the subsequent effects on performance. The divergence between the warrior and peacekeeper role was used to explore in what ways roles can collide. In the first place there can be an ‘identification-collision’, the soldier who sees himself as a warrior and did not become a soldier to be a peacekeeper. Secondly, there can be a ‘task-collision’. In that case a soldier cannot combine the two sorts of tasks or isn’t able to switch from one task to the other. An example of the third collision is the well-digging soldier who identifies himself with the warrior role. These collisions, incompatible roles or tasks that do not correspond with expectations or identification, cause role strain.

According to the role theory, appearances of role strain mainly occur when situational demands exceed a person’s abilities or desires. While recognising the importance of coping strategies, the WPM shows that the negative effects of role strain can be constrained by group cohesion and morale.

Although not yet conclusive, the Warrior-Peacekeeper-Model offers a first step in building theoretical support for the premise that soldiers during contemporary missions have to deal with conflicting demands as a result of their role identification. Subsequently, the WP model is a starting point to explore possible consequences and particularly moderators at an individual, unit and organisational level, related with these role identifications. The framework may guide further empirical research, leading to recommendations about how to prevent role strain from playing an important role during missions.

It seems promising to investigate the importance of training in which the integrated execution of all military tasks in the age of the Comprehensive Approach is emphasised. Further research is necessary to analyse in more detail the importance of high unit cohesion and morale, including mutual respect for colleagues in different roles in other deployed units. Finally, the antecedents of identification with specific roles, both during recruitment, selection and socialisation and training, is a vital element in creating an army fit to embrace this comprehensive approach.

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10. Police Reform and Ownership in Bosnia and Herzegovina

*The Bermuda triangle?*

Susanne Huiberts-van Dijk

**Introduction**

*‘Every day, more foreigners pour in to do every conceivable task, and the more they do, the less the Bosnians do for themselves’* (Chandler 1999, p. 3)

This quote illustrates the level of concern of the international community about the effect of their activities on the position of ‘locals’ in the process in Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH] at the end of the nineteen-nineties. At the start of a state-building process, the external involvement is huge but this decreases in favour of local involvement. A process that can be compared with the growing up of a child, which is a metaphor that can be used to understand the relation between the state and the external donors. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina was still in its infancy and parental care was indispensable. Therefore, one aspect of state-building, police reform, was carried out by the United Nations [UN], from 1995 onwards. The UN focused on a technical level of police reform, with the main objective being to improve operational police practices. Their activities were directed at creating security for the population and stabilising the country. In 2003 the European Union [EU] took over this responsibility and concentrated its efforts on a long-term objective of police restructuring. The European Union Police Mission [EUPM] addressed the issues of institution and capacity building, which are underlying components of policing. A good quality institution offers a framework of legal and operational rules that improve operational policing practices. Furthermore, these practices will be sustained by the institution. This sustainability is important for long-term internal security that creates the circumstances for the country to be left on its own by external donors (Nathan, 2008).

An essential component of sustainability is local ownership since imposed police reform measures are difficult to maintain if they are not supported by local actors. At this

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1 Parts of this article were published in S. Huiberts-van Dijk, ‘Politiehervorming in Bosnië-Herzegovina. De Bermuda driehoek van de internationale gemeenschap’, *Kernvraag* 2009. The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for the comments made, however, the article remains the sole responsibility of the author.

2 The mandate of the EUPM has extended three times, EUPM I 2003-2005, EUPM II 2006-2007, EUPM III 2008-2009, EUPM IV 2010-211. This article refers to all missions of the EUPM.
point of the reform process the ‘adolescent’ must emerge who goes beyond his strict parental care. The case of the EUPM undertakings based on local ownership, however, clearly shows that this is not an objective which can be attained easily and without trouble. What complicates matters here is that ownership, next to being the ‘end-objective’, is also used as means to achieve this objective. The process of transferring from ‘parental care’ to ‘ownership’ brings along different dilemmas, which mutually reinforce each other and this makes the process even more difficult. This chapter will offer more insight into the many dilemmas inherent in the concept of ownership with regard to police restructuring processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The outcome is constructive for academics as well for practitioners because the police restructuring process is an important phase in post-conflict recovery. Furthermore, the discussion of ownership will contribute to the debate on how to close the gap between ownership rhetoric and practice (Donais, 2009).

This chapter starts with an outline of the concept of ownership. This concept is heavily debated from different perspectives and academic backgrounds. As a result, only a limited overview of these discussions is given and it does not fall within the scope of this chapter to be all-inclusive on this topic. After the literature review, the more practical and systematic model of Jens Narten (2009) will be used as a basis to create a better understanding of the dilemmas that deal with the way the international community is willing and able to hand over ownership and how the local actors manage this ownership. It will be shown that ownership, from the standpoint of external donors, can result in many unwanted consequences, such a passive stance or the hijacking of the process by so called ‘spoilers’. Next, by making use of this model it will be illustrated that, in the case of police restructuring process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the process ended up in a political debate and vicious circle that nullified all the reform attempts that were based on operational practices. In the end, by applying the model to the police restructuring process in Bosnia and Herzegovina a greater understanding of this process is gained. At this point a word of caution needs to be made because this research is based on the single case of police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which means that the outcome is specific to the case and cannot be generalised. Furthermore, only literature and policy documents are used and more empirical research is necessary to further validate the analysis.
10.1 Concept of Ownership

After the end of the Cold War the number of international interventions in domestic state affairs increased. These interventions were motivated by an increased attention for human security, which is a tendency that developed into the concept of responsibility to protect, a concept that has been the focus of increased attention (Chandler, 1999; Fukuyama, 2004). This includes not only the concept of responsibility to protect, but also to prevent and react to human rights violations and to rebuild countries after conflict. In this mindset, the numbers of reform projects to transform post-conflict, weak and even failed states into stable and democratic societies increased. Many reform processes were externally driven and international actors were involved in the different countries to create a self-sustaining and stable state. Due to this sharp increase of reform projects in the nineties, many debates were going on about the best way to deal with these reform processes and which lessons were to be learned. One of these debates is related to the concept of ownership. (See for instance Paris & Sisk, 2009; Fukuyama, 2004; Chesterman, 2004; Krasner, 2004; Paris, 2004; Caplan, 2002; Chandler, 1999, 2006).

As part of the many lessons learned, ownership was also given increased attention at the beginning of this century in the literature. This increased attention was motivated by the fact that a reform process could only be sustainable, if there is a gradual hand-over of the responsibility of this process to legitimate representatives of the local population, hereby creating ‘local ownership’. It was seen as a necessity since it is, on the one hand, acknowledged as one of the critical elements for long-term peace, and part of the exit strategy of the external donors, on the other. (Zaum, 2009; Osland, 2004) This was also recognised by the United Nations Secretary General during the first meeting of the UN Peace-building commission. Despite the increased attention for the concept at the beginning of the century, the practice of local involvement and participation is not new at all. Awareness had already started to grow in the 1980s that more attention had to be paid to the role of individuals and population in transformation processes. In 1995, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee further developed these principles. Although ownership was an often-used concept in the development practices, it

3 UN press release 27 June 2007.
4 “OECD brings together the governments of countries committed to democracy and the market economy from around the world.” It provides a forum for governments where they can exchange policy experiences. The
was not before the end of the nineties that this concept was employed in the jargon and practice of post-conflict reform and security sector reform.

Today, the role of ownership is emphasised in the security sector reform and also in police reform and restructuring (See for instance Donais, 2009; Donais, 2008; Hansen, 2008b; Yasutomi & Carmans, 2007; Marenin, 2005; OECD DAC, 2005). Police reform includes the technical operational measures, where police restructuring focuses on the institutional processes that offer a framework according to which the reform measures are implemented (Maras, 2009). In both processes it is important to establish ownership as soon as possible. Upholding security is one of the tasks of a state, and reforming the police and restoring the monopoly of force, therefore, means a reinforcement of the state. This does not mean that there are no other actors operating in this field, but the state is the only actor that has the legitimate power to use or order the use of force. Restoring this public authority adds to the strengthening of the state institutions and to the overall state-building process, which in the end contributes to a self-sustaining state that does not need external support (Osland, 2004). However, the only actors who can take responsibility for this are locals because otherwise the monopoly on the legitimate use of force still rests in the hand of external actors (Bayley, 2006; Schnabel & Erhart, 2005).

Next to this need for ownership at the institutional state level in the restructuring process, it is also important to involve society in the ownership, because the police are strongly connected with society. The tasks of the police are twofold: first, they have the responsibility to protect the state’s inhabitants and need to be responsive to the needs of society. Second, they need to enforce the law. These tasks are not a one-way street; it is a mutual relationship in which the community needs to participate. To make this work, it comes down to trust between society and the police (Jackson & Lyon, 2002). During conflicts, public confidence is damaged as the police are often used as an instrument to wage war. Also after the war, the police are often not capable or willing to uphold public security in an impartial manner (Mani, 2000). In such cases this mistrust continues to exist and results in a situation in which the police are considered ‘predators rather than protectors’ (Grono, 2009). As a consequence, one of the aims of the reform is to improve trust, through improvement of the rule of law and police practices, and creating a system of accountability (Baker, 2009; Hansen, 2008b). All these confidence-building measures may increase public awareness, which in turn can be helpful to the ongoing reform process. Local residents might be more

Development Assistance Committee [DAC] is a sub forum of the OECD for bilateral donors in which the donors strive to improve the effectiveness of collective aid.
willing to contact and inform the police about crime cases or be less tolerant towards misconduct. Overall, the relation between the population and the police is important for the whole reform process. A critical element in this relation is trust, which is problematic as long as there is no local ownership, since ‘outsiders’ cannot enforce it. Therefore, there is an urgent need for ‘national’ ownership (Bayley, 2001; Bryden & Hänngi, 2005; Nathan, 2008; Scheye & Peake, 2005; Yasutomi & Carmans, 2007).

Although there seems to be a general consensus on the need for ownership, the contents and definition of the concept is heavily debated. From several definitions it appears that in case of ownership the control on the peace process and the future must, at least, be in the hands of local actors. The discussion is about which phase of the process locals should control. The metaphor of the car illustrates this discussion well. Is it enough to sit in the car? This presupposes that the local actors embrace the reform process that is externally led. Or, must the local actor get behind the wheel and run the reform process from there. Strongly connected with this discussion is the division between ownership as an instrument or end goal, seen from a process perspective. If ownership is considered to be an end goal it is sufficient to have the local actors in the car, but in the end they must get behind the wheel. If it is seen as an instrument, local actors must be put in the driver’s seat immediately (See for this discussion Donais, 2008; Chesterman, 2007; Yasutomi & Carmans, 2007; Reich, 2006; Boughton & Mourmouras, 2002). Nathan (2008, p. 21), amongst others, explicitly supports the last assumption and in that definition ‘ownership means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by domestic actors rather than external actors’. Although many would agree with this definition from an academic perspective, in practice it is difficult to achieve immediately.

Narten (2009), among others, further developed this debate into a more practical and systematic concept. His definition of ownership is based on ‘project cycle management’, which international organisations often use as a tool for project management. This model identifies four project phases of rebuilding and full ownership is realised when locals participate in all of these four stages. In this way ownership is perceived as an end, but to achieve this outcome, ownership needs to be introduced gradually. In this way, ownership is also an instrument. Therefore, ownership can be defined as ‘the process and outcome of gradual transfer to legitimate representatives of the local society, of assessment, planning and decision-making functions, the practical management and implementation of these functions, and the evaluation and control of all phases...’ (Narten, 2009, p. 254).
10.2 The dilemmas of ownership

This approach brings along three mutually reinforcing dilemmas decisive for the process and outcome of the reform process, the ‘footprint, spoiler and dependency dilemmas’. This perspective is useful since it is one of the few systematic efforts to address the ownership dilemmas, in particular those relevant in post-conflict contexts, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. A brief synopsis of the dilemmas will be introduced, after which they are applied to the police restructuring process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The first dilemma is the ‘footprint dilemma’ and it deals with the level of international involvement, which can be judged by the scale of the international presence, its strength and powers and the way these are used. (Paris & Sisk, 2007). On the one hand, it is not desirable that the external actors have too much influence on the process because sustainable reforms cannot be merely imposed, they need to be supported and executed locally. This becomes even more imperative if the reform affects the values, norms and culture of an organisation and state. On the other hand, practice shows that it can be very difficult to work with local actors in a post-conflict setting. First, the (normative) motivations of the external actors might contradict with the local values, which are dominant in case of ownership (Donais, 2009). Second, it is difficult to select local actors that have the capabilities and knowledge for the job, who at the same time are considered legitimate by the population and external donors (Hansen, 2008b). Elections can offer a solution for the problem of legitimacy; however, they can empower local actors who are short of knowledge, or, even more important, who lack the drive and initiative to carry out reform (Sisk, 2009; Zahar, 2006).

This lack of local initiative happens mainly when the local actors cannot identify with the reform objectives as a result of the absence of national interests or a mismatch between the external and domestic norms, cultures and values. This situation may be strengthened because foreign assistance programmes ‘are commonly developed and funded on “a wish and a prayer,” without a clearly articulated and factually informed justification for what is proposed.’(Bayley, 2006). However, it appears that in this situation international actors become even more reluctant to consult and cooperate with locals and they retain all responsibility. This is particularly the case in sensitive state sectors that deal with security, such as the military or police, since these sectors can be used as instruments for power (Nathan, 2008). Consequently, a situation arises that has been typified as an international
protectorate, patronage, ‘empire lite’, colonialism, or even despotism (see for instance Reich, 2006; Ignatieff, 2003; Chandler, 1999). This dilemma is as well connected with the dependency dilemma as with the spoiler dilemma, as showed in Figure 1.

*Figure 1: ownership dilemma triangle (based on Narten, 2009, p. 262)*

As Figure 1 shows, the *dependency dilemma* is strongly linked with the footprint, since external actors take all the responsibility in the process and for the outcome, while local actors are along for the ride and taking a passive stance. Due to this passive attitude, international actors take even more responsibility upon themselves and all potential reform activities that may have been present at the local level disappear. This negative spiral results in an even bigger footprint. Additionally, this dependency can empower local resistance and hostility towards the reform process and the reformers. Some local actors do want to receive the responsibility for and participate in their own reform process; however, as the result of the negative spiral, they do not get it. This may also come about because international donors do not consider these local actors to be the legitimate stakeholders in the process and they exclude them from it. Since they have no official platform to express their views and to pursue their interests, they may turn to unofficial platforms, which may then reinforce the third dilemma, the *spoiler dilemma* (Bryden & Hänggi, 2005; Nathan, 2008; Gromes, 2009).

A consequence of a big international footprint is a lack of local responsibility for the reform process and its outcome. Although this may be frustrating for some locals, it can be very convenient for others. Some local groups do not identify themselves with the reform
objectives and have no benefit from the reforms. These ‘spoilers’ can hide themselves behind the big footprint and international dominance and will promote a dependent stance. Above all, they put all responsibility at the international level with the result that they can ‘blame’ the external donors for unwanted processes and outcomes (Zahar, 2006). By doing so, they appeal to local feelings of discontent about the big footprint and the imposed dependency position of the locals. Hence, the support for the spoilers will grow. This development can be curbed by including these spoilers in the consultations and co-operation, forcing them to identifying with the reform. However, the question is whether the international actors are willing to cooperate and consult with them. Often these local actors have legacies, for example from preceding conflicts, that need to be accepted. Furthermore, their own political stance will influence the reform objectives and outcomes, since ownership has the consequence that the reform trajectory may be adjusted. These modifications do not necessarily correspond with the international plans. Eventually, this can result in a withdrawal of responsibilities and powers by the internationals, which again increases the footprint. Ultimately, this reinforces the other two dilemmas (Paris & Sisk, 2007; Narten, 2009)

The three dilemmas appear to form a sort of ‘Bermuda triangle’, in which all good intentions and reform measures disappear if any one of them is not taken into consideration. In the next section this will be illustrated by the EU police restructuring measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This case will show that the externally driven reform proposals, which were motivated by technical and operational policing practices, became the subject of a heavy national political debate in BiH. In September 2007 there was even a political deadlock that was only resolved with enormous international pressure. It was not until April 2008 that two ‘policing’ laws were adopted by the Bosnian parliament to improve the policing practices. However, these laws are the result of a political discussion that was not fully supported by arguments on improving policing practices. However, as a starting point a short overview is given of the police reform process from 1995 until 2008.

10.3 Police reform 1995-2008

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the urge to reform the police was strengthened because the police were an important actor during the war, committing various atrocities and actively helping to pursue and terrorise the local population of other ethnicities. The result was that it lost its impartiality, neutrality and, moreover, the trust of the population (ICG, 2005; Bassuener, 2005). In 1995, the Dayton Peace Treaty was signed. Besides ending the war, it also provided
in the establishment of the United Nations International Police Task Force [UNIPTF], tasked with the reform of the police. Its primary objective was to make the police function according to ‘internationally recognised humans rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Chandler 1999). The main responsibility to uphold the security remained with the local authorities and the IPTF focussed mainly on improving the technical aspects of policing. Since the UN had no executive powers, it could not intervene when it appeared that local police actors showed hardly any initiative, making the reform process difficult. Without strong international pressure and threats of decertification, hardly anything happened (ICG, 2005). The main point of this reforming strategy was local ownership, but the latter emerged as the biggest obstacle for the police reform (Donais, 2006; Zahar, 2006). As a result of these problems, the mandate of the IPTF was broadened in 1997 and it received more executive powers.

In 1999, the character of the IPTF changed and, apart from improving operational policing techniques and practices, more attention was paid to the organisational level (Muehlmann, 2007). The police forces were reorganised according the principles of democratic policing, and it was clear that the remnants of post-communist and post-war structures needed to be reduced further. In addition, the IPTF presented a strategy featuring a third priority with regard to the establishment of de-politicised, impartial, accountable and multinational police forces. In realising these objectives, the certification process was continued and, additionally, it was used to push the IPTF reform agenda forward (Collantes Celador, 2009). In addition to being subjected to general vetting procedures, police officers and politicians could be banned from their office by the High Representative if the Office of High Representative [OHR] found that they obstructed the process of peace implementation. Although many things improved, such as basic training methods, the downsizing of the police forces, and the removal of officers suspected of war crimes, many weaknesses remained to be addressed at the end of the UN mission in 2002. Especially the existing police structure and organisation showed strong remnants of the pre-war organisational culture, where decision-making was over-centralised and a lack of responsibility, initiative and hierarchy prevailed. Additionally, the police continued to be vulnerable to political influence. In particular, the decentralised structure of the Federation, that encompasses ten different police regions,

5 The Office of High Representative is the international body in Bosnia and Herzegovina that is tasked with the coordination of all international activities and the implementation of the Dayton Accords. The ‘High representative’ is the highest international representative in the country who has had executive powers since 1997. As a result the representative is allowed to impose and overrule local legislation and decisions as he or she sees fit if Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative bodies fail to do so. Furthermore, public officials can be removed from office if they violate legal commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement. For more information: PIC Bonn conclusions, http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182, 10 December 2007.
hampered the coordination and information exchange between the forces, which made the police a costly endeavour.\(^6\) Furthermore, hardly anything was done to improve supportive police functions such as budgeting, planning and human resources (Aitchison, 2007).

With the follow-on mission in 2003, the European Union Police Mission [EUPM], focussed on these issues and the discussion on sustainability appeared on the agenda. The objective was ‘to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice’.\(^7\) The approach of the EUPM was based on local ownership and the mandate was to mentor, monitor and inspect according to best European and international practice, without any executive or enforcement powers (Juncos, 2007). In an attempt to realise ownership, *Bosnian Police Steering Boards* on the local level have been established, which are co-chaired by local authorities and which provide in operational planning. Furthermore, the EUPM focussed more on capacity building, and the development of managerial skills. An increased ownership on this level would improve the operational and financial sustainability (Collantes Celador, 2009). Next to its contributions on the improvement of policing practices and increasing ownership, the EUPM also had a strong advisory and supportive role in the restructuring discussion. This appeared to be important since many problems were only resolved in a superficial manner because the underlying problem, the state structure, was not dealt with. This was particular true with regard to financial sustainability. Thus restructuring was a necessity (Juncos, 2007; Collantes Celador, 2007).

These plans were further developed after the outcome of the feasibility study of the European Commission was presented in 2004. This report identified many shortcomings and police reform was pinpointed as one of the conditions for the negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Three criteria were identified to address these problems. On the initiative of the international coordinating Office of the High Representative, the OHR, a *Police Restructuring Commission* was established to develop the plans further. The former Belgian Prime Minister, Wilfred Martens, chaired the commission that consisted of representatives of the international community (including the EUPM), local politicians and the main police actors at state and entity level (i.e. Republika Srpska or Federation level). In 2005, after long and thorough discussions, the Bosnian politicians finally agreed on the restructuring plans. This led to the creation of the *Directorate for Police Restructuring*

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\(^6\) In 2005, the police consumed 10\% of the state’s budget; in comparison, the European average is 5\%. Moreover, the allocation of these budgets was disproportional, which hampers innovation. (see for an in-depth study on costs and spending: Collantes Celador, 2007, p. 13-15 )

\(^7\) Council Joint Action, 11 March 2002.
Implementation [DPRI] wherein all police agencies of Bosnia and Herzegovina were represented and which was tasked to develop a plan for implementation of the restructuring plan. Although they presented their plans in 2006, the points of disagreement that had slowed down earlier negotiations continued to influence the political debates. Furthermore, the political climate saw an increase in inflammatory and nationalistic rhetoric. This political climate hindered political decision-making on the implementation plan (Bassuener, Lyon & Witte, 2008; Muehlmann, 2008).

10.4 Ownership in police restructuring

10.4.1 The initiative phase 2004-2005

The ‘footprint dilemma’ is related to international involvement in the reform process. Since 1995, there has been an extensive involvement of the UN and later the EU with police reform in BiH. The EUPM mission focused more on strengthening the police capacity, which had to be support overall police reform activities. This mission was the first to actually put the issue of sustainability on the agenda, but the issue of police restructuring was an international joint venture, with the OHR as the main initiator. In 2004, there was international consensus that the underlying source of the main police problems was the existing state structure, as designed in the Dayton Peace Treaty, and the police structure derived from it.

Dayton created a strongly decentralised state, with two entities: the Republika Srpska [RS] and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of the powers are delegated to the level of the entities. The government at the state level has limited overarching competencies, for instance on issues related to drugs trade, custom problems and intelligence. The policing structures of the two entities also differ considerably. The RS has a centralised structure, where main authority lies with the Ministry of Interior at the entity level. The Federation, on the contrary, has a very complex decentralised police structure, which is the problematic result of the ‘shotgun alliance’ between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The Federation was split into ten Cantons to which some of the federation powers were delegated further. The result of this is that each Canton has its own police force headed by an autonomous Cantonal Ministry of Interior (Bose, 2006).

Several consequences flow from this current police structure. First, it does not live up to EU standards and rules, since there is no one overall authority that can be held responsible for the police process. This is one of the criteria of the first partnership negotiations with the
EU. Second, Bosnia and Herzegovina has fifteen\(^8\) separate police forces of which only three operate at state level, putting a heavy burden on the budgets, which in turn does not improve sustainability. Furthermore, as a result of the extreme decentralisation, the Cantons or the RS can decide on their own procurement. Next to this inefficient use of budgets, the current procurement policy obstructs interoperability between the police forces. This is an obstacle for the good functioning of the police. On top of this, the constitution and legislation of the Entities prevent the police from crossing the ‘Inter Entity Border Line’ (IEBL) between RS and the Federation.\(^9\) Moreover, the Federation jurisdiction is divided between the Cantons, representing the ethnic lines instead of professional or technical criteria. This implies a disproportionate division of the workload because, for example, the population densities differ. Furthermore, there is a greater risk of ethnically based political interference by the different ethnic groups as the result of the current structure because eight Cantons have an ethnical majority that affects political structures too (Wisler, 2005; Hansen, 2008a; Muehlmann, 2008).

The plan for the restructuring of the was underpinned by the EU report in 2004, which contained three minimal reform criteria all presented as non-negotiable. It was stipulated that, first, all legislative and budgetary competencies for all police matters must be vested at State level. This means that both entities will lose some of their powers to the state level. The second criterion stated that the political (nationalistic) interference with operational policing practices was no longer permitted. The last criterion stipulated that functional local police areas had to be determined by technical policing criteria, where operational command is exercised at the local level.\(^10\)

As a result, the OHR adopted the stance that the police structure needed to centralise and merge into a single structure. However, the focus on centralisation was disputable. David Bayley (2006, p. 62-63) asserts that police structures are not decisive for police behaviour. ‘Changing the table of organisation does not change attitudes and mind-sets.’ Furthermore, there are different decentralised police systems within member states of the European Union. The Dutch system, for instance, is composed of 25 autonomous police regions and one central unit, which do not hamper the democratic and good functioning of the police (ICG, 2009). This does not mean that it was not acknowledged by all parties that the state structure indeed

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\(^8\) At state level there are three forces: State Border Service (SBS), Agency for Investigation and Protection (SIPA) and Interpol NCB (National Central Bureau) Sarajevo. The Federation has ten police forces and the RS and the district Brcko each have one police force.

\(^9\) Exceptions to this are SIPA and SBS.

posed many problems, it was however debated to what extent centralisation was the only solution, a standpoint that also circulated within the EUPM (Collantes Celador, 2009).

Although many acknowledged that the existing police structures were inadequate and that they hampered police reform, it was ‘an internationally-imposed discussion’ (Muehlmann, 2008) which did not take into account the local sensitivities that such reform involved. Additionally, it was made very clear that the EU criteria underpinning the process were non-negotiable. Thus, besides being an imposed discussion, the criteria which the reforms had to live up to were also laid down. This fixation on the strengthening of the state structure was even a controversial point between the international actors. The OHR in particular took the stance that the policing structures needed to be centralised and police areas reorganised, which touched upon the most sensitive issue of Bosnian politics. As a result, although the ‘international footprint’ during the assessment process was very dominant, it was not made up of unified actors. Nevertheless, after the assessment procedures, power and responsibility had to be handed over to the Bosnian representatives.

10.4.2 The restructuring plan 2005

Local ownership adopted the guise of a Police Restructuring Commission, in which the Bosnian political, civic and police representatives discussed the conditions of the reforms further and created consensus. However, it must be remembered that the discussion was chaired and heavily influenced by the international community, such as the EU, OHR and the EUPM. Thomas Muehlmann (2008, p. 13) even concludes that ‘despite the original intention to promote local ownership, the process was in reality totally internationally-driven.’ Thus, the footprint continued to put its stamp on the planning phase, although the Bosnian politicians and parliament were the ones that had to make the decision in the end. Ownership was inevitable in this phase. It appeared to slow down the restructuring process since domestic politicians could not identify and agree with the ‘centralisation’ plans.

The most controversial issue that led to a heavy debate centred around questions of whether the police forces of RS should to be merged with the forces of the Federation and whether the newly designed police areas would cross the Inter Entity Border Line. During this discussion, the political parties of the Bosnian Serbs were at complete loggerheads with the parties of the Bosnian Muslims. In general it can be stated that the Bosnian Serbs, politicians in government and opposition, and police officers came together in their struggle to maintain their autonomy within the state of BiH. They saw the reform proposals as a direct threat to
this position, since the position of the government at the state level would be reinforced at the
cost of the autonomous position of the RS. Furthermore, they were afraid that the entity
structure, a guarantee for their current position, might be abolished if the new police regions
came into existence. Whereas the Bosnian Serbs thought of the reforms as too far-reaching, at
the other end of the spectrum the Bosnian Muslims stated that the reform proposals were too
modest. Again, their main argument had nothing to do with the operational practices, but they
advocated a more centralised state since that would strengthen their position in the country.
‘The Bosnian Croats mainly hide behind the Bosnian Serbs’ (Muehlmann 2008, p. 3). In the
end, all three main political parties pursued their own interests.

From an international perspective, particularly that of the OHR, the local politicians
positioned themselves as ‘spoilers’. The OHR tried to break the opposition by convincing the
Serb police experts of the necessity of the plan in secret talks. This approach failed and
‘soured’ the debate. After extensive bargaining, during which the High Representative
implemented a zero-tolerance policy towards the obstructing parties, agreement was reached.
The centralisation agenda disappeared after all, which was an international concession to the
Bosnian Serbs (Muehlmann, 2008). The three non-negotiable EU criteria remained on the
table: all legislative and budgetary competencies handed over to the state level, no ethnically
based political influence on police practices and police areas based on functional and
technical criteria. In October 2005, the reforms plans finally received political approval.
However, Collantes Celador (2009, p. 238) concludes that this accord was ‘an agreement to
have further discussion on the topic’, which took place during the debates on the
implementation plan.

10.4.3 The implementation plan 2005-2008

The policy of ownership was continued despite the earlier difficulties in the process. The
Directorate for Police Restructuring Implementation, in which all police agencies of BiH were
represented, was tasked to agree on a plan for implementation of the restructuring. Motivated
by the operational necessity of reforms, the directorate presented their plan in December
2006, and strikingly enough, the centralisation issue and the reorganisation of the police areas
were on the agenda again. Apparently, the international motivation for the reforms appealed
to the operational police level as well, since these dealt with improvement of policing
practices and increased sustainability. Thus, at the operational level ownership seemed to
function properly. Problems turned up again during the decision-making process of the
implementation plans, and in spite of the fact that the implementation proposal was developed with slightly more local influence, political willingness was limited.

Yet, the decision-making ended in a political stalemate in 2007 due to the politicisation of the debate. The Bosnian politicians, who were seen as the so-called ‘spoilers’ by the international community, took the opportunity to slow down the reforms again, a tactic all three of the political sides took advantage of, since all disagreed with some of the EU mandated criteria. However, it was especially the Bosnian-Serbs who most openly displayed such behaviour. They showed some spoiler behaviour by negotiating the non-negotiable criteria, by being absent during voting procedures and by using strong nationalistic rhetoric towards the internationals and their own supporting groups. One of the tactics was showing little interests in pursuing the reforms, which resulted in a passive and negligent stance. (Bassuener, Lyon & Witte, 2008; Muehlmann, 2008) Although this contributed to an increase of the dependency dilemma it could be mainly seen as a spoiler tactic. (As showed in Figure 2)

Figure 2: ownership in police reform in BiH

- The EU decided on the criteria, the framework. The filling in had to be done by locals.
- Locals had no interest in the reform criteria of the I.C. and politicians rejected most of the proposals.
- EU involvement has increased since 2007 using carrot and stick method.

- ‘Footprint’
- ‘Spoiler’
- ‘Dependency’

- Locals showed no interest in the reforms and adopted in some cases a passive and dependent stance.
- Since passivity was their own choice it did not create a base for spoilers.

This stalemate was only broken in November 2007 due to far-reaching international involvement, the imposition of deadlines for the signing of a partnership document, the EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement [SAA],¹¹ and threats of international political intervention and dismissals. In the so-called ‘Declaration of Mostar’ it was decided that the

¹¹ The SAA treaty is the first step towards EU membership and it was signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 16 June 2008.
police should be organised at state level and that it would be financed from one budget, which should be decoupled from political interference. Although the international community presented the outcome as a breakthrough in 2007, it has also been heavily criticised. First, the realisation process was criticised because the international actors tried to enforce decision-making through conditionality, thus increasing their footprint. Consequently, the concept of ownership became an empty formality. This international position gave local actors even more reason to take a non-cooperative stance, because apparently they were not serious partners or owners in the process. In this sense conditionality even empowered spoilers, since it gave them more ‘ammunition’ to challenge the position of the international agents.

Second, the outcome is debated. In the Mostar Declaration the issues of the maintenance of an independent police force for the Republica Srpska, and the establishment of the new police regions independent of a cantonal and entity border were untouched, despite the fact that they were the showpieces of the original plan. As a result, the credibility of the international organisations involved was undermined, and more specifically these harmed the overall EUPM activities. The signal that is given by the international community by not sticking to its own conditionality diminished the importance of the reform agenda and the urge to reform. Furthermore, the whole process created a politicised sphere at the operational level that made reform more difficult. Consequently, the agreement was less significant than the original proposals and, moreover, the legalisation process was fraught with problems. In March 2008 the new legislation was even rejected by the Bosnian Parliament with the result that the existing agreement was ‘stripped down’ even further. The remnants comprised the laws on the Directorate for the Coordination of the police bodies and agencies and on independent and supervisory bodies of the policing structure’. These laws are intended to improve the coordination of the police forces at state level. In addition, the Bosnian politicians agreed on the integration of the forensic and training facilities, which does not imply a merger between the police forces. The RS preserved their own independent police. Finally, in April 2008, this new legislation was accepted (Perdan 2008).

Many issues have not been addressed yet, such as the transfer of policing powers to these new agencies. Hence, these new bodies have no coordination role in the entity or the cantons. Furthermore, the problem of fragmentation continues, such as the fragmentation of telecommunications systems, databases, computer-based investigation (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). This fragmentation hampers operational practices, since the

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cooperation and information exchange between law enforcement agencies remains weak. Nonetheless, it should be noted that despite the political fight over restructuring and the slowed down reform, the International Crisis Group concluded that the police still managed to become one of the most trusted institutions, which improved their quality and functioning (International Crisis Group 2009). However, it remains to be seen whether these changes are sustainable and if so, to what extent.

10.5 Ownership: The Bermuda Triangle?

Putting in place a police restructuring process that is supportive of the overall police reform in BiH appears to be a thorny endeavour. The restructuring is necessary to improve police practices and make them sustainable. Important in this sustainability is local ownership, which is not only the desired outcome, but also the means to accomplish this objective. The general philosophy of the international community is that when local ownership is implemented as an instrument, it means that responsibility is gradually transferred to local representatives. However, the process towards establishing ownership involves many problems, which the international community has experienced in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The model of Narten on the dilemmas of the implementation of ownership offers useful insight in the police restructuring process. A vicious circle was created, in which all ‘well-intended’ reform initiatives, including the operational reforms of the EUPM, were politicised and slowed down. Following the logic of Narten’s model, this is the consequence of the international approach, the footprint. It can be argued that the international community, and in particular the OHR, started the politicisation of the restructuring by emphasising the centralisation issues. This ‘legacy’ was handed over to local parties that had to negotiate an end product that seemed to be already laid down, since these were based on operational requirements and EU conditions. These intended reforms did not tie in with local political interests; hence, they touched upon the most sensitive political area, the reform of the state structure. Local politicians were subsequently empowered, which offered them the opportunity to slow down the process by taking a dependent position. Furthermore, it gave them the chance to ‘hijack’ the reforms for their own nationalistic agendas, as a result of which the reform discussion became fully politicised and the operational criteria became of minor importance. Additionally, the outcome did not quite live up to expectations of the international participants and stakeholders and it can be debated if this forced outcome is sustainable.
Although the impact of ownership was negative for the police reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there may not be better alternatives. The overall objective of the EUPM is to achieve a self-sustaining police that operates according to the best European and international standards. This necessitates ownership, because these standards imply a change that cannot be enforced or imposed. Therefore, local ownership will be a necessity. However, it should be borne in mind that ownership implies reform in line with local conditions and the footprint should only consist of advising and training. This is the approach that the EUPM is already conducting at an operational level and the Bosnian police have managed to develop into a trusted institution. Perhaps the task of the police and the politicians in this process is not only to regain the confidence of local residents, but also to gain the trust of the international community, participators and stakeholders.

References


11. Police reform by the military in post-conflict states

Experiences of the Dutch gendarmerie since 1989

Henk Sollie

Introduction

On Monday, 25 December 2006, more than 1,000 UK troops stormed the headquarters of an Iraqi police unit in the city of Basra. According to a British Army spokesman, the police officers working in this unit committed more crimes than they solved. The raid on this police station, which accommodated the Serious Crimes Unit, was conducted for security reasons. The policemen were accused of cooperating with local death squads and of torturing and executing prisoners. ‘We’ve removed a very significant and nasty part of the police force which has been scaring people in Basra’, said Major C. Burbridge of the British Army. The incident is noteworthy because this police unit was trained and armed by the predecessors of the British soldiers who conducted the raid (De Nooy, 2007). Iraqi police and army commanders reacted by stating that the British raid was illegal and an overreaction. As a result, the incident had a negative impact on cooperation between British and Iraqi security officials.

This incident illustrates some aspects of local police reform with which foreign military (and other) institutions can be confronted. Several actors are involved in police reform, each with their own interests; secondly, reforming a police institution is not a technical, rational exercise in which input and output are determined; rather, it is an open-ended process (which can even lead to negative output); thirdly, police reform is an activity that directly affects personal lives and the whole community in a given area within which a police force operates (and vice versa) and it is therefore also a political process. Most of all, though, the incident shows that the British Army used physical force to punish Iraqi police, without the consent of local police commanders. In other words, one can argue, with Lammers (2005), that in this case an occupier used a negative sanction, i.e. physical force, to coerce the occupied to cooperate.

Lammers’ theory is used in this chapter as an analytical framework to scrutinise police reform experiences of the Dutch Army in the aftermath of a military intervention. The reason for looking at military police reform from an occupational perspective is as follows. Like in Iraq (although this was not from the outset a peace operation), military interventions are deployed, albeit usually after mediation and/or interference by international organisations, by ‘coalitions of the willing’ or global powers, in states which do not or will not accept and observe international

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1 The author would like to thank Dr. Guus Meershoek and the anonymous reviewers for their comments that helped to improve the manuscript.
2 Sources: www.timesonline.co.uk, December 26, 2006, Reduced to rubble: British troops launch Christmas raid on the ‘station of death’; www.bbc.co.uk, December 25, 2006, UK troops storm Iraqi police HQ.
3 Source: www.bbc.co.uk, December 25, 2006, UK troops storm Iraqi police HQ.
4 It is not only the British Army that has carried out police reform in Iraq; a substantial number of British police officials have also been involved.
standards of effective and good governance (Ten Cate, 2006: 256). In these so-called ‘constructive interventions’, intervention forces usually perform administrative functions and introduce a process of reform of local institutions (including security) in the particular state until authority can be handed over to the local government (i.e. local ownership). However, one can argue that since a foreign state (i.e. donor country) intervenes in another state, regardless of having received its permission or not, it transgresses the sovereignty of that particular state. Therefore, on closer inspection, these forces are occupiers (Lammers, 2005; Ten Cate, 2006). Subsequently, the local population becomes an important aspect of such an intervention since its support will be needed for long-term development. To gain this support, cooperation has to be established between the ‘ruled’ (the local government, etc.) and the ‘ruler’ (the intervention force). Hence, police reform in post-conflict states occurs, as a result of military intervention, in an occupational context. Applying Lammers’ theory of occupation to experiences of police reform can therefore afford us more insight into this complex subject.

There is an entire body of literature on police reform, most of which, however, discusses reform by civilian police (as it is they who offer most of the support to local police reform, both bilateral and multilateral) and not by the military, especially not the Dutch army. Consequently, this chapter tries to some extent to fill this gap by describing experiences of Dutch military personnel with police reform activities in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan (see the third section for the selection criteria). In total, 16 interviews were conducted with officials holding different ranks in the Koninklijke Marechaussee (Dutch gendarmerie) who had carried out police reform activities in one of the three countries mentioned. Other sources were the literature (both national and international, and scientific), parliamentary records and policy reports about police reform (including military police) in general and Dutch military police reform activities in particular. It should be emphasised that this chapter does not focus on executive policing tasks by the military.

Before going on to discuss Lammers’ theory in more detail, I briefly describe what police reform is and why Western armies like the Dutch perform these kinds of activities in the aftermath of a military intervention. The outline of the chapter is presented thereafter.

The evolution of contemporary police reform by military forces
Since the end of the Cold War, the major Western powers have transformed their search for security. International disorder became the focus of foreign policies. To counter this threat, international actors and donors help post-conflict, transitional, or other kinds of ‘failed’ states, with the creation (among other things) of effective and fair security institutions. ‘Reform or transformation of the security sector is now seen as an integral part of the transition from one-party to pluralist political systems, from centrally planned to market economies, and from armed

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5 Some of the literature used in this chapter is also based on police reform by civilian police.
6 The Koninklijke Marechaussee is a police force with a military status. Besides policing the military, it is also responsible for protecting the external borders; it guards several residences of the Dutch royal family and of the Dutch Prime Minister. Policing the civilian airport Schiphol Amsterdam is also a responsibility of the Marechaussee.
7 See for instance Hills (1998, 2001) for executive policing by the military during peace operations.
conflict to peace, and is a growing focus of international assistance’ (Hendrikson & Karkoszka, 2002, p. 175). The rationale for this assistance is the need to create minimum levels of security in these kinds of societies and to prevent local violence turning into a regional conflict (Marenin, 2005). Since the end of the 1980s this has led, to a huge increase in military interventions and foreign development activities focused on the security sector/system.

The assistance of international actors in the reform of security institutions is better known as ‘Security System Reform’ [SSR]. One component of the security system is the police as an institution. The rationale for creating or transforming the local police into effective law-enforcement institutions, operating under the rule of law and with respect for human rights is, roughly speaking, that the police are an important prerequisite for political and economic development (Bayley, 2006; Dobbins, Jones, Crane & Cole DeGrasse, 2007; Marenin, 2005; Mobekk, 2005; Neild, 2001; OECD, 2007; O’Neill, 2005). This approach is also referred to as democratic police reform, which can be defined, in accordance with Bayley (2006), as reforming local police into institutions that are accountable to the law, protect human rights, are accountable to people outside their organisation who are specifically designated and empowered to regulate police activity, and that serve the needs of individual citizens and private groups.

Perhaps too simplistically but having regard to easy reference, two types of assistance can be distinguished with respect to police reform, viz.: ‘capacity building’, the structural reform component, and ‘integrity building’, the behavioural reform component (Kaspersen, Eide & Hansen, 2004). The latter implies activities which aim to pass on democratic standards and human rights. The former is carried out by recruiting and training police officers and, for instance, by donating materials (buildings, vehicles, equipments etc.).

With the end of the Cold War, the Dutch Army changed its focus from protecting the integrity of national and allied territory (its first main task) to its second main task, namely promoting the international rule of law and international stability. In the context of supranational organisations like the UN, EU and NATO, Dutch armed forces participate in peace missions throughout the world to contribute to a safe and secure environment for the reconstruction of local societies. Consequently, the Netherlands has also contributed to so-called ‘police missions’ in which local police are reformed and the ‘rule of law’ is created or restored.

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8 A common definition of SSR is: ‘the transformation of the “security system” – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.’ The security system includes the following actors: core security actors (i.e. army, police), security management and oversight bodies (i.e. ministries), justice and law enforcement institutions (i.e. judiciary, prisons), non-statutory security forces (i.e. liberation armies, private security companies) (OECD-DAC, 2005, p. 20).


10 One could list many theories of change that are related to SSR and police reform, including: professionalisation, good governance, accountability, institutional reform, a community security approach, improving service delivery, etc.

11 The army is not the only Dutch actor involved in police missions. Since 1993 the Dutch civilian police have also contributed officials to this type of mission.
Outline

Research reports suggest, however, that police reform processes are laborious and that there are no easy or quick ‘fixes’ in such processes (Bayley, 2001, 2006; Harris, 2005; Marenin, 1999, 2005; Sollie, 2009). In fact, police reform activities can have adverse outcomes, as the incident in Basra, Iraq demonstrates. For that reason, this chapter seeks to outline the experiences of the Koninklijke Marechaussee with police reform in post-conflict, ‘occupation’ contexts. To illuminate this issue, the theory of Lammers on occupation regimes (2005) has been applied to the recent experiences of the Dutch Army with police reform in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan. Although this approach can be useful to gain an insight into this complex subject, it is important to highlight the fact that it has some limitations. First, this study focuses only on police reform. However, police reform cannot be separated from other developments in a given state, especially not from judicial and prison reforms because the reform of other agencies will affect the police and vice versa (Holm & Eide, 2000; Kaspersen et al., 2004; Marenin, 2005; Voorhoeve, 2007). Secondly, only the experiences of the Dutch Army, more specifically the Marechaussee, during three specific missions are taken into consideration; a rather limited number of cases, given the large number of police missions that have been conducted since 1989. Third, Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan differ from each other, and what is more, from other states in the world. Moreover, this chapter focuses only on police reform by the military and not by other organisations, such as police and private security companies. This means that explanations cannot be generalised without any further consideration.

The theory of Lammers (2005) is briefly considered in the following section. Subsequently the Dutch contribution to the police missions in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan are described in the third section. In the fourth section the occupational theory is applied to the Dutch police reform experiences in these three post-conflict states. The chapter concludes by stating some important dilemmas and issues concerning police reform by militaries in post-conflict states.

11.1 Occupations from an organisational sociology perspective

Police reform by the military in post-conflict states usually occurs within the framework of peace missions: i.e. peace-building and peace-enforcement missions. However, as mentioned above, this takes place in an (more or less) occupied context, i.e. a constructive occupation. The following subsections describe how an occupier can create cooperation with local elites and why police reform in post-conflict states can be regarded as a constructive occupation.

11.1.1 Occupation, means of control, and indigenous elites

An invader who occupies the territory of another populace – albeit with benevolent intent – will be confronted with the question of how to control the subjugated inhabitants. Although history
shows that occupational regimes can differ in a variety of ways, the foreign ruler generally tries to recruit the assistance of local elites who can act as intermediaries between the occupier and the rank-and-file occupied. In the foregoing and in the remainder of this chapter, occupation is defined as ‘a foreign domination brought about or sustained by the use or threat of force’ (Lammers, 2005, p. 14). Suffice it to say that *grosso modo* two types of occupation can be distinguished: an occupation as a result of a foreign conquest (a); or alien rule which gradually leads, in the perception of the local people, to an occupation (b). 

To maintain their power, alien rulers can use three means of control with regard to indigenous elites and also (directly or indirectly) to the rank-and-file in an occupied area. First, one can apply or threaten *negative sanctions*, usually of a physical (as the British did with regard to the police unit in Basra) or economic nature, although social sanctions are also possible (such as demotion). A proper balance has to be struck between the threat of and the use of force, since, on the one hand, the use of ‘naked power’ will tend to become ever more repressive, costly and even counter-effective; but on the other hand, threatening negative sanctions will only be convincing to the subdued populace if they perceive that one is willing to apply them. Second, an occupier can rule on the basis of *authority*: the ruled accept the power of the ruler as legitimate. Because rulers want to be seen as the legal authority, occupiers usually try to sell their rule as being justified; ‘in many an occupation, people indeed do recognise, in one way or another, the “right” of the invader and his “duty” to administer their (part of the) country’ (Lammers, 2003, p. 1381). However, viewing the occupier (to a greater or lesser extent) as legitimate does not automatically mean that the ruled will comply with the imposed directives. Therefore an occupier can resort to the third means of control: *positive sanctions*. By creating stability in a society (for instance, by creating professional security institutions like the police), a foreign ruler can induce a certain degree of willingness among the populace as they are relieved from fighting and its related insecurity. Likewise, this willingness can also originate from an occupation regime that turns out to be ‘less worse’ than was initially anticipated. Moreover, such a notion among the subdued people can also generate authority.

Positive sanctions can also serve another aim. Rewarding helpful elites, like politicians, managers, scientists and other prominent people, can be useful. Cooperation of local elites with
the occupier will make the occupation far more effective and efficient – especially with regard to the limited manpower and other resources of an occupier – because these elites have knowledge, know-how and skills, and moreover, authority. Two types of elites can be distinguished: loyal elites and native elites. The former consist of leaders whose authority is vested by their superiors (‘authority from above’); the authority of the latter stems from the subordinates, followers or constituents (‘authority from below’). Since loyal elites are legitimated by the occupier, it is likely that they have no or even negative authority (because they are viewed as traitors), and are therefore of limited value as a means of control. Conversely, if cooperation is established with native elites, an occupier has also obtained some of the elites’ ‘(inter-)organisational authority by means of which they can assist the usurper in overcoming resistance to his directives among the subjugated people’ (Lammers, 2003, p. 1381). However, this cooperation is a hazardous activity for elites, as is explained in the next section.

11.1.2 Constructive occupations

Military interventions since the 1990s have usually been initiated to develop or maintain the international rule of law. There are many types of international peace missions and interventions aimed at preventing or ending conflicts in which police reform is an important component. These interventions, according to Lammers (2003, 2005), are a kind of ‘sanitary’ occupation in which the improvement of the lives of the population is an important ‘ occupational aim’. In case the occupier builds and/or reforms local institutions (like the police) – or supports this process with human, financial, or material resources – one can speak of a ‘constructive occupation’.

Constructive occupations are characterised by a united effort to rebuild the country in question, a process that leads to a well-organised transfer of sovereignty and a further development of the political and social constellation of the occupied – and gradually more liberated – country (Lammers, 2005, p. 296). In doing so, unstable states have to transform into well-functioning democracies. Consequently, it is important, with regard to reform activities, that well-thought-out plans are made, but also that cooperation with indigenous elites be established; that they are aware of the intentions of the occupation and give their wholehearted support. ‘An occupation is not just about methods and policies which a foreign, alien ruler uses to control the country in a top down manner and to reform it possibly, but most of all about the bottom-up reactions: to what extent and in which way native elites want and are able to cooperate’ (Lammers, 2005, p. 296). However, cooperation with the occupier is a risky endeavour for native elites because their credibility with the population at large is at stake; they can be charged with collaboration. Such cooperating elites, mediating between the occupier and the subjugated people, find themselves on a slippery slope which often leads, in the eyes of their adherents, to their becoming a dubious, loyal elite, or worse, a servant of the alien ruler – while elites believe they are doing a superb job, serving the interests of their people in

16 Examples of such occupations are the allied occupations of Germany and Japan after the Second World War, the UN mission in East-Timor, and in intention also the reconstruction missions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.
impossible circumstances. However, history shows that loyal elites can turn into more or less native elites, although not always for idealistic reasons.\textsuperscript{17}

11.2 Dutch experiences with police reform in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan

During the last two decades, the Dutch Army conducted 17 missions, including policing missions, in which Dutch soldiers contributed to police reform activities. These missions were deployed in 12 countries on the continents of Europe, Africa, Asia and the island of Haiti (see table below). In practice, The Netherlands provided the country concerned with financial and material resources and/or with human capacity, such as trainers and experts, to guide and implement the reforms. Except for the United Nations Mission in Haiti [UNMIH] mission in Haiti,\textsuperscript{18} all police reform activities in these 17 missions were, for pragmatic reasons, carried out by the Marechaussee. The majority of activities were a) training and mentoring/monitoring local policemen, and b) advising local police officers during their daily work.

Table 1: Police reform by the Dutch Army\textsuperscript{19} (Sollie, 2009, p. 58)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Multinational Advisory Police Element (’97 - ’01) / European Community Police Assistance (’01 - ’02)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission Proxima (’03 - ’05)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (’08 – to date)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force Iraq (’03 - ’05)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force (’04 – to date) / European Union Police Mission Afghanistan (’07 – to date)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission Kinshasa (’05 - ’06)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (’06 – to date)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan (’06 – to date)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group (’89 - ‘90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission II(l) (’91 - ‘97)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{17} For example, during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945), Japanese officials helped (thereby violating orders) Indonesian nationalists because of sympathy for their cause (see Lammers, 2003).

\textsuperscript{18} During UNMIH several marines provided driving lessons and courses in preventive maintenance.

\textsuperscript{19} Some missions succeeded each other, and therefore do not differentiate much (i.e. the UNIPTF mission of the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina was succeeded by the EU mission EUPM) though other missions were operating at the same time (like ISAF and the EU Police Mission Afghanistan) and do not bear much resemblance.
A selection had to be made, from among the large number of missions in which police reform was conducted, of those missions in which, with regard to the notion of occupation, police reform activities were carried out in the aftermath of a military intervention. Consequently, this chapter examines three missions which were significant in terms of their size (personnel, donations, influence) and were recently carried out in very different countries, i.e. Bosnia [EUPM], Iraq [SFIR] and Afghanistan [ISAF]. By taking into account important, relevant and diverse cases, the experiences gained in these cases are to a certain extent representative of and relevant to forthcoming policing missions in post-conflict states. The three missions are described below, but it should be noted that the security conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina were much better (improved) than in Iraq. The situation in Afghanistan was and is even fiercer than the one in Iraq.

11.2.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina: EUPM
Three police missions were deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the WEU Task Force Mostar, the UN-mission ‘UNIPTF’ and the EU mission ‘EUPM’. The latter was launched on 1 January 2003 and is still running. EUPM focuses mainly on the higher police echelon. The 463 (reduced to 170 since 2006) unarmed EUPM police officials perform no executive policing tasks, but try through monitoring, mentoring and inspection to establish a sustainable, professional, multi-ethnic police in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operating in accordance with International and European standards.

Since the extension of the mission in 2006 and 2008, EUPM has come to focus more on the fight against organised crime. The Netherlands contributed Marechaussee officials (20 per rotation until 2006, four thereafter) as well as civilian police (respectively eight and six per rotation). The military has given a variety of training and instruction courses to agents of local police forces, the border police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency. They also trained other EUPM officials.

11.2.2 Iraq: Stabilisation Force Iraq
From 1 August 2003 until 15 March 2005, the Dutch Army contributed to the UN mandated multinational force SFIR. Their task was to maintain public order so that the political and economic reconstruction in Iraq could begin. SFIR operated explicitly in support of the transitional government; troop-contributing countries did not want to be seen as an occupying power. After the transfer of sovereignty on 28 June 2004, the SFIR mandate changed. Executive tasks were substituted mostly for SSR activities. The Netherlands participated with one Marine Battalion and their support units, which were located in the province of al-Muthanna. Later on, they were followed by Dutch land forces. A local provincial police commander had already been assigned by US forces when the Dutch mission deployed. In addition, the United

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20 With regard to the ‘important’ cases, see for instance Patton (1990, p. 169-180) on sampling politically important cases.

21 Source: www.eupm.org.

States had also started to build up a police organisation, the *Iraqi Police Services*. Dutch Marechaussee officers have continued these activities and have recruited, trained, mentored and monitored local policemen. In early 2004, with regard to the transition of sovereignty, another 41 extra Marechaussee instructors were sent to Iraq. Some of them functioned as instructors at the Iraqi police academy; others trained local Iraqi Police and Highway Police. At the end of their mission in Iraq, the activities of the Dutch Marechaussee were taken over by British police officials (Kamp, 2004; Matthijssen, 2005; Muller, 2005; Overdiek, 2004; Pranger, 2006). 23

11.2.3 Afghanistan: *International Security Assistance Force*

On December 20, 2001 the UN Security Council decided to deploy ISAF. At the outset of the mission the aim was to support the Afghan government in ensuring safety in and around the capital Kabul. Since August 2003, NATO has been responsible for ISAF and the mission area expanded in several phases until Afghanistan was covered in its entirety. An important task was SSR and this was carried out mainly through Provincial Reconstruction Teams [PRT]. The Dutch Army was responsible for the PRT in the province of Baghlan from 1 October 2004 until 1 October 2006. At first 150 Dutch soldiers were operating in Baghlan, later increased to 180. With regard to police reform, the PRT was reinforced with instructors of the Marechaussee. They took care of basic police training for about 300 local policemen and police instructors. In addition, the PRT built a guardhouse and installed several radio and relay stations for the local police force. 24

In addition, the Dutch army has deployed a *Task Force* in the southern province of Uruzgan since 31 July 2006. This force consists of roughly 1,300 soldiers and a PRT. The Marechaussee detachment within this reconstruction team had roughly the same tasks as the one in Baghlan. With regard to police reform, this involved training and advising the *Afghan Uniform Police* [AUP]. 25 The PRT provided the local police with the necessary equipment and built several police stations, checkpoints and, not least, a provincial training centre. Furthermore, the Netherlands contributed financial resources to the formation of the *Afghan Counter Narcotics Police* and has brought into being a provincial and local coordination centre in Uruzgan. 26

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25 At the outset of the mission the Marechaussee trained *Afghan National Auxiliary Police* ANAP. This militia-like 'police force' was a temporary solution of the Afghan government to temper the violence, mainly in the southern provinces. Later on, when the ANAP was abolished, the former agents of this corps were retrained to become AUP. In total, the Marechaussee trained about 1,000 ANAP agents.

11.3 Police reform by the Dutch Army in an ‘occupied’ setting

The Dutch police reform activities in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan are one element of numerous donor activities that are carried out by the international community to create stable, democratic countries. The aim of the three missions (i.e. the ‘occupational’ goal) with regard to the police is to build police organisations that operate according to the rule of law and human rights. It would be safe to say that these missions can be considered ‘constructive interventions’. This chapter only explores the Dutch experiences, but it should be noted that their activities are (to some extent) related to those of other international donors. For instance, in Uruzgan Dutch Marechaussee personnel were carrying out police reform activities in cooperation with Australian and American officials, and in Bosnia the Marechaussee people were working with police and army personnel from other European countries.

11.3.1 Capacity building: recruiting, training and advising local policemen

The Dutch Marechaussee personnel who were involved in the police reform processes assisted both in capacity building and integrity building. With regard to capacity building, they advised and trained local police officers in both strategic, organisational aspects and day-to-day, operational police work. One of the main activities Marechaussee officials conducted, essentially in Iraq and Afghanistan, was providing training in basic policing principles. Local constables were trained during two-week courses; in Afghanistan this course has recently been extended to eight weeks. Illiteracy was a very common phenomenon, so knowledge could only be passed on verbally, and local constables rarely had any police skills or knowledge. Hence, Marechaussee officials had to be very flexible and adaptable while giving training.

Before local policemen could embark on a training course, they first had to be recruited. An important component of the recruiting process was vetting: candidates and/or ex-police officers were checked to discover whether they had committed crimes, war crimes included, and other illegal activities and whether they supported the former regime (in Iraq this process was to a large extent completed by the Marechaussee’s predecessors). For the Marechaussee, vetting is an important means of controlling the police, because it allows them to decide which persons are selected to become a policeman, a chief, or even the head of police. However, it was quite difficult to screen police officers in-depth, especially the rank-and-file, because data on a person’s history was hard to find or was unavailable. Most of the time the Dutch Marechaussee staff had to rely on local people’s memories, which was tricky since such information was not always reliable and gave local people an opportunity to reinvigorate old feuds.

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27 This section is based on 16 interviews with Dutch Marechaussee personnel (of different ranks) who conducted police reform activities during EUPM, SFIR and ISAF.
The local police executives usually welcomed every form of training and advice. Hence, the Marechaussee could initiate a lot of activities on the basis of authority. Their power was accepted as legitimate (although this is difficult to assess) most likely on rational-pragmatic grounds; i.e. the directives imposed by Marechaussee officials were complied with because it was useful to do so in the course of improving working processes. However, many respondents stated that a substantial number of local police officers usually accepted advice because they wanted no trouble with the internationals. An EUPM respondent said: 'These policemen, although they were friendly, saw us as a necessary evil, because the EUPM is rather powerful for the reason that they can employ and discharge officers. For them, particularly for the older officers, it was a cause of holding out longest; eventually we [EUPM] are gone and they can continue in their own way.' Especially in Bosnia, local constables know how to deal with foreign advisers, like officials of the Marechaussee, since internationals (i.e. alien rulers) have been conducting reform activities in this country for more than a decade. Frequently they said they would follow-up the advice given, but eventually did not. Respondents stated that local officers were ‘playing a game’ with the internationals: behave in such a way as to satisfy the internationals, without much work or change. Sometimes it was even functional for local officers to do this, because every international adviser advises his counterpart (i.e. local police officer) according to his own views on police practices. Since a new adviser with new ideas shows up every year (or even six months), respondents observed a sort of ‘international-tiredness’ among local policemen; they adopted this attitude as a kind of self-defence.

With regard to the police in Iraq and Afghanistan, not only the rank-and-file lacked policing knowledge, so too did the police commanders. Even though the Marechaussee personnel wanted to perform the police reform activities in (close) cooperation with the local police, i.e. local ownership of the reform process as this was an important element of the ‘occupying’ strategy, it was usually not possible. Because local police commanders were unable to direct and organise the reform process, in reality the Marechaussee became primarily responsible for it. This placed the Marechaussee people in a difficult position, because they had to work out for themselves what was best in the given circumstances. Not an easy task given the fact that they did not know the local situation and culture and were not properly instructed for this type of work. Besides, cooperation with other international donors rarely existed, even in terms of a common reform strategy. This created situations in which every donor, like the Dutch Marechaussee in al-Muthanna and Uruzgan, worked according to its own notions of policing (like the international advisers in Bosnia), based on their national perceptions of how the police should be organised. Hence, local police forces were trained and structured in very different ways in each area of responsibility (the provinces in these cases), which created police organisations that were not entirely adjusted to the local context and needs.

11.3.2 Capacity building: donations
In addition to providing training and advice to local police officers, ranging from the rank-and-file to the highest command, the Dutch Marechaussee also invested in the local police infrastructure. During EUPM, SFIR, and ISAF, police stations were built and refurbished where that was necessary and possible. Likewise, vessels, vehicles, means of communication, and office supplies were distributed and policemen were provided with equipment. It should be noted that the donated capacity varied per mission; i.e. in Bosnia police stations were provided with modern equipment (such as computers), while checkpoints in Afghanistan were rebuilt cargo containers. This kind of capacity building can be regarded as a positive sanction; i.e. as a means of control the Marechaussee had to create or strengthen cooperation with the local police. It also proved to be a major incentive for local people to join the police because they would receive a salary, uniforms and other clothes, a weapon, food etc. An SFIR respondent said: ‘These police officers liked our reform activities very much, because they got increasingly good quality stuff. ... However, at a certain point their attitude toward us changed. We became less interesting because our mission soon would be ended just like our donations. As a consequence, they focused increasingly on the British who would follow-up our mission and had a full sack of money.’ What this citation also points out – and numerous respondents, including those from the missions in Bosnia and Afghanistan, also mentioned this – that the cooperation of the local police with the Marechaussee was rather opportunistic; they were more concerned with getting materials than learning democratic policing knowledge and skills. For instance, when donations were given to the local head of police, this person usually distributed it on the basis of favouritism, or used it for personal gain. As a consequence, at least some of the donated goods were not used in the way it was intended. This was reinforced by the fact that not only police commanders used material for their own purposes, but also the rank-and-file. For instance, they sold their clothing and other materials. When such activities came to light, the Marechaussee applied adverse sanctions like demotion or discharging policemen from the force. Nonetheless, it never stopped local policemen from doing it (again).

11.3.3 Integrity building

Integrity building – instructing local policemen that they have to operate lawfully and have to serve and protect the community – was one of the most difficult tasks the Marechaussee had to perform. It was the experience of Marechaussee officials that norms and values of local policemen were inclined towards the local, dominant culture. It takes a great deal of time and effort to transform these into acceptable (according to our common Western view) human rights standards and even then one might question what local constables would do with such knowledge. Corruption and the inappropriate use of force by the local police were a tricky problem. Despite the efforts of Marechaussee personnel to underline the importance of these democratic standards during training and via mentoring, local constables mostly operated according to their own views. In practice, it was hard to suppress this. Adverse sanctions were used when a police official was found guilty of malpractice. However, it is difficult to prove that
someone was guilty since it is not possible to monitor policemen every hour and day of the week. Furthermore, the definition of corruption and inappropriate use of force is context dependent: certain actions which were normal in Afghanistan would be unacceptable in Western countries like the Netherlands. This created a tension for the Marechaussee operatives because on the one hand they wanted to respect local culture (considering the need to maintain their cooperation), but on the other hand they could not tolerate incorrect policing (i.e. not working in accordance with the rule of law and human rights). In such situations Marechaussee officials had to act according to their own judgement whether to respect or to punish the deeds of the local constables and put cooperation at stake.

11.3.4 The local security situation

The local security situation significantly influenced the police reform process. It determines which and how reform activities can be executed. For example, in Afghanistan foot patrols with indigenous policemen were impossible for safety reasons, while in Iraq reform activities were halted temporarily due to a deadly attack on a Dutch Marechaussee official. This limited the training options for the local police forces and consequently also the quality of their operation. The violence in the two countries concerned – which is an indicator that international forces, despite their good intentions, are perceived as occupiers by (at least) a part of the populace – place the cooperation with the police under strain. Cooperation with the Dutch Marechaussee (the ‘occupier’) was in many cases a risky endeavour in the most literal sense: it was dangerous for local police in Uruzgan to wear a uniform because the Taliban would know they had collaborated with ISAF, meaning harm would be inflicted on the policeman or his family. Consequently, policemen only wanted to train and operate in and nearby their own community, which limited their usefulness.

Conclusions

Lammers’ occupational theory states that foreign rulers can only successfully occupy the territory of another populace if they are capable of creating cooperation with local people. With regard to police reform in a post-conflict state in a constructive occupation context, this would seem evident given that eventually – when the occupier leaves – local people will become responsible for their police. Different kinds of sanctions can be used to enforce this cooperation in police reform processes. The activities of the Marechaussee mainly involved the use of positive sanctions, such as distributing financial and material resources and sharing police knowledge via training and advice. When considering physical force – an ultimate remedy and counterproductive – the Dutch opted for sanctions, like demotion or discharging policemen who had not operated according to the rule of law and/or with respect for human rights.

Despite the application of several means of control, the Marechaussee experienced (to a greater or lesser extent) two problems in their cooperation with local policemen. First, local
constables acted opportunistically more often than not; they cooperated when resources could be acquired – learning democratic policing principles was of secondary importance (if it was of any importance at all). Secondly, local police officers were not open minded and did not keep their promises: they said ‘yes’, but did ‘no’. Both aspects hindered the reform process and frustrated Marechaussee officials in the performance of their tasks. In line with Lammers, local policemen cannot be expected to adopt everything that the internationals offered in their training or advice. Although cooperation can be beneficial to local policemen – they receive better materials and learn new working methods, for instance – it is also a risky endeavour for them. In the worst case one has to pay with his life and/or the lives of his family for his cooperation, regularly so in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq. Or career prospects may diminish, as was the case in Bosnia. Local policemen will therefore calculate the benefits of cooperating with the international community – in this case the Dutch Marechaussee – and the extent of their cooperation, fearing to lose credibility and becoming a collaborator in the eyes of their colleagues and other countrymen. An important aspect in considering whether to cooperate or not and to what extent, which Lammers does not mention, is the duration of the ‘occupation’. As soon as the international community withdraws its security forces from a particular post-conflict state, local policemen no longer operate under patronage but have to stand on their own two feet. Consequently, the interests (and therefore actions) of local policemen will shift, as they did in the Iraqi province al-Muthanna as the extraction date of the Dutch military drew near.

Time does not work in an occupier’s favour: Police reforms are complex, long-term processes and they only have a lasting impact if they are comprehensive (i.e. providing materials and training, creating accountability and integrity: but other organisations related to the police also have to be reformed, like the judiciary) and adjusted to the local context (Bayley, 2006; Greener, 2009; Hills, 2009). This takes time. But the longer foreign rulers remain, the more likely they are to generate conflict, resistance and even insurgency (Dobbins et al., 2007; Lammers, 2005). With the passage of time, foreign actors are more likely to be seen as occupiers by the local population, which consequently causes a decrease in the legitimacy of intervening powers. With regard to police reform, internationals lose the authority needed to drive the reform process. Other sanctions have to be applied to compensate for this loss. There is a risk that, like the British in Basra, one will end up in a negative spiral in which adverse sanctions have increasingly to be used to maintain control of the local police. This jeopardises the cooperation with the local police and, as a consequence, the reform process itself.

Some important dilemmas concerning police reform by militaries in post-conflict states have been highlighted. The Dutch military experiences with police reform in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan, however, point out more important issues. First, thanks to a lack of coordination and (related to that) the absence of a common police reform strategy, donors operate according to their own view of how the police should operate. Secondly, military officials had to make strategic reform decisions even though they lacked sufficient knowledge of the police and were not trained to do so. Third, military bodies work according to (usually short-term) mission and rotation dates, while police reforms are long-term, open-ended processes that involve joining up
strategies and actions at a range of different levels, including the political one. All things considered, it is legitimate to question whether international military institutions, and not (as in other police reform processes) the civilian police, should lead police reform in post-conflict, ‘occupation’ contexts.

References


12. Epilogue

Concluding notes on the convergence between military and police roles

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The last decade has seen a fundamental reorientation in security, laying bare two opposing narratives about the way we wish to define and organise it. On the one hand, we have witnessed the emergence of the post-modernist narrative, which builds on the thesis that nation states gradually lose control over one of their prime pillars, as their strings of sovereignty are pulled by the forces of globalisation, computerisation, and individualisation. Such an environment places security providers in a different context, changing their roles and expectations. Both the positions of actors who are expected to contribute to state authority as well as the profiles of communities they should serve and protect are subject to significant shifts.

Who is the enemy for the contemporary military forces? Who or what should be the target of police services in societies which demand an all-in protection for a variety of risks? The strategic and intelligence requirements of these public security forces are being profoundly influenced by this risk orientation. This forces them into a direction where they become institutions with an insatiable desire for data on a vast scale of activities and events. This quiet evolution is supposed to reduce fear and anxiety in fragile and turbulent environments and ultimately should restore the trust in the relevant government authorities. Uncertainty about future developments and positions has become an essential part of post-modern discourses focusing on the world wide web of material, physical, economic and virtual connections in which the state monopoly over the provision of security is falling prey to fragmentation, privatisation and lateralisation of security.

In this perspective, police and military forces find themselves in a situation in which they have to deal with a great diversity of security risks and seek to define their role and task in a transnational world which is governed by a knot of multilateral organisations. The postmodern narrative predicts security organisations who have lost their traditional ties with the nation states and which now seek the connection with a transnational society which is marked by a wide differentiation of security deficits, ranging from straightforward local crimes and public order issues to the control of organised crime and counter-insurgency in territories beyond the realms of the state. Within this narrative, the role of the state as main security provider is increasingly being questioned as debates on the definition of key policing tasks and the police’s capability to meet the demands of the public have been reopened. Financial restraints compel administrations to stretch police budgets and to increase its efficiency. State security forces, such as the police and customs, are therefore increasingly teaming up in a public security domain that is characterised by partnerships and networks between and among state and non-state security actors. Along a similar line of thought, in a postmodern narrative, defence forces face challenges that have forced them to go beyond their original remit, and to develop themselves to address the full spectrum of violence as well as provide a full continuum between prevention and post-conflict stabilisation. Besides winning wars, contemporary armies are increasingly expected to be able to support civilian crisis management activities, such as enabling the return of refugees, employing counter-terrorism activities, supporting elections, developing and maintaining the infrastructure, policing war-torn societies, escorting children on field trips or to their schools etc. The modern Janus-faced armies are therefore compelled to broaden their focus, re-train
their soldiers and co-operate with NGOs, development organisations and state security actors such as the police, the border police, customs, public prosecutors and correctional services on both the international and national level in conflict-ridden societies.

Despite the popularity of theorists such as Castells, Rhodes, Held and others, who have predicted the onset of a networked society and a plural and hybrid style of security governance, living in a risk society does not necessarily lead to fundamental shifts and changing positions, including the authority by the state through the provision of security. This is a narrative that views the growing private security market as complementary instead of competing with the public provision of security. It is also a view, held by academics such as Loader and Walker, that claims the state still has the best qualities to ensure that collective security is distributed across the community. It is a point of view that explains why state authorities and the techno-industrial players are co-operators rather than competitors in a market that is always seeking new challenges, supported by each and every incident which occurs. In an anxiety society which seeks to minimise risks and dangers, the state can find ample space for governance through security. Different levels of government all seem to play their part in this governance through security: the nation state with its ministries, national defence and police forces, intelligence agencies, prosecutorial authorities, judiciary and penitentiaries. But also provinces, municipalities and increasingly international levels of government play their part in the provision of security.

The desire for security, in this sense, seems insatiable, which also builds on the perpetual chain of links between crisis, security deficit and restoration of that deficit by means of new policy instruments. The viability of this narrative has been demonstrated in several chapters throughout this volume. The values attributed to the state are mirrored in contemporary peace-building and security sector reform efforts. Although non-state actors are a focal point in most definitions of security sector reform, in practice, these activities tend to focus only on state actors. Despite the fact that the idea of the state as best suited medium for the equal and fair distribution of security is increasingly being contested by scholars such as Bruce Baker, the state centred approach towards security is anchored in the international community’s approach towards peace and related stability operations. Both narratives have a strong appeal and find their way into different realities. On the one hand, we witness the release of law enforcement control in geographical fringes, and the delegation of security to private providers and civil vigilantes. On the other hand, however, constabulary forces regain control in crime zones and are endowed with exceptional powers by their authorities.

Various contributions in this book have shown that – both historically and currently – it is hard to distil a dominant security discourse. Nevertheless, by analysing different strands of the military and the police sector, the authors have identified several interlinking developments. Significant is the growing extra-territorialisation of security: in a line of thought which seeks to prevent insecurity from spilling over into other countries or areas, countries with financial, material, professional, political and human resource capacity have gradually adopted the role of preventive security agents. Security sector reform, for instance, which can be seen as a comprehensive though inherently ambiguous package of instruments, is generally regarded as a tool-box for bolstering the security task of local authorities and is often used as a leverage to prompt these local authorities to address the security interests of donors and push for democratic reforms.
Important is also the philosophy which embraces the comprehensive approach to security. This integrated strategy embodies interagency co-operation between public and private security actors, as well as between internal and external security agents, and lays serious emphasis on the interconnection of phases between, for instance, the restoration of order to post-conflict institution-building. The extraterritorial, preventative (pre-emptive), multi-agency and comprehensive security perspective has become interwoven in the security strategies of nation states as well as multilateral organisations with a security mandate, in particular the UN and NATO, but also the EU, the Council of Europe and the OECD. The European Union, for instance, adopted a Security Strategy in 2003 which harbours these new principles, and at the same time, through its external relations policy, for instance in the context of the Transatlantic Dialogue or the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Union seeks to export police and judicial reform as well as a human rights philosophy.

If there is one aspect which is illustrated vividly in this collection it is that the blurring of boundaries between police and military is not new. The blurring of boundaries is inherent in the fault-lines of history, the colossal changes brought about by colonisation, the seismic shifts caused by technological innovation, and the tidal drifts of global and regional conflict. The disappearance of the organisational and cultural borders between police and military is perhaps because there never were any substantial differences between armed and civilian forces. Both are bestowed with the monopoly of violence, albeit with different tasks, powers and resources. In essence, however, one finds that core values of the police and military organisations are nearly identical: the masculinity, the hierarchy, the order and discipline, the internal loyalty, the closed ranks. Several contributions in this book argue that the dividing line between the military and civilian forces can be seen as a human construct that serves specific purposes, including political, and depends on the time and place in which they are active. Both the police and the military can be situated on a civil-military scale which is influenced by, amongst other things, political priorities and preferences, local conditions and institutional culture. As the military can adopt a constabulary role, so can the police adopt a paramilitary role.
It is a commonly held belief that societies that claim to be ruled by democratic principles prefer to secure peace and public order by an institutional means of coercion that is controlled by a civil rather than a military authority. From that perspective, categorisations like ‘military’ or ‘police’ remain relevant and the blurring of these labels will call into question again the issue of civilian control.

What we presently are witnessing is – besides being a reorientation in terms of budget and policy - a response to an era in which the lines between the two organisations were much sharper, an era in which the philosophy of community policing stood out strongly against aggressive military intervention. Paradoxically, in times when security dangers acquire a more asymmetrical and unpredictable character, police forces use harsher measures against the population whilst the military – at least when we have the pictures of bike-patrolling soldiers in Afghanistan in mind – try to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the population, not least by receiving cultural awareness training before they go on mission. Does this ‘paradox’ – if it can really be shown to exist – entail that defence and police forces are becoming more ambiguous and hybrid in their roles? Are the military forces turning into peacekeepers and the police officers into urban warriors? Does the creation of paramilitary police units demonstrate a more martial approach? These may merely be external phenomena but at the same time they may signs of deeper dimensions.

If the boundaries between police and military are blurring, as the growing constabularisation of the military seems to indicate, this may be due to the shift in the external environment of these forces and services. On the one hand, an upsurge of asymmetric conflicts such as counter-insurgency can be discerned, which requires fighting and policing at the same time. On the other hand, new paradigms such as the Human Security Doctrine and the Responsibility to Protect have redefined security priorities from protection of the homeland to the promotion of the international rule of law and international stability. Much of this falls into line with the growing importance of preventive security, such as the establishment of a ‘well-governed ring of friends’ around the European Union, meaning that Europe as a region should be protected against the hangover from social, cultural and economic
deprivation, fragile states, and ethnic and religious strife in adjacent regions. Good governance by exportation of police and security reform has become a well-trodden path in the realisation of the convergence of values, not merely horizontally between police and military, but also vertically between coloniser and colonised, between the occupier and the occupied, and between donor and recipient. Convergence processes, whether or not inter-sectoral in nature, are often based on the need to mimic strategies and to copy-cat organisational models. From a survivalist point of view, however, military and police must ensure that their tasks, powers and resources remain distinctly different; a security amalgam may undermine their reason for existence. Hence, more research could and should be undertaken into the tension between convergence and competition of values and organisational models of police and military.

Budgetary constraints and economic forces form a dimension mentioned by some of the authors, but we have not identified the extent to which the strategic reorientation by police and military forces, both at national and international levels, has been dictated by the decreasing national budgets for defence. A preliminary assessment is that budgets for intelligence and surveillance (the latter particularly through technological devices) are still going up, despite the economic crisis, whilst budgets for human resources are going down. If this can be demonstrated to be true, it means that nation states will become more wary – as Janssens has argued in this volume – of sending expensive, well-trained people to remote high-risk areas with little security profit. A research avenue for the near future would be how economic variables influence the orientation of security forces. Questions such as the balance of expenditure between human and technological resources will be important: Will it be the case in the near future that only countries that can provide large-scale, low-wage security professionals can participate in expeditionary forces? To what extent will the reorientation of police and military forces entail a return to traditional core tasks (e.g. national defence for army forces) whilst delegating or ‘off-shoring’ security tasks to private providers, like private military companies? Will the distribution of security still be an equitable service delivered to all citizens, or will it become a privilege for the happy few that can afford to buy security, like the Amsterdam ‘burghers’ did in the past, as Last tells us in his chapter?

Much of the organisational and cultural blurring between police and military stems from common, i.e. international, training modules. Both security organisations have an important responsibility in extraterritorial peace-building missions, in which their assistance is sought in several ways, for instance in the control of crime and corruption. The training of these security officials is based on toolboxes derived from experience and best practices in Security Sector Reform, Responsibility to Protect or the Comprehensive Approach. Empirical research is required to analyse the extent to which international training vocabularies contribute to blurred security semantics. And how do the trainers (for instance of police in Afghanistan or Iraq) train the trainers, in other words, how is training used as a vehicle for the transportation of ‘blurred’ organisational and cultural values? On a more fundamental level, more research is needed to understand the nature of the blurring boundaries: Which boundaries are being blurred? Does it happen intentionally or unintentionally and why? What are the push and pull factors, and more importantly, what are the consequences? Does the blurring of boundaries between security actors support or undermine the establishment of the rule of law?
Omitted from this book – certainly not deliberately but more by default – is the discourse relating to aspects of ethics, integrity and accountability. An important question that comes to the fore is that, if it is the case that police and military are in the process of amalgamation, then how, by whom and by which set of rules are they to be managed, supervised and controlled? The challenges that are brought along by urban warfare or policing post-conflict cities, for instance, may be formidable in that they demand the security professional to use coercive powers in a situation which may be legally void. The judiciary and parliamentary oversight authorities will have a tough job in defining what is wrong and what is right in potentially ambiguous contexts. Codes of conduct are essential, but may have a limited application in situations that reach far beyond traditional warfare. Hence, research is required into strands such as whether the expansion of expeditionary forces entails the need for a global constabulary ethic, or whether we should leave room for differentiation and situational logic. Do expeditionary responsibilities bring with them the need for a reconsideration of ethical values, including the need for impartiality and the immunity to political influence? Does the reliance on technology mean that policing implies the use of the remote control button, by which the much cherished ‘winning hearts and minds’ slogan turns into a hollow phrase?